State v. Quintanilla, 3D18-1483
| Decision Date | 10 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D18-1483,3D18-1483 |
| Parties | The State of Florida, Appellant, v. Jose Quintanilla, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
An appeal from a non-final order the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Milton Hirsch, Judge.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Gabrielle Raemy Charest-Turken, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Special Assistant Public Defender, and Gabrielle McCabe and Manon Ferdani, Certified Legal Interns, for appellee.
Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, and MILLER, JJ.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court's order suppressing evidence of Jose Quintanilla's blood alcohol analysis garnered pursuant to a compulsory blood draw under section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2019). The State contends the trial court erroneously elevated the standard of proof required to conduct a compelled blood draw under the Fourth Amendment and improvidently imported into the blood draw statute an additional element of driver fault. For the following reasons, we reverse.
Shortly before midnight on December 2, 2010, appellee, Jose Quintanilla, was operating a chassis cab truck with an attached cargo box, in rural, unincorporated Miami-Dade County. While negotiating a left-hand turn at a four-way intersection governed by a traffic control signal, Quintanilla collided with a significantly smaller sedan. The driver of the sedan was rendered unconscious and would later succumb to injuries suffered in the crash. Her passenger was ejected from the vehicle and was seriously injured.
Lieutenant Henry Suarez arrived first to the crash scene. He and two other responding officers detected the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Quintanilla's breath. Additionally, they noticed Quintanilla appeared unnaturally "limber" and "fluid," and his eyes were "bloodshot" and "watery." Hence, they contacted Officer Mark Slimak, a twenty-one-year veteran of theMiami-Dade Police Department specially trained in alcohol-related investigations, to conduct a further probe.
Slimak arrived shortly thereafter and was briefed by Suarez and the other officers on their observations regarding Quintanilla's odor, demeanor, and appearance. He was also informed that Quintanilla was the driver of the truck involved in the crash. Slimak scrutinized the scene of the accident and ascertained from paramedics on the scene the critical nature of the injuries sustained by the occupants of the sedan.1
Slimak attempted to interview Quintanilla, however, a language barrier prevented meaningful discourse. Nonetheless, Quintanilla confirmed he was the driver. At that time, Slimak, himself, detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Quintanilla's breath and observed that Quintanilla's eyes were bloodshot and watery. As paramedics prepared to transport Quintanilla to a medical facility for accident-related injuries, Slimak ordered the treating paramedic to perform a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw on Quintanilla, pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes.
The State ultimately charged Quintanilla with one count of driving under the influence ("DUI") manslaughter, in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)(3), FloridaStatutes, and one count of driving under the influence resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes. Thereafter, Quintanilla sought suppression of the blood alcohol test results, contending the warrantless, compelled withdrawal of blood violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Quintanilla asserted Slimak lacked probable cause to believe Quintanilla was driving under the influence or that he caused the accident. The lower tribunal conducted an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the suppression motion.
At the hearing, Slimak testified as to Quintanilla's odor of alcoholic beverage, unsteady gait, and bloodshot, watery eyes. Slimak explained that he was made aware of the extent of the injuries of those involved in the crash. He then offered his observations regarding the scene:
[T]his particular intersection is a four-way intersection. It's governed by a traffic light in all directions. Upon my arrival the box truck was, the final resting place was in a southwesterly direction, or facing south as if it was making a left-hand-turn in the southbound direction onto 147 Avenue. The other vehicle was in an eastbound direction in the intersection on the west side.
He also stated that he observed physical damage on the front right side of the box truck and that "the front end of [the decedent's vehicle] . . . had very extensive damage, almost throughout the whole body of the vehicle." Slimak ultimately opined that Quintanilla "had violated the right of way of the [decedent's] vehicletraveling in an eastbound direction, and that [Quintanilla] appeared to be impaired . . ."2 Upon additional questioning, Slimak reiterated, "the driver of the truck impeded the other vehicle's right of way, and that driver appeared impaired."
The lower tribunal granted suppression, finding Slimak lacked probable cause sufficient to compel a blood draw. In its order, the trial court acknowledged that Slimak had probable cause to believe Quintanilla was operating a motor vehicle involved in a crash while under the influence of alcoholic beverages and that Slimak was aware the sedan occupants had suffered serious bodily injuries in the accident. The court further specified that the State had made a sufficient showing of exigent circumstances. However, it posited that an expert determination of driver fault was an element of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, and proceeded to conclude that Slimak's qualifications were insufficient to endow him with the proficiency required to testify as an expert in traffic accident investigations.3 In disqualifying Slimak's testimony regarding driver fault, the trial court relied upon section 90.702, FloridaStatutes, Daubert,4 and Frye,5 stating: Accordingly, it found that probable cause of impairment, coupled with probable cause that the motor vehicle driven by the impaired individual was involved in a crash resulting in death or serious bodily injury, was insufficient to avoid suppression. This appeal ensued.
In reviewing a suppression order, "[w]e defer to a trial court's findings of fact as long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but we review de novo a trial court's application of the law to the historical facts." Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 414 (Fla. 2010) (citing Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007)).
As a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw implicates both constitutional and statutory issues, we bifurcate our analysis accordingly.6
"A blood draw conducted at the direction of the police [constitutes] a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Liles, 191 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); State v. Geiss, 70 So. 3d 642, 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)); see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) () (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1616, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985)).
Both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution guarantee that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."7 Amend. IV, U.S. Const.; see Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno, 500U.S. 248, 250, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). "The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable." Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990)).
" Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970). "'Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed,' and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be searched." Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).
"As a general rule, [the Court] has also required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a warrant before a search is made." Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51, 90 S. Ct. at 1981. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per seunreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S....
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