State v. Ransom

• Decision Date: 31 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. A-1-CA-37079,A-1-CA-37079
• Parties: STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUINN RANSOM, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. QUINN RANSOM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. A-1-CA-37079

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

December 31, 2019

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of Appeals.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY

Drew D. Tatum, District Judge

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General

Santa Fe, NM

Lauren J. Wolongevicz, Assistant Attorney General

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender

B. Douglas Wood III, Assistant Appellate Defender

Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MEDINA, Judge.

{1} Defendant, Quinn Ransom, appeals his convictions on two counts of burglary of an automobile contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-3(B) (1971), one count of attempted burglary of an automobile, and one count of possession of burglary tools contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16-5 (1963). Defendant raises five issues on appeal: (1) his right to speedy trial was violated; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) his convictions violated his right to be free of double jeopardy; and (5) abuse of process. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2} The facts are as follows: On the evening of June 16, 2013, Defendant walked onto a parking lot next to No Hassle Auto in Clovis, New Mexico, and entered an unlocked van parked in the lot. Defendant rummaged around the van's interior and removed a small baseball bat. Defendant used the bat to break the windows of several vehicles parked on the lot. Clovis Police Officer Brian Wanzor saw Defendant striking the window of one of the vehicles with the baseball bat and observed several vehicles with broken windows. Officer Wanzor confronted Defendant as Defendant was attempting to open the door of one of the vehicles. Defendant dropped the bat and Officer Wanzor placed Defendant under arrest.

{3} Officer Wanzor testified that the interior of a Honda Civic had been "gone through" and that the glove box and console were open. John Kutcha, the owner of No Hassle Auto, testified that his business took possession of the vehicles on his lot when the owners brought them in for service and that Defendant was neither a customer nor authorized to be on the premises. Kutcha also testified that Defendant was not authorized to strike the vehicles with the baseball bat.

{4} In addition to witness testimony, the State introduced photo exhibits into evidence depicting the inside of multiple vehicles that had been rummaged through, including the Honda Civic described by Officer Wanzor. The State also introduced surveillance video showing Defendant shatter a window on a white Nissan Maxima and reach into the vehicle. Defendant did not present any witnesses.

{5} Defendant was convicted of two counts of auto burglary, one count of attempted auto burglary, and one count of possession of burglary tools. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant's Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial Was Not Violated

{6} Defendant contends his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial[.]" U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also N.M. Const. art. II, § 14 ("[T]he accused shall have the right to . . . a speedy . . . trial."). Preventing prejudice to the accused is at the heart of the speedy trial right, which also emanates from "the concomitant 'societal interest in bringing an accused to trial.' " State v. Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 4, 366 P.3d 1121 (quoting State v. Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 12, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387).

{7} "In determining whether a defendant's speedy trial right was violated, [the appellate courts have] adopted the United States Supreme Court's balancing testin Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 . . . (1972)." State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 58, 367 P.3d 420. We consider: "(1) the length of the delay in bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay." State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 9, 387 P.3d 230 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We "weigh[ ] these factors according to the unique circumstances of each case in light of the [s]tate and the defendant's conduct and the harm to the defendant from the delay." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In reviewing these factors, "we defer to the district court's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence, but we independently review the record to determine whether a defendant was denied his speedy trial right and we weigh and balance the Barker factors de novo." State v. Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 4, 355 P.3d 81.

A. The Length of Delay Is Presumptively Prejudicial and Weighs Against the State

{8} We first determine whether the length of the delay is presumptively prejudicial. "The 'length of delay' factor serves a dual purpose when analyzing a speedy trial violation." State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 14, 396 P.3d 171. "[I]t acts as a threshold triggering mechanism used to determine whether the delay is 'presumptively prejudicial' . . . [and if so] it is the first independent Barker factor that must be addressed to determine whether a defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated." Id. ("A delay is presumptively prejudicial if the delay exceeds twelve months for a simple case, fifteen months for a case of intermediate complexity, and eighteen months for a complex case." Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{9} Defendant argues that this was a simple case, rather than a case of intermediate complexity as the district court found. Defendant contends his case should be classified as simple because the charges stemmed from a single incident which was captured on video, the case did not involve expert witnesses, and the State ultimately called only two witnesses. Generally, "we defer to the district court's finding on the question of complexity when that finding is supported by substantial evidence." See State v. Thomas, 2016-NMSC-024, ¶ 11, 376 P.3d 184 (alterations, omission, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted); State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 52, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (stating that the district court is in the best position to determine the complexity of a case because of its familiarity with the factual circumstances, contested issues, available evidence, judicial machinery, and "reasonable expectations for the discharge of law enforcement and prosecutorial responsibilities" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

{10} We have held that a simple case typically requires "less investigation and tend[s] to involve primarily police officer testimony during the trial," while an intermediate case seems "to involve numerous or relatively difficult criminal charges and evidentiary issues, numerous witnesses, expert testimony, and scientific evidence." State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 14, 134 N.M. 648, 81 P.3d 591 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). At the time of the district court's ruling, Defendantwas facing a seventeen count indictment that included four counts of auto burglary, four counts of attempt to commit a felony, two counts of larceny, seven counts of criminal damage to property, and one count of possession of burglary tools.

{11} The district court relied on its review of the seventeen (17) charges and anticipated eleven (11) witnesses for the State, when it ruled that the case was of intermediate complexity. Given the number of varying charges and number of witnesses we conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court's determination and therefore defer to its finding of intermediate complexity, for which a delay of fifteen months is considered presumptively prejudicial. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 14.

{12} Defendant's speedy trial right attached when he was arrested on June 16, 2013. See Laney, 2003-NMCA-144, ¶ 10 (stating that the right to a speedy trial attached when the defendant becomes an accused, either by arrest, indictment, or criminal information). The district court denied Defendant's speedy trial motion on March 10, 2016. This delay of approximately thirty-three months exceeded the presumptively prejudicial threshold by approximately seventeen months. We therefore weigh this factor moderately against the State.¹ See State v. Steinmetz, 2014-NMCA-070, ¶ 6, 327 P.3d 1145 (weighing a length of delay twenty-eight months past the presumptively prejudicial threshold for an intermediate complexity case "moderately against the [s]tate.").

B. Reasons for Delay

{13} We next evaluate "the reason the government assigns to justify the delay[,]" which "may either heighten or temper the prejudice to the defendant caused by the length of the delay." Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There are three types of delay attributable to the state, which are weighed against the state in varying ways. See State v. Castro, 2017-NMSC-027, ¶ 22, 402 P.3d 688. First, deliberate attempts by the state to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense weigh heavily against the state. Id. Second, "neutral delays, including negligence or overcrowded courts that should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than the defendant." Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). And third, there are "appropriate" delays for which there is "a valid reason, such as a missing witness." Id. (internal quotation marks and...