State v. Ragona
| Citation | 5 N.W.2d 907,232 Iowa 700 |
| Decision Date | 27 October 1942 |
| Docket Number | 46062. |
| Parties | STATE v. RAGONA. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
Hays Guernsey & Powers, of Centerville, for appellant.
John M. Rankin, Atty. Gen., Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles L. Johnston, Co. Atty., of Centerville, for appellee.
Defendant was convicted of the charge of committing lascivious acts with a child of six. For obvious reasons, we do not undertake to make a detailed statement of facts other than such as may be necessary for a decision of the six assignments of error presented for our consideration.
I. The first assignment of error challenges the competency of prosecutrix to testify. Upon examination by the court, she testified as follows:
Upon examination by the county attorney she testified as follows:
" Following such testimony, over objection by defendant, the court permitted the child to be sworn and to testify. We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion by such ruling. State v. Yates 181 Iowa 539, 164 N.W. 798; State v. Hall, 225 Iowa 1316, 283 N.W. 414; State v. Diggins, 227 Iowa 632, 288 N.W. 640, and cases cited therein.
II. The second assignment of error challenges the overruling of defendant's objection to the competency of Mabel Heintze secretary to the county attorney, to testify to the age of the defendant. Her testimony was that on June 24, 1941, she heard defendant say that he was 31 years old, also that she has known defendant for 13 or 14 years and that he was more than five years old when she first knew him. We hold that the testimony was competent to prove that defendant was over 18 years old. It is also asserted that the witness' name was not endorsed on the indictment and that there is no showing that any notice had been served. However, the abstract fails to show that any objection was made to her testimony on this ground in the trial court. It can not be raised for the first time on appeal.
III. The third assignment asserts that the court erred in permitting unlimited cross examination of defendant. We hold that there is no merit in the contention.
On direct examination, defendant testified as follows:
On cross examination, over renewed objections, defendant was called upon to testify that he had lived in Appanoose County 31 years, took prosecutrix for a ride in his Ford automobile on the night in question, about 7 P.M.; drove to the Esther apartments, six or seven blocks, let his wife out there, tried to get his wife to go to a show; knows where Centerville Grammar School is (the situs of the alleged acts), has been to that building; after leaving the Esther apartments, he returned home (describing the route in detail); he and prosecutrix were alone in the car; he did not go anywhere else that evening with the child; four or five days later he was in the office of the county attorney with the county attorney, a deputy sheriff and the chief of police, signed a paper (which was not offered in evidence) after looking it over without reading each page. A number of questions were asked concerning the contents of the written statement, about which defendant disclaimed any knowledge, either as to the contents of the writing or whether he made the statements, testifying "I was too excited to know anything"; had the impression he was under arrest; he had had a couple of drinks on the night he was with the child, a glass of wine and a high ball; does not remember saying, in the county attorney's office, that he had had three big tumblers of wine and two high balls, but does not believe he said that; did not read any statement to that effect in the paper he signed for the county attorney.
Defendant contends that the extensive cross examination, which the court permitted, violated Section 13892, Code 1939, which provides: "When the defendant testifies in his own behalf, he shall be subject to cross-examination as an ordinary witness, but the state shall be strictly confined therein to the matters testified to in the examination in chief." We do not agree with this contention. What may be said to be "strictly confined" to matters testified to in chief, is left largely to the discretion of the trial court. State v. Archibald, 208 Iowa 1139, 1142, 226 N.W. 186, and cases cited therein. There was no such clear abuse of discretion herein as would warrant a reversal at our hands.
The question now before us is very similar, if not identical, to that presented in State v. Hathaway, 224 Iowa 478, 481, 276 N.W. 207, 209, wherein this court, through Justice Mitchell, states:
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State v. Ragona
...232 Iowa 7005 N.W.2d 907STATEv.RAGONA.No. 46062.Supreme Court of Iowa.Oct. 27, Appeal from District Court, Appanoose County; Heinrich C. Taylor, Judge. Conviction for lascivious acts with a child. Defendant appeals. Affirmed. [5 N.W.2d 908] Hays, Guernsey & Powers, of Centerville, for appel......
- Brinton v. Washington County Hosp.