State v. Ramos
| Decision Date | 16 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 30279-2-III,30279-2-III |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. JOEL RODRIGUEZ RAMOS, Appellant. |
SIDDOWAY, J. — At issue is whether Joel Rodriguez Ramos, sentenced 20 years ago, at age 14, to consecutive 20-year terms for 4 counts of first degree murder, was entitled to consideration of an exceptional downward sentence when his case was remanded to correct an error in the terms of his community custody. The answer is that the trial court had the authority to consider his request. Yet it expressed strong reservations about its authority in this complex case, in the face of State arguments that consideration of a reduced sentence would be improper.
The result is ambiguity and an inadequate record from which to determine whether and why the court exercised its discretion. We reverse the sentence and remand so that the trial court, with the benefit of this decision on the several challenges raised by the State, can freely exercise its discretion and provide an adequate record.
In 1993, 14-year-old Joel Ramos was charged in juvenile court with four counts of aggravated first degree murder for the deaths of the four members of the Skelton family: a mother, a father, and their 12- and 6-year-old sons. The facts established in the criminal trial of Mr. Ramos's codefendant can be found in the unpublished decision filed in the codefendant's appeal. State v. Gaitan, noted at 80 Wn. App. 1077, 1996 WL 123155.
Mr. Ramos was originally charged in juvenile court. After pretrial investigation, he waived his right to a decline hearing and the case was transferred to the adult court division of the superior court. There, he was charged with one count of premeditated first degree murder and three counts of first degree felony murder. He pleaded guilty as charged.
At the time of sentencing, the State, "pursuant to [the parties'] plea agreement," recommended "that Mr. Ramos be sentenced at the low end of the standard range, which is 80 years in prison." Report of Proceedings (Aug. 23, 1993), State v. Ramos, No. 25740-1-III, at 26 (Wash. Ct. App.). When it was Mr. Ramos's turn to respond, defense counsel stated, "we would urge the court to follow the recommendation of the prosecutor, that recommendation being one that has been accepted by Mr. Ramos." Id. at 27. The defense presented a packet of information regarding Mr. Ramos's childhood and family situation that it asked to be considered, presumably in support of leniency.
In announcing its sentencing decision, the court made several observations relevant to this appeal. Stating that it had considered the fact that Mr. Ramos was only 14, it said, Id. at 32. It stated that the premeditated murder count deserved more than 240 months, but nonetheless sentenced Mr. Ramos to 240 months for that count as well as the others.
Significant here, in the course of accepting Mr. Ramos's plea, the trial court asked him if he understood the standard range on each murder count and that "each count is required by law to be served consecutively, that is, one after another?" to which Mr. Ramos answered, "Yes." Id. at 19. At Mr. Ramos's sentencing, which occurred immediately following acceptance of the plea, the court again observed that the sentences for the counts "are required by law to run consecutive, one after another" and imposed consecutive sentences, for a total of 80 years' incarceration. Id. at 34.
The deadline for appeal passed with no appeal by Mr, Ramos.
Thirteen years later, in December 2006, Mr. Ramos filed, pro se, a notice of appeal. In the three rounds through this court and the Washington Supreme Court that hisappeal has since traveled, it has been determined (1) that his appeal was entitled to proceed "as a timely filed notice of appeal," Ramos I;1 (2) that the terms of his community custody imposed in 1993 were insufficiently precise and must be remanded, Ramos II;2 and (3) most recently, that he was entitled upon the remand to be resentenced rather than limited to the ministerial clarification of the term of community placement that this court had ordered, Ramos III.3
The resentencing was conducted in September 2011 by a new judge; the judge who had imposed Mr. Ramos's original sentence had retired. Mr. Ramos's paramount concern at the resentencing hearing was that the trial court consider ordering his sentences for the four murders to run concurrently rather than consecutively, thereby reducing his sentence substantially. Before the resentencing hearing, he filed a motion to vacate his sentence as authorized by CrR 7.8(b), presenting it as an alternative basis supporting review and reduction of the sentence.
