State v. Railroad Com'rs of Florida

• Decision Date: 19 April 1920
• Citation: 84 So. 444,79 Fla. 526
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SWEARINGEN, Atty. Gen., et al. v. RAILROAD COM'RS OF FLORIDA.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

84 So. 444

79 Fla. 526

STATE ex rel. SWEARINGEN, Atty. Gen., et al. v. RAILROAD COM'RS OF FLORIDA.

Florida Supreme Court

April 19, 1920

Original petition for writ of prohibition by the State of Florida, on relation of Van C. Swearingen, Attorney General, and others against the Railroad Commissioners of the State of Florida. Writ denied.

Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

A prohibition will only be granted by the Supreme Court to control the action of tribunals or persons exercising judicial power who attempt to usurp a jurisdiction belonging to some other forum.

The statutes regulating the procedure in issuing writs of prohibition contemplate the use of the writ only to restrain the unlawful exercise of judicial or quasi judicial power.

The common-law writ of prohibition is not a writ of right; but it is an extraordinary judicial writ, that in proper cases may be issued to restrain the unlawful exercise of judicial functions when no other adequate remedy is afforded by law.

While a writ of prohibition may issue in a proper case to restrain an unauthorized or illegal judicial or quasi judicial act, such a writ may not be issued to restrain a legislative or quasi legislative or a purely administrative or ministerial act not in its nature judicial or quasi judicial.

In fixing rates to be charged by railroad common carriers for transporting persons and property, the railroad commissioners exercise a quasi legislative function sometimes regarded as being administrative, but not judicial in its nature.

Where it is doubtful whether a statute authorizes a municipality to fix rates for a public utility company, such doubt must be resolved against the authority of the city.

Even if authority is by statute given to a municipality to fix rates for a public service corporation operating therein, such authority is subject to legislative control.

Any contract ordinance passed by the city with statutory authority fixing by agreement street car fares, as an incident to the granting of franchises to a street railroad company, is subject to legislative control.

The Charter Act of the City of Pensacola (chapter 6746, Acts of 1913) does not clearly and plainly give to such city the power to prescribe rates for street car fares to the exclusion of state authority, if at all.

Chapter 6527, s 3, Laws of Florida, approved June 7, 1913 (Comp. Laws 1914, s 2893), gives to the railroad commissioners authority 'to make reasonable and just rates of freight and passenger tariffs to be observed by all railroads, railroad companies and common carriers doing business in this state,' which includes street railroads.

Authority to prescribe reasonable and just rates of street car fares for the Pensacola Electric Company is by law vested in the railroad commissioners.

COUNSEL John B. Jones, of Pensacola, for relators.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

A petition for a writ of prohibition, signed by the Attorney General of the state and by the city commissioners of the city of Pensacola, in substance alleges that the officials of the city of Pensacola have statutory authority to regulate the fares to be charged by a street car company operating in that city, and that upon the petition of the receiver of such street car company the railroad commissioners of the state of Florida have assumed jurisdiction to fix rates for street car fares in that city, when such railroad commissioners are without jurisdiction in the premises. A writ of prohibition against the railroad commissioners is prayed.

The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court 'shall have the power to issue writs of * * * prohibition.' Section 5, art. 5.

A prohibition will only be granted by the Supreme Court to control the action of tribunals or persons exercising judicial power who attempt to usurp a jurisdiction belonging to some other forum.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain proceedings in prohibition, as conferred by the Constitution of this state, is confined to the legitimate office of that writ, as defined by the common law, and a statute enlarging and changing the purposes of the writ, so as to confer a new and original jurisdiction of matters not contemplated by the Constitution, will not be recognized by this court as affecting its jurisdiction. Sherlock v. City of Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 93; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 204.

The statutes regulating the procedure in issuing writs of prohibition contemplate the use of the writ only to restrain the unlawful exercise of judicial or quasi judicial power. Section 2262 et seq., General Statutes 1906, Compiled Laws 1914.

At common law it is well settled that a writ of prohibition must be directed to some judicial tribunal or officer. In other words, it lies only to prevent or control judicial (or quasi judicial) action, as distinguished from legislative executive, or ministerial action. Accordingly, it is generally held that prohibition will not lie to prevent the performance of ministerial duties by executive or administrative officers, or to restrain the performance by the courts of duties which are merely administrative and ministerial. 22 R. C. L. p. 13.

