State v. Reece
Decision Date | 10 January 2018 |
Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2013-000656,Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-022 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | The State, Respondent, v. Christina Reece, Appellant. |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Appeal From Pickens County
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge
AFFIRMED
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Assistant Attorney General Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., both of Columbia, and William Walter Wilkins, III, of Greenville, all for Respondent.
Christina Reece appeals her conviction and sentence for felony driving under the influence (felony DUI), arguing (1) the trial judge erred by refusing to suppress the results of a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw, (2) the trial judge lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the trial because Reece appealed the trial judge's pretrial order finding probable cause for the blood draw and the remittitur had not been issued prior to trial, and (3) the trial judge erred by refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal when the State presented no evidence Reece was under the influence or appreciably impaired. We affirm.
1. We find Reece's argument that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress the results of the blood draw because it violated the Fourth Amendment is unpreserved for this court's review. The State requested a pretrial probable cause hearing seeking a determination as to whether law enforcement had probable cause to draw Reece's blood in a felony DUI case. During this hearing, Reece never argued to the trial judge that the blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, Reece did not object on Fourth Amendment grounds when the State moved to admit the results of the blood draw at trial. See S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295, 301, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907 (2007) ; State v. Wannamaker, 346 S.C. 495, 499, 552 S.E.2d 284, 286 (2001) ( ); State v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ().
2. We find the trial judge was not divested of jurisdiction notwithstanding Reece's appeal from the order finding probable cause because the order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See State v. Reece, S.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated March 19, 2013 (footnote omitted) ("Since appellant has not been sentenced . . . any appeal is premature."). Reece's trial commenced on March 19, 2013. The remittitur was not returned until April 4, 2013. Reece contends the trial judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction over her trial because the supreme court had not yet remitted the case to the circuit court.
We construe Reece's argument the trial judge did not have subject matter jurisdiction as an assertion the trial judge lacked power to render the judgment. See Limehouse v. Hulsey, 404 S.C. 93, 104, 744 S.E.2d 566, 572 (2013) ( ); id. ; id. (" ; Tillman v. Oakes, 398 S.C. 245, 256 n.3, 728 S.E.2d 45, 51 n.3 (Ct. App. 2012) () . See generally Rule 205, SCACR () .
Reece contends the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to convict her because the remittitur was not issued until after her trial. We find the pretrial order was not immediately appealable. See State v. Samuel, 411 S.C. 602, 604, 769 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2015) ; State v. Rearick, 417 S.C. 391, 400, 790 S.E.2d 192, 196 (2016) (); State v. Looper, ___ S.C. ___, ___, 807 S.E.2d 203, 206 (2017) ( ). Thus, Reece's filing of the notice of appeal from the order did not divest the trial judge of jurisdiction. See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) ( ); see also State v. Dingle, 279 S.C. 278, 282, 306 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1983) (, )abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). Accordingly, the remittitur was not necessary to return full jurisdiction to the trial judge because the trial judge was never divested of jurisdiction. See S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Arnold, 287 S.C. 584,586, 340 S.E.2d 535, 536 (1986) (); id. at 585-86, 340 S.E.2d at 536 ( ).
3. We affirm the trial judge's denial of Reece's motion for directed verdict. Reece conceded at trial and concedes on appeal that the sole issue before the trial judge was whether she was under the influence of drugs at the time of the accident. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2945(A) (2017) (...
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