State v. Quinn
| Decision Date | 11 December 1909 |
| Citation | 105 P. 818,56 Wash. 295 |
| Parties | STATE v. QUINN. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, Snohomish County; W. W. Black, Judge.
Richard Quinn was convicted of murder in the first degree, and he appeals. Affirmed.
E. C. Dailey, for appellant.
Ralph C. Bell and Robert Mulvihill, for respondent.
The appellant was convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree, and brings this case here upon several assignments of error, the decision of which will require no particular statement of the facts. It is first urged that appellant was not served with a copy of the information, thus being denied the protection of the Bill of Rights, in that he has not been informed of the nature and cause of the accusation made against him. Section 22, art. 1, of the state Constitution provides that every person accused of crime shall have the right 'to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,' etc. It is provided (section 2131, Pierce's Code; Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 6879) that, 'as soon as may be after the filing of the information for a capital crime, the party charged shall be served with a copy thereof,' etc. So far as the Constitution is concerned, it is enough to say that it goes no further than to give the right to demand a copy, a privilege that was not exercised in this case; and, under an almost unbroken line of authority it is held that the statute is not jurisdictional. No greater weight is attached to it than to the Constitution itself. Each grants a privilege which may be waived. In this case defendant was regularly arraigned; asked for time to plead was granted five days, within which he demurred to the information. Whereupon he entered a plea as follows 'Comes now the defendant, and for answer to the charge set forth in the information (1) hereby enters his plea of not guilty; (2) that at the time charged in the information, and for a long time prior thereto, this defendant was insane and mentally irresponsible; (3) that after said time charged in the information, and for a long time prior thereto, up to and including the present time, the said defendant is insane and mentally irresponsible.' His conduct was a waiver of formal service of a copy of the information. The purpose of the law is to give notice of the crime charged. At common law this was not given until arraignment, but neither the Constitution nor the statute contemplates that a trial shall go for naught if a defendant, being informed of the crime charged, voluntarily pleads without service of a written copy of the charge. The arraignment has performed the office of the law, and, no request being made for a copy of the information, the statutory right must be deemed to be waived. The authorities upon this phase of the case are of one accord, and are collected in 10 Enc. Pl. & Pr. p. 471.
After appellant had announced himself ready for trial, and while a jury was being impaneled, appellant through his attorney withdrew his plea of insanity, the record reciting that: 'Defendant in open court withdraws plea of insanity.' After the jury had been impaneled and sworn to try the case, and a witness had been called and sworn, the record recites: 'Defendant now objects to proceeding with the trial, because no plea has been entered since the withdrawal of the plea of insanity.' This objection was overruled. In this the court did not err. The record showing that appellant demurred on the ground that the information did not state facts sufficient to constitute a crime, and, having announced himself ready for trial, this court will presume that a plea had been entered, if the record did not show, as we think it does, an affirmative plea. State v. Straub, 16 Wash. 111, 47 P. 227. If we understand the position of appellant, the point is made that the first plea was under Laws 1907, p. 33, c. 30, § 2, and that a withdrawal of the plea of insanity withdrew all other pleas. It will be noticed that the statute by its express terms makes allowance for the plea of insanity without affecting other pleas. It says of the plea of insanity that it may be entered 'in addition to the plea or pleas required or permitted by other laws than this.' The pleas then being severable, the withdrawal of the one left the other, and it was the duty of the court to proceed with the trial.
Testimony of a dying declaration was received by the court. In laying the premise for this the following question and answer were allowed by the court, over the objection of appellant: Ordinarily expressions of bare opinion are not allowed, but in receiving declarations of this character, where death follows the wound, they are by that fact deemed to be supported and supplemented, and are given the character of positive evidence. Necessity has worked an exception to the general rule in this particular. The deceased had received a mortal wound, and had been informed by the attending physician, who described her physical condition to the jury, that she must die. The statement was then drawn by the prosecuting attorney, and read in her presence and assented to by her, and was signed by her in the presence of witnesses. It will thus be seen that, irrespective of the testimony complained of, there was ample foundation for the reception of the declaration. The ruling of the court in admitting the declaration was well within the rule of State v. Power, 24 Wash. 34, 63 P. 1112, 63 L. R. A. 902, and State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 P. 251.
The next error assigned is that a gun and some cartridges were admitted, upon the testimony of an officer who had them in possession, and who was allowed to state over objection that another had told him that it was the gun and cartridges belonging to the defendant. It is urged that this was hearsay. Standing alone it would clearly be so. But the statute cannot state its case in one breath, nor prove it by one witness. The party who gave the gun and cartridges to the officer was put upon the stand, and testified that defendant handed her the gun and cartridges shortly after the shooting, and that she had delivered them to the officer. The testimony was proper, and tended to identify the exhibits. This assignment is without merit for another reason: The appellant when upon the witness stand identified the gun as his own.
It is also complained that the state was allowed to indorse the names of certain witnesses upon the information during the progress of the trial. The last expression of the court on this subject will be found in the case of State v. Le Pitre, 103 P. 27, wherein the previous decisions of this court were collected. In that case we undertook...
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State v. Powell
...606 P.2d 263 (1980) (citing among others Americk, State v. Guerzon, 23 Wash.2d 242, 160 P.2d 603 (1945), Spangler, and State v. Quinn, 56 Wash. 295, 105 P. 818 (1909)). Evidence of previous disputes or quarrels between the accused and the deceased is generally admissible in murder cases, pa......
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State v. Brown
...Reppin v. State (Colo.) 34 P. 2d 71; Garcia v. State (Tex.) 237 S.W. 279; State v. Fitzgerald, 330 Mo. 407, 32 S.E. 1113; State v. Quinn, 56 Wash. 295, 105 P. 818; Brashear v. Commonwealth, 275 Ky. 356; 121 718; People v. Hoyt, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262; State v. Smith, 221 N.......
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State v. Lane
...72 Wash. 154, 129 P. 1100; or the right to demand a copy of the charge against him, which may be waived, Art. I, § 22; State v. Quinn, 56 Wash. 295, 105 P. 818. But the unitalicized portion of this constitutional provision does not stand alone, and must not be read as if it did. The italici......
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State v. Parr
...this point: State v. Gates, 28 Wash. 689, 69 P. 385 (1902); State v. Churchill, 52 Wash. 210, 100 P. 309 (1909); State v. Quinn, 56 Wash. 295, 105 P. 818 (1909); State v. Spangler, 92 Wash. 636, 159 P. 810 (1916); State v. Hoyer, 105 Wash. 160, 177 P. 683 (1919); State v. Hunter, 183 Wash. ......