The action which may be restrained by the writ of prohibition must be judicial or quasi judicial in its nature. The writ will not lie to prevent officers or tribunals from acting where such action is not judicial in its nature.

The writ lies against any person or persons assuming to exercise judicial or quasi judicial power, although not strictly or technically a court.

The writ will not lie against ministerial, executive, or legislative officers who do not assume to exercise any judicial powers. 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) pp. 203, 206.

Where the power to issue writs of prohibition rests upon constitutional provisions and is given in general terms, the Legislature cannot enlarge the scope or office of the writ so as to include ministerial functions. 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 204; State ex rel. Scharnikow v. Hogan, 24 Mont. 379, 62 P. 493, 51 L. R. A. 958; Dobson v. Westheimer, 5 Wyo. 34, 36 P. 626; Hobart v. Tillson, 66 Cal. 210, 5 P. 83; Winsor v. Bridges, 24 Wash. 540, 64 P. 780; Cameron v. Kenfield, 57 Cal. 550.

The common-law writ of prohibition is not a writ of right; but it is an extraordinary judicial writ, that in proper cases may be issued to restrain the unlawful exercise of judicial functions when no other adequate remedy is afforded by law. 22 R. C. L. p. 4 et seq.; Alexander v. Crollott, 199 U.S. 580, 26 S.Ct. 161, 50 L.Ed. 317.

While a writ of prohibition may issue in a proper case to restrain an unauthorized or illegal judicial or quasi judicial act, such a writ may not be issued to restrain a legislative or quasi legislative or a purely administrative or ministerial act not in its nature judicial or quasi judicial. Whether such a writ is appropriate is determined by the nature of the act sought to be restrained, and not by the character or name of the office or position held by the person or persons sought to be restrained by the writ. A judicial officer may not be restrained by the writ of prohibition from the exercise of a nonjudicial function; but any officer or board may by the writ of prohibition be prohibited from exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions not within his or their lawful jurisdiction or power. 22 R. C. L. p. 14 et seq.; McWhorter v. Dorr, 57 W.Va. 608, 50 S.E. 838, 110 Am. St. Rep. 815; 111 Am. St. Rep. 929, notes; Williamson v. Mingo County Court, 56 W.Va. 38, 48 S.E. 835, 3 Ann. Cas. 355; Commissioners' Court of Washington County v. State ex rel. Bowling, 151 Ala. 561, 44 So. 465; Dobson v. Westheimer, 5 Wyo. 34, 36 P. 626; State ex rel. West v. Clark County Court Justices, 41 Mo. 44; Speed v. Common Council, 98 Mich. 360, 57 N.W. 406, 22 L. R. A. 842, 39 Am. St. Rep. 555; State ex rel. McAnally v. Goodier, 195 Mo. 551, 93 S.W. 928; State ex rel. McEntee v. Bright, 224 Mo. 514, 123 S.W. 1057, 135 Am. St. Rep. 552, 20 Ann. Cas. 955; Mechem on Public Officers, § 1019; High on Ex. Leg. Remedies (3d Ed.) 782; 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) p. 204; Goodwin v. State, 145 Ala. 536, 40 So. 122; State ex rel. Scharnikow v. Hogan, 24 Mont. 379, 62 P. 493, 51 L. R. A. 958; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 6 S.Ct. 570, 29 L.Ed. 601.

The writ of prohibition will lie only to retrain the unlawful exercise of judicial functions by an inferior tribunal, acts of an administrative or ministerial or of a legislative character not falling within its province. 32 Cyc. 600.

Under section 35 of article 5 of the Constitution as amended in 1910, the Legislature 'may clothe any railroad commission with judicial powers in all matters connected with the functions of their office.' And by section 2922, General Statutes it is enacted:

'The said railroad commissioners are hereby vested with judicial powers to do or enforce or perform any function, duty or power conferred upon them by this chapter to the exercise of which judicial power is necessary.'

But the exercise of judicial power by the railroad commissioners is not necessary in the performance of their statutory duty to prescribe tariff rates for railroad common carriers. See Spring Valley Water Works v. Bartlett, 63 Cal. 245.

'Rate regulation is purely a legislative function, * * * even where exercised by a subordinate body upon which it is conferred.' Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, text 278, 29 S.Ct. 50, 54 (53 L.Ed. 176).

'The fixing of rates, which may be charged by public service corporations--in this case a street car corporation--is a legislative function of the state.' Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 238 U.S....