State v. Quarles, 19720

Decision Date06 November 1973
Docket NumberNo. 19720,19720
Citation200 S.E.2d 384,261 S.C. 413
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. James QUARLES, Appellant.

Dallas D. Ball, Columbia, for appellant.

Solicitor Phillip K. Wingard, Lexington, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

James Quarles (the appellant), Clayton Pack and Richard Wright were indicted for the offenses of housebreaking and grand larceny of the personal property of Patricia Smith. The indictment charged that the offenses occurred on September 4, 1972. The house from which the personal property was taken was not occupied and the offenses were not discovered until September 5, 1972. Pack and Clayton entered guilty pleas and testified on behalf of the State. Quarles pled not guilty and was tried and convicted by a jury.

Jack testified that he, Quarles and Wright broke into the house and took personal property therefrom on September 4, 1972. Wright testified to the same effect but was not certain about the date. Quarles did not testify. David Plyler, a witness for Quarles, gave testimony which warranted the conclusion that the offenses actually occurred on August 29, 1972. At the close of all the evidence the State was permitted to amend the indictment to allege that the crimes occurred 'on or about' September 4, 1972, in order to conform with the evidence. Quarles has appealed, alleging error on the part of the trial judge (1) in permitting the amendment to the indictment, (2) in failing to direct a verdict because the State failed to prove ownership of the house entered and the property stolen, and (3) in failing to grant a new trial because of prejudicial testimony.

In this State there is a statute, similar to that in other states, permitting amendments to indictments. South Carolina Code § 17--410 provides:

'Amendments of indictments.--If (a) there be any defect in form in any indictments or (b) on the trial of any case there shall appear to be any variance between the allegations of the indictment and the evidence offered in proof thereof, the court before which the trial shall be had may amend the indictment (according to the proof, if the amendment be because of a variance) if such amendment does not change the nature of the offence charged. After such amendment the trial shall proceed in all respects and with the same consequences as if the indictment had originally been returned as so amended, unless such amendment shall operate as a surprise to the defendant, in which case the defendant shall be entitled upon demand, to a continuance of the cause.'

It has generally been held in those jurisdictions having a permissive statute that where time is not of the essence of the crime, an erroneous or defective allegation as to the time of the commission of the offense is a matter of form which may be corrected. Annot., 14 A.L.R. (3d) 1297 (1967); 41 Am.Jur. (2d) Indictments and Informations § 194 (1968); 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 242 (1944). It has also been stated that such provisions 'have been given a liberal construction so as to carry out their purpose of simplifying procedure and furthering the ends of justice by eliminating technicalities.' 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 230 (1944). A review of our decisions that have touched upon the subject indicates that this generalization fairly represents the view of this Court.

Critical determinations to be made by a court when confronted with the issue of amending the date alleged in an indictment is always whether the amendment alters the nature of the offense charged and surprises the accused, preventing a fair trial. An examination of the statutory definition of housebreaking and the common law definition of larceny compels the conclusion that the amendment allowed in this instance did not change the nature of the offenses originally alleged, for in neither is time of the essence. As was stated in State v. Rush, 129 S.C. 43, 123 S.E. 765 (1924):

'Since time was not of the essence of the offense charged, there was no necessity for the change in the form of the indictment . . .. But, since the amendment did not change the nature...

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10 cases
  • State v. Tumbleston
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 27 Noviembre 2007
    ...S.C.Code Ann. § 17-19-20 (2003); see also State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 27, 207 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1974); State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 417, 200 S.E.2d 384, 386 (1973); State v. Rutledge, 232 S.C. 223, 225, 101 S.E.2d 289, 292 (1957). Therefore, an indictment passes legal muster when it cha......
  • State v. Means
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 6 Febrero 2006
    ...drugs from defendant where original indictment identified the officer only as an "undercover SLED agent"); State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 416-17, 200 S.E.2d 384, 385-86 (1973) (indictment may be amended to state the correct time or date of the alleged crime when time or date is not of the ......
  • State v. Wade
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 18 Octubre 1989
    ...offense, or is made part of the description of it." See also State v. Rutledge, 232 S.C. 223, 101 S.E.2d 289 (1957); State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 200 S.E.2d 384 (1973); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 Moreover, we have in the past specifically upheld the validity of an indic......
  • State v. Kennedy
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 8 Junio 1999
    ...315 Or. 103, 843 P.2d 424, 428-31 (1992); Commonwealth v. Lobel, 294 Pa.Super. 550, 440 A.2d 602, 607 (1982); State v. Quarles, 261 S.C. 413, 200 S.E.2d 384, 385-86 (1973); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 876, 183 S.E. 254, 255-56 ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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