State v. Reece
Decision Date | 10 January 2018 |
Docket Number | 2018-UP-022 |
Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Christina Reece, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2013-000656 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard November 6, 2017
Appeal From Pickens County Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., both of Columbia, and William Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville, all for Respondent.
Christina Reece appeals her conviction and sentence for felony driving under the influence (felony DUI), arguing (1) the trial judge erred by refusing to suppress the results of a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw, (2) the trial judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the trial because Reece appealed the trial judge's pretrial order finding probable cause for the blood draw and the remittitur had not been issued prior to trial, and (3) the trial judge erred by refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal when the State presented no evidence Reece was under the influence or appreciably impaired. We affirm.
1. We find Reece's argument that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress the results of the blood draw because it violated the Fourth Amendment is unpreserved for this court's review. The State requested a pretrial probable cause hearing seeking a determination as to whether law enforcement had probable cause to draw Reece's blood in a felony DUI case. During this hearing, Reece never argued to the trial judge that the blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, Reece did not object on Fourth Amendment grounds when the State moved to admit the results of the blood draw at trial. See S.C. Dep't of Transp. v First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) ; State v. Wannamaker, 346 S.C. 495, 499 552 S.E.2d 284, 286 (2001) ( ); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("A party may not argue one ground at trial and an alternate ground on appeal.").
2. We find the trial judge was not divested of jurisdiction notwithstanding Reece's appeal from the order finding probable cause because the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See State v. Reece, SC Sup Ct. Order dated March 19, 2013 (footnote omitted) ("Since appellant has not been sentenced . . . any appeal is premature."). Reece's trial commenced on March 19, 2013. The remittitur was not returned until April 4, 2013. Reece contends the trial judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction over her trial because the supreme court had not yet remitted the case to the circuit court.
We construe Reece's argument the trial judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction as an assertion the trial judge lacked power to render the judgment. See Limehouse v. Hulsey, 404 S.C. 93, 104, 744 S.E.2d 566, 572 (2013) ("[t]he word 'jurisdiction' does not in every context connote subject matter jurisdiction") ; id. ; id. (" ; Tillman v. Oakes, 398 S.C. 245, 256 n.3, 728 S.E.2d 45, 51 n.3 (Ct. App. 2012) () . See generally Rule 205, SCACR () .
Reece contends the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to convict her because the remittitur was not issued until after her trial. We find the pretrial order was not immediately appealable. See State v. Samuel, 411 S.C. 602, 604, 769 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2015) ; State v Rearick, 417 S.C. 391, 400, 790 S.E.2d 192, 196 (2016) ("Significantly, appellate court decisions that pre-date and post-date the enactment of section 14-3-330 have consistently held that a defendant may appeal only after sentence has been imposed."); State v. Looper, ___ S.C. ___, ___, 807 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2017) ( ). Thus, Reece's filing of the notice of appeal from the order did not divest the trial judge of jurisdiction. See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) (the trial court's interlocutory order denying a motion to suppress, noting "[a]n appeal in a criminal case must attend the final judgment rendered on the indictment") an appeal from ; see also State v. Dingle, 279 S.C. 278, 282, 306 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1983) (, )abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). Accordingly, the remittitur was not necessary to return full jurisdiction to the trial judge because the trial judge was never divested of jurisdiction. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Arnold, 287 S.C. 584, 586, 340 S.E.2d 535, 536 (1986) (); id. at 585-86, 340 S.E.2d at 536 ("the [trial court] never lost jurisdiction and ...
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