State v. Randall

• Decision Date: 29 July 1919
• Docket Number: 15340.
• Citation: 107 Wash. 695,182 P. 575
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. RANDALL.

182 P. 575

107 Wash. 695

STATE v. RANDALL.

No. 15340.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 29, 1919

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County.

Earl Randall was convicted of unlawfully driving an automobile and he appeals. Affirmed.

Hayden Langhorne & Metzger, of Tacoma, for appellant.

Fred G Remann and J. W. Selden, both of Tacoma, and Elmer E. Healey of Puyallup, for the State.

MAIN J.

The defendant was charged by complaint, before a justice of the peace, with unlawfully driving an automobile. From a judgment of conviction in that court, he appealed to the superior court, where the complainant was demurred to on the ground that it failed to state facts 'sufficient to charge this defendant with the commission of any criminal offense.' The demurrer was overruled and the trial resulted in a judgment of conviction and a fine in the sum of $25 and costs. From this judgment the appeal is prosecuted.

No statement of facts or bill of exceptions has been brought to this court. The only question presented is whether the complaint charges a crime. After specifying the day when and the place where the unlawful driving occurred, and complaint substantially follows the language of section 23, c. 142, Laws of 1915, which provides:

'No person driving or operating any motor vehicle shall drive or operate the same in any other than a careful and prudent manner, nor at any greater speed than is reasonable or proper, having due regard to the traffic and use of the way by others, or so as to endanger the life and limb of any person.'

It will be noticed that under this statute it is made a criminal offense, first, to drive or operate a motor vehicle in other than a careful and prudent manner; second, at a greater rate of speed than is reasonable or proper, having due regard to the traffic and use of the way by others; and, third, so as to endanger the life or limb of any person. Whether this statute falls within the class which defines separate and distinct offenses under the rule stated in Seattle v. Molin, 99 Wash. 210, 169 P. 318, or whether it falls within the class of statutes which define but one crime but specify the various ways in which that crime may be committed, it is not necessary here to determine.

The demurrer to the complaint was based upon the sole ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to charge a crime. The only question then to determine is whether a complaint or information which specifies the day and the place of the offense and embodies substantially the language of the statute charges a crime. Attention here will only be given to that portion of the statute which provides that no person shall drive a motor vehicle at any greater speed than is reasonable and proper, having due regard to the traffic and use of...