State v. Liles

• Decision Date: 08 April 2016
• Docket Number: Nos. 5D14–1654,5D15–405.,s. 5D14–1654
• Citation: 191 So.3d 484
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross–Appellee, v. Wade F. LILES, Appellee/Cross–Appellant. State of Florida, Appellant, v. John Nathan Willis, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

191 So.3d 484

STATE of Florida, Appellant/Cross–Appellee,

v.Wade F. LILES, Appellee/Cross–Appellant.

State of Florida, Appellant,

v.John Nathan Willis, Appellee.

Nos. 5D14–1654

5D15–405.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

April 8, 2016.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied May 25, 2016.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant/Cross–Appellee.

William R. Ponall and Michael J. Snure, of Snure & Ponall, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellee/Cross–Appellant.

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Jeri Delgado, Nancy Ryan and

Anne Moorman Reeves, Assistant Public Defenders, Daytona Beach, and Aaron D. Delgado, of Damore, Delgado, Romanik & Rawlins, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

ORFINGER

, J.

The State of Florida appeals two orders suppressing the results of warrantless blood draws taken from Wade F. Liles and John Nathan Willis during drunk driving investigations involving separate traffic crash fatalities.¹ In both cases, the trial courts found that, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Missouri v. McNeely, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013)

, the blood draw results were inadmissible because the blood was obtained without a warrant, consent, or any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. The State argues that section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), is a general exception to the warrant requirement that applies even after McNeely. We disagree, but reverse based on the good-faith exception set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

Wade Liles and John Willis were involved in separate fatal traffic crashes in 2011 and 2012. While investigating these traffic fatalities, the investigating officers saw indications that Liles and Willis may have been under the influence of alcohol when the crashes occurred and requested blood draws pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011)

. Both Liles and Willis initially refused. However, they ultimately complied with the warrantless blood draws after being told that law enforcement would forcibly take their blood, if necessary. After Liles and Willis were arrested and charged, both filed motions to suppress the results of the warrantless blood draws. Both trial courts granted the motions, finding that McNeely either required a warrant or exigent circumstances, and that the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.

The review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is a mixed question of law and fact that uses a two-step approach. We defer to the trial court's findings of fact, provided that they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but review de novo a trial court's application of law to the historical facts. E.g., Delhall v. State, 95 So.3d 134, 150 (Fla.2012)

; Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 605 (Fla.2001) ; Ferguson v. State, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D62, D62, 2015 WL 9491865 (Fla. 5th DCA Dec. 31, 2015).

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Amend. IV, U.S. Const

. A blood draw conducted at the direction of the police is a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) ; State v. Geiss, 70 So.3d 642, 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). To comply with the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant or consent for a blood draw, or there must be some other exception to the warrant requirement. See

Kilburn v. State, 54 So.3d 625, 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). When, as here, no warrant is obtained, “[t]he state has the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Id. To satisfy that burden, the State argues that the warrantless searches in these cases were reasonable under either of two exceptions: consent or exigent circumstances.

Consent

A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few well-established exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)

. One of the well-established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593–94, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946). The State argues that the warrantless blood draws here should be upheld under the consent exception to the warrant requirement.

The State concedes that Liles and Willis did not give actual consent to the blood draws. However, it argues that both blood samples were properly drawn on the authority found in section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011)

, the mandatory blood-draw provision of Florida's implied consent statutory scheme,² which provides as follows:

If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substances, or any controlled substances has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being, a law enforcement officer shall require the person driving or in actual physical control of the motor vehicle to submit to a test of the person's blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof or the presence of chemical substances as set forth in s. 877.111 or any substance controlled under chapter 893. The law enforcement officer may use reasonable force if necessary to require such person to submit to the administration of the blood test. The blood test shall be performed in a reasonable manner. Notwithstanding s. 316.1932

, the testing required by this paragraph need not be incidental to a lawful arrest of the person.

In Williams v. State, 167 So.3d 483, 490–91 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)

, review granted, No. SC15–1417, 2015 WL 9594290 (Fla. Dec. 30, 2015), this Court recognized that statutory implied consent was not equivalent to Fourth Amendment consent, explaining that valid consent has long been recognized as a “jealously and carefully drawn” exception to the warrant requirement and for a search based upon consent to be valid, it must be freely and voluntarily given and cannot be the product of coercion. Further, statutory implied consent laws do “not constitute a per se exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. at 491 ; see also State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 237 (S.D.2014)

(indicating that implied-consent statute did not constitute stand-alone exception to warrant requirement). Based on Williams, even if we agree with the State that Liles and Willis impliedly consented to the blood draws by driving, they explicitly revoked that consent when they refused to submit to the blood draws. Because Liles and Willis did not consent to the blood draws, we conclude that the warrantless blood searches were not authorized by the consent exception.

Exigency

The State next contends that exigent circumstances exists to justify the warrantless blood draws. This exception to the warrant requirement “applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558

(quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011) ). Applying that exception, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless blood draw in Schmerber when the officer reasonably believed that the delay involved in securing a warrant would result in the dissipation of alcohol in a driver's blood. 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. 1826. Forty-seven years later, in McNeely, the Supreme Court clarified Schmerber, holding that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not create a per se exigency justifying warrantless, nonconsensual blood testing in all DUI cases, though it is a relevant consideration in determining if exigent circumstances exist. 133 S.Ct. at 1568. Hence, “[a]fter McNeely, law enforcement officers [are] no longer categorically permitted to obtain a suspect's blood sample without a warrant simply because the alcohol [is] leaving the suspect's blood stream.” Commonwealth v. Duncan, No.2013–SC–000742–DG, 483 S.W.3d 353, 359 (Ky.2015).

In drunk driving investigations, the Fourth Amendment mandates that officers obtain a warrant unless excused by an exception to the warrant requirement. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561

. The McNeely Court observed that a warrantless search in exigent circumstances is reasonable when “there is compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” Id. at 1559 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) ). However, there is no general justification for applying the exigent circumstances exception when “officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search.” Id. at 1561.³ Here, as both trial courts found, the State failed to present sufficient evidence that exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless blood draws under the totality of the circumstances in either case. Indeed, the State made no effort to do so, as the blood draws were based solely on the officers' reliance on section 316.1933(1). See

McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1567 (explaining because state had relied on per se approach, “the arresting officer did not identify any other factors that would suggest he faced an emergency or unusual delay in securing a warrant”).

We decline to adopt the State's argument that McNeely does not apply in these cases and that the Schmerber rule is as broad as previously believed. After McNeely, law enforcement must obtain a warrant or later show that exigent circumstances prevented them from doing so. Following McNeely, we must read section 316.1933, Florida Statutes

, as a directive to...