State v. Reeves

• Decision Date: 04 February 1889
• Citation: 10 S.W. 841,97 Mo. 668
• Parties: STATE v. REEVES.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

10 S.W. 841

97 Mo. 668

STATE v. REEVES.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 4, 1889.

1. SEDUCTION — CRIMINAL PROSECUTION — SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

Under Rev. St. Mo. §§ 1259, 1912, making it a felony to "seduce and debauch" an unmarried female of good repute, under promise of marriage, and providing that, the evidence of the woman as to such promise must be "corroborated to the same extent required of the principal witness in perjury," it is error, on a trial for such an offense, to instruct that as to the promise of marriage there must be evidence to corroborate that of the woman, which may be supplied from the circumstances of the case, as the degree of proof required by the statute is ignored by such an instruction.

2. SAME — CORROBORATIVE TESTIMONY.

The instruction is also faulty for failing to designate the circumstances which would supply the necessary corroboration, and for the omission to define "corroboration."

3. SAME — REQUISITES OF CRIME.

In such case, an instruction that if the defendant promised the prosecutrix, an unmarried female of good repute, to marry her, on the faith of which she allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her, the defendant should be convicted, is erroneous, for omitting the element of seduction from the essentials of the crime.

4. SAME.

An instruction that if defendant had carnal intercourse with the prosecutrix, and that she submitted to him without promise of marriage, he should be found not guilty, should be given at the instance of defendant, there being evidence tending to establish that state of facts.

5. SAME — EVIDENCE — COMPETENCY.

There being conflicting evidence as to the material facts in the case, and no prosecution having been instituted until more than a year after the birth of the child alleged to be the result of the connection between the prosecutrix and defendant, during which time the latter married, it is error to refuse to allow the prosecutrix to be asked, on cross-examination, if the idea of prosecuting him did not first present itself to her after his marriage, as that fact might tend to throw light on the animus of the prosecutrix.

6. SAME — FELONY.

Under said section 1259, making said offense punishable either by confinement in the penitentiary, or by fine and imprisonment in the county jail, and section 1676, defining a "felony" as any offense liable to be punished by confinement in the penitentiary or death, such offense is a felony, and not within the statute of limitations.

7. CRIMINAL LAW — INDICTMENT — MOTION TO QUASH.

A motion to quash an indictment may be entered pending a plea of not guilty, and will not effect a withdrawal of the plea.

BLACK, J., dissenting.

Appeal from circuit court, Callaway county; G. H. BURCKHARTT, Judge.

Indictment against William M. Reeves for seducing and debauching Zerelda Hall, an unmarried female. On the trial, in November, 1888, the prosecutrix testified that she was unmarried, and 17 years old; that she became acquainted with defendant in July or August, 1886, and that he came to see her about that time. Defendant told prosecutrix that he would marry her if she would allow him to have carnal intercourse with her, which she did, being persuaded by his promise, and by love and sympathy. At the time of the trial the child which resulted from that intercourse was 15 months old. The first intercourse occurred in December, 1886, in Callaway county. She stated that he kept renewing his promise of marriage, and, therefore, she never instituted criminal proceedings until a few days before the trial. No one prompted her to complain but her father. She could not say how often she had intercourse with him; whether as often as 12 times or not, but probably as many as 6 times, but never before he promised to marry her.

L. B. Hall, father of the prosecutrix, testified that she was 17 years old August 21, 1888; that he knew defendant, who began coming to his house in 1886 to see prosecutrix. He asked witness' consent to allow her to marry him in August, 1888, which he gave. Defendant went to see her two or three times a week. Other men came to the house of witness about the same time, but not many. Witness mentioned 11 men who sometimes visited at his house, some of whom came to see prosecutrix, and stated that the prosecutrix stayed at the house of defendant's mother about a week.

