State v. Reddick, 108747

• Decision Date: 12 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 108747,108747
• Citation: 2020 Ohio 925
• Parties: STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OCIE REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

2020 Ohio 925

STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OCIE REDDICK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 108747

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

March 12, 2020

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-85-197183-ZA

Appearances:

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony Thomas Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Ocie Reddick, pro se.

FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Ocie Reddick ("appellant"), brings the instant appeal challenging the trial court's judgment denying his motion to vacate void sentence. Appellant argues that the trial court's sentences on his aggravated murder and attempted murder convictions were void and contrary to law. After a thorough review of the record and law, we affirm appellant's sentence for aggravated murder, vacate appellant's sentence for attempted murder, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural History

{¶ 2} In 1985, after a jury trial, appellant was convicted of aggravated murder, in violation of R.C. 2903.01, with a three-year firearm specification and mass murder specification (Count 1), and attempted murder, in violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.02, with a one-year firearm specification (Count 2). The trial court merged the three-year firearm specification on Count 1 with the one-year firearm specification on Count 2. The trial court sentenced appellant on the aggravated murder count to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 20 years, consecutive to the three-year firearm specification. The trial court sentenced appellant on the attempted murder count to a prison term of 10 to 25 years, with 10 years of actual incarceration. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively with one another. The trial court's August 9, 1985 sentencing journal entry provides, in relevant part,

DEFT SENT TO LIFE IMPRIS C.C.I.W/NO PAROLE ELIGIBILITY [UNTIL] 20 FULL YEARS ARE SERVED. DEFT SENT 3 YRS ON THE GUN SPEC TO RUN CONSECUTIVE W/THE LIFE SENT. DEFT SENT 10-25 YRS ON THE ATT MURDER CONVICTION IN COUNT #2. THE SENT ON THE GUN SPEC IN COUNT NO. 2, AS IT MERGES W/THE GUN SPEC IN COUNT #1. ALL TIME TO RUN CONSECUTIVE.

{¶ 3} Appellant filed a direct appeal challenging his convictions and the trial court's sentence. State v. Reddick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 50814, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 6957 (May 7, 1987) ("Reddick I"). This court affirmed the trial court's judgment.¹

{¶ 4} On August 31, 1999, appellant filed a "motion to correct illegal sentence." The following day, appellant filed a "motion to correct sentence." The trial court denied appellant's motion to correct illegal sentence on August 31, 2005.

{¶ 5} Appellant filed an appeal challenging the trial court's judgment denying his motion to correct illegal sentence. State v. Reddick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87086, 2006-Ohio-3687 ("Reddick II"). On appeal, appellant argued that "the trial court did not comply with the terms of R.C. 2929.11(B)(2) when it imposed his sentence" on the attempted murder count. Id. at ¶ 6. Appellant further argued that "the minimum sentence under R.C. 2929.11(B)(2) is 4 to 7 years, thus his sentence for 10 to 25 years is in excess of that provided by law." Id.

{¶ 6} This court affirmed the trial court's denial of appellant's motion and noted that

[A]ppellant failed to comply with the deadline set forth in R.C. 2953.21 and did not provide an adequate excuse for noncompliance, as outlined in R.C. 2953.23. He filed his direct appeal on September 27, 1985; however, his motion to correct an illegal sentence was not filed until August 31, 1999, almost 14 years later. It is clear that appellant's deadline of 180 days expired well before he filed his petition for post conviction relief; thus, he failed to comply with the deadline set forth in R.C. 2953.21 when filing his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Asa result of his noncompliance, the trial court was barred from granting his motion.

Id. at ¶ 16.

{¶ 7} On September 9, 2008, appellant filed a motion to correct void sentence pursuant to Crim.R. 47. Therein, appellant argued that the trial court committed plain error in imposing a sentence of 10 to 25 years with 10 years of actual incarceration on the attempted murder count, and that the sentence was void ab initio. The state filed a brief in opposition, arguing that appellant's argument regarding the sentence for attempted murder was barred by res judicata. On September 4, 2015, the trial court denied appellant's motion. Appellant did not appeal this decision.

