State v. Reese
| Decision Date | 14 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 56505,56505 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Samuel Norbert REESE, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Gene E. Voigts, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.
M. E. Stokes, St. Louis, for appellant.
In 1955, defendant pleaded guilty to two charges of first degree murder and one charge of armed robbery. In State v. Reese (Mo.Sup. banc) 457 S.W.2d 713 an appeal from the action of the trial court in overruling a motion to vacate under rule 27.26, V.A.M.R., this court held that in all three pleas there was 'a total lack of any attempt at compliance with our rules', in that despite defendant's known low level intelligence, the severity of the sentences that could be imposed, and the possibility the sentences could run consecutively, there was nothing done by the trial court to determine the pleas were voluntarily made with understanding of the nature of the charge, as required by rule 25.04. 1
We reversed the judgment and ordered defendant be permitted to withdraw two of his pleas and have a trial on the merits on one of the murder charges and in the armed robbery charge. This was in accord with our long-standing rule reiterated in the Reese opinion, supra, 457 S.W.2d l.c. 717, that a guilty plea should not be received unless it is made voluntarily and understandingly. Then, however, contrary to what we have done in past cases where there has been a defective plea, we withheld judgment as to withdrawal on the plea in the other murder charge, involving the death of one George Zagib, pending a further evidentiary hearing, the court expressing the view that if defendant could not explain an admission contained in a letter written to Judge Aronson by defendant from the penitentiary in 1968 that he was a principal in the George Zagib death and a reference to 'the one man I have killed', no manifest injustice under rule 27.25 could possibly result from denial of permission to withdraw the plea 'regardless of any errors the trial court may have made.' 2
In the evidentiary hearing, it turned out the letter, state's exhibit 1, which had been returned to Judge Aronson, who died in the meantime, had been lost, without fault of either side, and no one could find a copy. Defendant did not testify. He had testified at length in the original 27.26 hearing. In that hearing the state took the position he must maintain his innocence in order to withdraw his plea and, over objection, was permitted to cross-examine him as to whether or not he participated in the crimes charged. He denied shooting Mr. Zagib or participating in his robbery. He was then cross-examined on the admissions appearing in the letter, as set forth in State v. Reese, supra, 457 S.W.2d l.c. 716--717. Defendant then offered the letter in its entirety, but it was excluded on the objection of the state that it contained hearsay and was self-serving. The position of defendant's counsel at the second hearing and as stated here on oral argument was that his analysis of the cases on post conviction motions to vacate sentences or withdraw guilty pleas had convinced him that the testimony of a defendant alone, in a 27.26 hearing or supplementary hearing, is not sufficient to obtain relief, and in view of the fact the letter in which the court was interested could not be found, he did not believe further testimony from defendant would be helpful to him. So there was no evidence presented at the second hearing.
The trial court thereupon overruled the motion to withdraw the plea in the Zagib case, holding that when the 1968 letter was written, defendant was a reasonably intelligent individual and his admissions should be believed in absence of exculpation appearing in the letter or otherwise, and hence there was no manifest injustice in not allowing withdrawal of the plea under rule 27.25, regardless of any error of the trial court in originally accepting the plea.
The present appeal followed.
We have concluded we were following a false issue in our earlier opinion when, after having found all three pleas were improperly accepted, for the reasons set forth in the opinion, we withheld action on the withdrawal of the third plea pending defendant's explanation of the statements contained in the 1968 letter. Those statements, of course, would be admissible against defendant in a subsequent trial on the merits, but inquiry into a defendant's guilt or innocence, where a guilty plea has been accepted which is not understandingly and knowingly made, has not heretofore been considered a pertinent or necessary inquiry on a motion to withdraw the plea.
There are many reported decisions in Missouri where attempts have been made to withdraw guilty pleas after sentence. The courts have consistently granted relief, without inquiry as to whether defendant is in fact innocent or guilty, where the facts have shown that the plea was not entered voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the charge. See, for example, State v. Williams (Mo.Sup. banc) 361 S.W.2d 772; State v. Blaylock (Mo.Sup.) 394 S.W.2d 364; State v. Arnold (Mo.Sup.) 419 S.W.2d 59; State v. Smith (Mo.Sup.) 421 S.W.2d 501; State v. Edmondson (Mo.Sup.) 438 S.W.2d 237; State v. Rose (Mo.Sup.) 440 S.W.2d 441; Burrell v. State (Mo.Sup.) 461 S.W.2d 738; Doepke v. State (Mo.Sup) 465 S.W.2d 507. In most of these cases it has been apparent defendant had no defense or was in all probability guilty. 3
These cases have not elaborated on the fundamentals behind our willingness to let a defendant withdraw his plea where it has not been made voluntarily and understandingly, but in that circumstance, as used in rule 27.25, 'manifest injustice', or its absence, should not be equated with ultimate innocence or guilt and withdrawal permitted or denied on what we speculate the true facts are in this regard, with no trial on the merits. This becomes apparent when we stop to consider that any and all defendants, regardless of guilt or innocence, are guaranteed a jury trial and are entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence. See discussion in Bellew v. Swenson (Mo.Sup.) 459 S.W.2d 351, 355.
