[¶2]
On July 29, 2019, a vehicle driven by Rademacher struck three
people. Rademacher was charged with one count of murder, two
counts of attempted murder, and three counts of terrorizing.
At trial Rademacher conceded that the incident occurred, and
that three individuals were struck by his vehicle. The issue
for the jury was whether Rademacher had the requisite intent
for the charged crimes. Rademacher claims the district court
violated his right to be present during trial on two
occasions-prior to jury deliberations and after the jury
started deliberations. On December 3, 2021, the jury found
Rademacher guilty of murder, attempted murder and
terrorizing. Rademacher timely appealed.
[¶3]
Rademacher argues the district court improperly removed him
from the courtroom prior to jury deliberations and he was not
present for jury instructions and closing arguments.
[¶4]
A defendant has a right to be present in the courtroom at
every stage of trial. N.D.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(1)(B). We have
explained the scope of North Dakota's Rule requiring a
defendant's presence at trial, and the constitutional
underpinning of the presence requirement:
"The presence requirement has its roots in the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Illinois v
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1058, 25
L.Ed.2d 353, reh'g denied, 398 U.S
915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). The Sixth Amendment
provides that: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him. . . .' U.S. Const. amend. VI. This
constitutional guarantee was made obligatory on the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Allen, 397 U.S. at
338, 90 S.Ct. at 1058 (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965)). We have a
similar guarantee in our State Constitution:' In criminal
prosecutions in any court whatever, the party accused shall
have the right . . . to appear and defend in person
.' N.D. Const. art. I, § 12.
"North Dakota has long recognized the constitutional
right of a defendant to be personally present during the
whole of a trial. State v. Schasker, 60 N.D. 462
235 N.W. 345 (N.D. 1931) (calling in jury after retirement
and allowing court stenographer to read evidence from notes
in absence of defendant in a felony prosecution was a plain
violation of defendant's constitutional rights under the
North Dakota Constitution Article I, section 12 (previously
N.D. Const. Art. I, § 13)). The right is not absolute,
and may be affirmatively waived by the defendant. See,
e.g., Rule 43(c)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P. (permitting absence
with the written consent of the defendant for pleas of guilty
for misdemeanor offenses). Cf. State v. Ash, 526
N.W.2d 473, 481 (N.D. 1995) (concluding trial court erred in
responding to jury communications without the defendant being
present, but the error was harmless considering, in part,
defense counsel's repeated waiver of defendant's
right of presence). The right, too, may be lost by a
defendant's unruly and disruptive behavior.
Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057.
"When the constitutional right of presence is violated,
it is subject to the harmless error standard for
constitutional errors- 'harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24,
87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, reh'g denied, 386 U.S.
987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967) (holding a
reviewing court must declare error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt before a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless). See also Ash, 526 N.W.2d at 481;
State v. Hatch, 346 N.W.2d 268, 278 (N.D. 1984)
(stating error is harmless 'where it can be determined
beyond a reasonable doubt that the substantial rights of the
defendant are not affected. . . .').
"In addition to the constitutional guarantee, Rule 43(a)
of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
presence of the defendant 'at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury. . . .' Our North
Dakota Rule is fashioned after the similarly-worded Federal
Rule 43. Compare F.R.Crim.P. 43, with N.D.R.Crim.P.
43. The presence requirement embodied in Federal Rule 43 has
been interpreted as being broader than the constitutional
right. United States v. Alessandrello, 637 F.2d 131,
138 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949, 101
S.Ct. 2031, 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981) (reasoning Federal Rule 43
is broader than the constitutional right because it
'embodies the right to be present derived from the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause, the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the common law privilege
of presence'). Despite the purported breadth of Rule 43,
it, too, is subject to express limitation. See,
e.g., F.R.Crim.P. 43(b), (c); N.D.R.Crim.P. 43(b), (c)
(noting certain instances where the defendant's presence
is not required).
"Although Rule 43 is contained in our procedural rules,
our past decisions view its violation in light of the
constitutional requirements. See, e.g., Ash, 526
N.W.2d at 481 (concluding error of communicating with jury
outside of defendant's presence was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt); State v. Smuda, 419 N.W.2d 166,
168 (N.D. 1988) (noting presence requirement of Rule 43,
N.D.R.Crim.P., but concluding defendant's right was
violated under the North Dakota Constitution and violation
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Hatch, 346
N.W.2d at 278 (noting recent adoption of Rule 43,
N.D.R.Crim.P., and concluding trial court violated Rule 43 by
communicating with jury outside presence of defendant and
counsel but violation was disregarded under constitutional
standard for harmless error)."
City of Mandan v. Baer, 1998 ND 101, ¶¶
8-12, 578 N.W.2d 599.
[¶5]
Here, the first question is whether Rademacher was absent
during "trial." The parties did not cite to a case,
and we have not found one, where North Dakota generally
defines which proceedings constitute "trial" under
N.D.R.Crim.P. 43. However, we have decided cases identifying
particular court proceedings that are part of trial requiring
the defendant's presence. See, e.g., Smuda, 419
N.W.2d 166 (N.D. 1988) (communications between the court and
jury); Hatch, 346 N.W.2d 268 (N.D. 1984)
(communications between the court and jury); Baer,
1998 ND 101 (jury selection); State v. Curtis, 2009
ND 34, 763 N.W.2d 443 (return of verdict); Hill v.
State, 2000 ND 143, 615 N.W.2d 135 (testimony being read
to the jury).
[¶6]
We also take guidance from another context where we have held
a defendant's public trial right is not violated when the
defendant or the public is not present during
"discussions about routine administrative" matters
that do not involve resolution of disputed facts, "but
instead involve logistical, procedural and housekeeping
matters" as well as rulings on evidence and objections.
State v. Pendleton, 2022 ND 149, ¶¶ 8, 13,
978 N.W.2d 641.
[¶7]
We take further guidance from another jurisdiction describing
the proceedings constituting "trial" under their
statutes requiring that a defendant be present:
"'The defendant in a felony case shall be
present . . . at every stage of the trial
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the
verdict . . . except as otherwise provided by law.'
(Emphasis added.) Harrison claims the note-passing moment in
the jury room was a 'stage of the trial' requiring
his presence.
"In State v. Killings, 301 Kan. 214, 241, 340 P.3d 1186
(2015), the court explained what constitutes a 'stage of
trial' triggering the statutory directive for
defendant's presence. The court said:
'A felony defendant must be present at any stage of
the trial when the jury is in the courtroom or when the
defendant's presence is essential to a fair and just
determination of a substantial issue. The statutory
command . . . is analytically and functionally identical to
the requirements under the Confrontation Clause and the Due
Process Clause of the federal Constitution that a criminal
defendant be present at any critical stage of the proceedings
against him or her.' (Emphasis added.)
See also State v. McDaniel, 306 Kan. 595, 601, 395
P.3d 429 (2017) (stating the right to be present under K.S.A.
2019 Supp. 22-3405(a)
'extends to "any stage of the criminal proceeding
that is critical to its outcome if the defendant's
presence would contribute to the fairness of the
procedure."' (Emphasis added.)"
State v. Harrison, 467 P.3d 477, 481 (Kan. 2020).
[¶8]
Rademacher contends he was not present during closing
arguments or final jury instruction. He acknowledges he has
the burden of showing a violation of his rights occurred.
See L.C. v. R.P., 1997 ND 96, ¶ 18, 563 N.W.2d
799 ("On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of
showing error."). Rademacher claims, and we agree,
closing arguments and instructing the jury are stages of the
criminal proceeding critical to its outcome so that his
presence was required.
[¶9]
Rademacher...