{¶ 8} On May 21, 2019, appellant filed a "motion to vacate void sentence as it is contrary to law." Therein, he argued that the sentences imposed on both the aggravated murder and attempted murder counts were void and contrary to law. On June 11, 2019, the trial court denied appellant's motion. It is from this judgment that appellant filed the instant appeal on July 1, 2019.

{¶ 9} Appellant assigns two errors for review:

I. [The] [t]rial court abused its discretion when it denied [appellant's] motion to vacate void sentence as it is contrary to law.

II. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied [appellant's] motion to vacate void sentence as it is contrary to law without holding an evidentiary hearing.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Motion to Vacate Sentence

{¶ 10} In appellant's first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his "motion to vacate void sentence." Appellant contends that his sentence is void because the trial court exceeded its sentencing authority.

1. Attempted Murder

{¶ 11} As an initial matter, the state concedes that the trial court's sentence on the attempted murder count is void. As such, the state asserts that the sentence on this count should be vacated, and the matter remanded for resentencing.

{¶ 12} After reviewing the record, we find that appellant's sentence of 10 to 25 years, with 10 years of actual imprisonment, is contrary to law.

{¶ 13} Appellant was sentenced in August 1985. At the time, R.C. 2929.11(B)(4), governing the permissible statutory range for first-degree felonies, provided, "the minimum term shall be four, five, six, or seven years, and the maximum terms shall be twenty-five years." Accordingly, the trial court exceeded its statutory sentencing authority in imposing a sentence of 10 to 25 years, with ten years of actual incarceration. The sentence is, therefore, contrary to law.

{¶ 14} Appellant's first assignment of error is sustained with respect to his sentence for attempted murder.

2. Aggravated Murder

{¶ 15} Appellant also contends that his sentence for aggravated murder is contrary to law. We disagree.

{¶ 16} R.C. 2953.08(A) allows a defendant to challenge a sentence that is "contrary to law." However, R.C. 2953.08(D)(3) specifically bars an evidentiary review of a trial court's sentence on an aggravated murder count. State v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-155, 131 N.E.3d 321, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).

{¶ 17} Appellant does not challenge the evidentiary basis supporting his sentence. Rather, he argues that the trial court's sentence on the aggravated murder count is void because the sentence is not authorized under R.C. 2929.03(A).

{¶ 18} A trial court has no authority to impose sentences that are void as a matter of law. State v. Lee, 2018-Ohio-1839, 112 N.E.3d 65, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234, ¶ 28. Notwithstanding the limitations under R.C. 2953.08(D), "an appellate court has authority to review sentences that are void." Id., citing Williams at ¶ 28, and State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 25. Thus, although this court is not entitled to review the evidentiary basis supporting appellant's sentence, we may review the record to determine whether the sentence imposed is void. See Smith at ¶ 14. As the Ohio Supreme Court has noted,

"'No court has the authority to impose a sentence that is contrary to law,' when the trial court disregards statutory mandates, '[p]rinciples of res judicata, including the doctrine of the law of the case, do not preclude appellate review. The sentence may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack.'" [Williams] at ¶ 22, quoting[State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 23, 30].

Smith at ¶ 15.

{¶ 19} At the time of the August 1985 sentencing hearing, R.C. 2929.03(A), governing the penalty for aggravated murder, provided, in relevant part, "the trial court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment."

{¶ 20} In support of his argument that his sentence for aggravated murder is void, appellant directs our attention to this court's holding in Smith, 2019-Ohio-155, 131 N.E.3d 321. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to follow Smith.

{¶ 21} In 1988, Smith entered into a plea agreement with the state and pled guilty to aggravated murder. The trial court imposed a sentence on Smith of 20 years to life in prison. In 2018, Smith filed a motion to void his sentence. The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, Smith argued that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it sentenced him to a prison term that was contrary to law. Specifically, Smith argued "that his prison term is contrary to law because a sentence of 'twenty (20) years to life' is not an authorized sentence for aggravated murder." Id. at ¶ 18. This court noted that R.C. 2929.03(A) only authorized a sentence of "life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment." Id. at ¶ 16. Furthermore, this court noted "[b]ecause the trial court imposed a sentence that does not comport with the statutory language set forth in R.C.2929.03(A), * * * the trial...