The trial court denied the request to consider an exceptional downward sentence— what Mr. Ramos refers to as his request for a "full resentencing." In its oral ruling, thecourt expressed reservations about its authority, all based on objections raised by the State. First, it concluded that its role on remand was to determine the terms and conditions of Mr. Ramos's community placement, interpreting the Supreme Court's decision as not contemplating a full resentencing. Second, it expressed its view that a key precedent on which Mr. Ramos relied—In re Pers. Restraint of Mulholland, 161 Wn.2d 322, 166 P.3d 677 (2007)—should not be applied "retroactively" to his case. Report of Proceedings (Sept. 16, 2011) (RP) at 35. Third, it pointed out that matters now urged in favor of an exceptional downward sentence should have been raised by Mr. Ramos's original lawyer, whose effectiveness had never been challenged. Fourth, it attached significance to what it construed as Mr. Ramos's agreement to the imposition of consecutive sentences as a term of his plea bargain, which is why, the court concluded, much of the information now offered in support of an exceptional reduced sentence was not presented.
While offering these rationales in explaining its decision, the trial court also stated that, in any event, it was exercising its discretion not to engage in a full resentencing. Apart from having explained the perceived limitations on its authority, however, it did not offer a reason why. After denying the request for a full resentencing and the CrR 7.8(b) motion, it turned to the action clearly required by the Supreme Court: specification of a community custody term and conditions.
Mr. Ramos appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) denying his request fora full resentencing, (2) denying his CrR 7.8 motion, (3) ruling that Mulholland could not be applied to him either through a full resentencing or pursuant to CrR 7.8, and (4) ruling that recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court that recognize a requirement for certain leniency in sentencing juveniles could not be relied upon for their scientific underpinnings in conducting the resentencing or deciding the CrR 7.8(b) motion.
During the trial court's hearing on the resentencing request and CrR 7.8(b) motion, defense counsel granted that the postconviction law bearing on the issues presented was "byzantine." RP at 28. Certainly the different analyses required for Mr. Ramos's request for a full resentencing, on the one hand, and relief under CrR 7.8(b), on the other— complicated in each case by the fact that he had been granted an out-of-time appeal in Ramos I—presented the trial court, and now us, with a uniquely complex set of issues.
To most clearly explain our decision, we present it in three parts. First, we address whether the trial court's discretion on remand was as broad as argued by Mr. Ramos, reviewing the several challenges made by the State. We conclude that it was.
Second, we address Mr. Ramos's alternative collateral attack—his motion under CrR 7.8(b)—and how the issues it presents differ from the issues presented by the resentencing alone. We conclude that relief under CrR 7.8(b) was properly denied.
Finally, we review the trial court's disposition of the request for a full resentencing and what proves to be the critical issue: whether, in resentencing Mr. Ramos, the trialcourt exercised its discretion to consider (or not) his request for an exceptional downward sentence with a full understanding of its discretion and on a proper basis. Because there is reason to believe that the court's decision was based on one or more errors of law, we remand.
The State contends that the Supreme Court's directive that the trial court "specify the community placement term and the conditions of community placement" imposes a limit on the trial court's authority that it would exceed by entertaining Mr. Ramos's request to impose an exceptional downward sentence for the murder counts. Ramos III, 171 Wn.2d at 49. In announcing its decision on Mr. Ramos's request for a full resentencing and CrR 7.8 motion, the trial court accepted the State's argument, stating:
It is my conclusion that the Washington State Supreme Court, in saying "resentencing," was discussing it in a—and the order is in a limited fashion related only to the right to be present because it would involve the discretion of the judge here, meaning me, in determining if any or—if any or if some or many conditions of community placement would apply and that does require discretion, particularly if we're talking about criminal related sanctions. And so my interpretation of the opinion is, is that the court did not remand this for a complete resentencing on all issues.
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