These two safeguards are among the most primal and elemental of any we have. 'The right to have a trial by jury is a fundamental right in our democratic system, and is recognized as such in the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Federal Constitution, and the constitutions of the various states', 47 Am.Jur.2d, Jury, Sec. 7. It is guaranteed as to criminal trials in Missouri by Art. I, Sec. 18(a) and 22(a) of the 1945 Constitution, V.A.M.S.
In State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S.W.2d 596, 602, this court, en banc, said of
A guilty plea is a waiver or relinquishment of these protections and if the plea is invalid because it is not knowingly and understandingly made, as we held in the first appeal is true in all three pleas in this case, then it deprives the defendant of safeguards which are rightfully and properly his, no matter whether he is in fact innocent or guilty of the crime charged. This deprivation by means of a defective plea is itself manifest injustice, and one so deprived is entitled to have his guilty plea set aside and receive a trial on the merits, which is the appointed and appropriate place to arrive at a determination of guilt or innocence, Bellew v. Swenson, supra. The law does not provide one method of trying innocent persons and another for trying guilty persons. 4
Where the trial court complies with rule 25.04 and does not accept the guilty plea until it is first determined the plea is made voluntarily and with understanding of the nature of the charge, then, of course, there can be no manifest injustice of the sort here involved, because the giving up by defendant of the right to a jury trial, the presumption of innocence, confrontation frontation of witnesses, and privilege against compulsory self incrimination--all concomitants of pleading guilty--is done voluntarily and knowingly.
Rules 25.04 and 27.25 were adopted effective January 1, 1953 as part of the original criminal rules of this court. They have remained unchanged and were intended to complement each other, not conflict, as would result if a defendant's application to withdraw his plea is to be judged solely on the basis that relief under rule 27.25 turns on his guilt or innocence, without regard to whether the plea was in fact made voluntarily and understandingly. In addition, the ramifications of examining guilt or innocence in post conviction proceedings would be farreaching and could convert every post conviction hearing into a trial on the merits, because if the state can defeat the proceeding by proving the defendant is guilty, fairness would dictate the defendant be permitted to prove he is not guilty.
We have earlier mentioned cases where we have permitted withdrawal of pleas where not made voluntarily and understandingly. On the other hand, where the plea has been entered voluntarily and understandingly--that is, in compliance with rule 25.04--in almost every instance, relief has been denied. 5 See the numerous cases cited under k274, Criminal Law, West's Missouri Digest. This, however, is not the case before us.
As can be seen from examination of articles published at or near the time the rules of criminal procedure were adopted by this court after the proposed draft was submitted by the court's Advisory Committee of Criminal Practice and Procedure to the bar of the state, rule 27.25 with its 'to correct manifest injustice' language was taken from the federal criminal rule 32(d). In a leading federal case on the subject, the United States Supreme Court has held that where an application is made...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Sanders
...argument because the argument diminished the presumption of innocence afforded to all persons whether guilty or innocent. State v. Reese, 481 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Mo. banc 1972). Prosecutor: We talked about voir dire, on voir dire, the principles. He was presumed innocent. You can see by the ov......
-
Beishir v. State
...second appeal from the original convictions, and that the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendants is not before us, State v. Reese, 481 S.W.2d 497 (Mo. banc 1972). Nevertheless, in this post conviction review and our consideration of whether defendants' constitutional rights we......
-
Crow v. State
...guilty plea in the chicken stealing case the plea was invalid because it was not knowingly and understandingly made, citing State v. Reese, Mo., 481 S.W.2d 497; and, (B) that prior convictions other than the chicken stealing and attempted jailbreak were considered in the application of the ......
-
State v. Harris
...of innocence. As said by Judge Hollingsworth in State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S.W.2d 596(1, 2) (banc 1951), and repeated in State v. Reese, 481 S.W.2d 497, l.c. 499 (Mo. banc 1972): 'This is no mere procedural presumption. It is substantive, basic; there is no Defendant contends on appe......