State v. Ray

• Decision Date: 27 March 1911
• Citation: 114 P. 439,62 Wash. 582
• Parties: STATE v. RAY.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

114 P. 439

62 Wash. 582

STATE v. RAY.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 27, 1911

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Whitman County; H. W Canfield, Judge.

Charles E. Ray was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he appeals. Affirmed.

J. T. Brown, for appellant.

Charles L. Chamberlin, for the State.

MOUNT J.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced under an information charging him as follows: 'The said Charles E. Ray, in the county of Whitman, in the state of Washington, during the month of December, 1909, then and there being, did, with intent to defraud the owner of the property hereinafter mentioned, willfully, knowingly, unlawfully, and feloniously unlawfully obtain appropriate, buy, receive, conceal, and withhold fifty bushels of wheat of the value of $50, the said wheat then and there being the property of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a corporation. The said Charles E Ray, when he did so unlawfully obtain, appropriate, buy sell, conceal, and withhold said wheat as aforesaid, knew that the said wheat was the property of the said Northern Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, and had been stolen from said Northern Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, contrary to the form of the statute,' etc. It is argued that the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's general demurrer to this information.

If we understand appellant's position, it is not that the complaint is insufficient upon its face, but that the court permitted the state to prove that the defendant had purchased the 50 bushels of wheat from different persons upon three different occasions. It is plain that, if it was error for the court to admit such evidence, this did not affect the sufficiency of the information, for the sufficiency of the information is determined by what appears upon its face, and not otherwise. The information is clearly sufficient under the rule in State v. Druxinman, 34 Wash. 257, 75 P 814. The witness Fred Barton, called by the state, testified, in substance, that upon December 11, 1909, he remarked to defendant about the railway company having lots of wheat on the side track, and defendant said, 'I will give you a dollar and a half per sack for all wheat put in my barn'; that on that night the witness and one Jesse Grant took 10 sacks of wheat from the car, and put the wheat in defendant's barn, and defendant paid the witness $15 for the wheat; that on December 18, 1909, the same two persons took 5 more sacks of wheat which they put into defendant's barn, and defendant paid them $7.50 therefor; that on December 23, 1909, the witness and one Joseph Miller took 12 more sacks of wheat which they put into defendant's barn, and defendant paid them $18 therefor. The witnesses Grant and Miller also testified to the same effect. This evidence was objected to upon the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, which objections were overruled; and then counsel for defendant moved the court to require the state to elect upon which of these offenses it relied, for the reason that each offense was a separate offense committed upon different dates by different persons, and each of itself amounted to petit larceny, and that the three offenses could not be tacked together to make a crime of grand larceny. These objections were overruled by the court. The statute provides at section 2601 (Rem. & Bal. Code): 'Every person who, with intent to deprive or defraud the owner thereof * * * or * * * who knowing the same to have been so appropriated, shall * * * buy, sell, receive, or aid in concealing or withholding any property wrongfully appropriated * * * in such manner as to constitute larceny under the provisions of this act * * * shall be guilty of larceny.' And at section 2605, Rem. & Bal. Code: 'Every person who shall * * * buy, sell, receive, conceal or withhold in any manner specified in section 2601 * * * property of the value of twenty-five dollars, in any manner whatever, shall be guilty of grand larceny. * * * Every other larceny shall be petit larceny. * * *' Appellant now insists that the evidence should have been excluded, or that the state should...