Ida Hall, a sister of prosecutrix, stated that she was 15 years old, and that defendant, prior to December, 1886, came to visit prosecutrix very often, and in August, 1888, she heard him ask her father to give his written consent to his marriage with prosecutrix. Witness heard defendant ask prosecutrix to marry him in the presence of her father and mother, to which prosecutrix answered that she would think about it. A number of witnesses testified to the good reputation of the prosecutrix, and one stated that defendant acknowledged that he was the father of her child.

Defendant was himself a witness in his own behalf, and stated that he became acquainted with prosecutrix in June, 1886, and commenced to go to see her, going quite frequently. He first had connection with her in the latter part of July, 1886, in the yard, at the house of a Mr. Jones, where they remained from about 8 or 9 o'clock at night until 1 in the morning, and from that time had intercourse with her frequently. There was no promise of marriage made. He simply asked her for it, and she said he could get it. The second time she refused to yield at first, but he insisted, and she consented. Witness could not tell the number of times he had connection with her, they were so many. He also mentioned the names of four other young men that took liberties with her. Witness never told her that he loved her, to induce her to have intercourse, but did tell her that she was good looking, to which she replied that he was a good looking fellow. Her way of lying around on him first induced him to make the proposal.

There was other evidence, but it was of little consequence, some tending to show bad character of the prosecutrix, and some in rebuttal.

The jury found defendant guilty, and fixed his punishment at three years in the penitentiary. A motion to set aside the verdict was overruled, and judgment entered thereon. Defendant appeals.

Rev. St. Mo. § 1676, defines "felony" to be any crime for which the offender is liable, on conviction, to be punished with death or confinement in the penitentiary.

B. G. Boone, Atty. Gen., for the State. Crews & Thurmond and I. W. Boulware, for appellant.

SHERWOOD, J.

Indicted for the seducing and debauching, under the promise of marriage, Zerelda Hall, the defendant, put upon his trial, was found guilty, his punishment assessed at three years in the penitentiary, judgment and sentence accordingly, and he appeals to this court. For the reversal of the judgment numerous grounds are assigned, which are to be passed upon in this opinion.

1. The motion to quash the indictment, though filed with the consent of the court, and after a plea of not guilty entered, but not withdrawn, did not have the effect of withdrawing that plea. A motion to quash is in the nature of a demurrer. It certainly occupies no higher plane; and at common law a defendant in a prosecution for a felony might, at one and the same time, enter his plea of not guilty to the indictment, and his demurrer to the sufficiency thereof, and, upon the indictment being held sufficient in law, he would be triable on his pending plea of not guilty, just as if no demurrer had been interposed. And the like was true of a plea in bar or in abatement interposed at the same time with a plea of not guilty. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 435, 440; 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 23, § 128; Id. c. 31, § 6, and cases cited. But, though this was true in cases of felonies, the rule did not cover misdemeanors. Id. This explains the view taken in State v. Copeland, 2 Swan, 626, and Hill v. State, 2 Yerg. 248, where the offenses charged were only misdemeanors. These considerations rule the point raised against the defendant, and an eminent text-writer regards the doctrine here announced as the better one; holding, as he does, that a motion to quash is in order at any time down to the rendition of the verdict, and this without any withdrawal of pleas. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 762.

2. The crime charged in the indictment was, under the provisions of section 1259, Rev. St., a felony, because punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary; and the fact that it might be punished by a lighter punishment does not rob it of its felonious attributes. This is well settled. Rev. St. § 1676; Johnston v. State, 7 Mo. 183; Ingram v. State, Id. 293; State v. Green, 66 Mo. 632. For these reasons the statute of limitations, (section 1705, Rev. St.,) invoked by defendant, does not apply here, and the prosecution was begun in time.

3. By our statute it is made a crime for any person, "under promise of marriage" to "seduce and debauch any unmarried female of good repute," etc. Section 1259, Rev. St., and section 1912, Id., provide that, in trials for that crime, the evidence of the woman, "as to such promise, must be corroborated to the same extent required of the principal witness in perjury." Section 1912. The statutes of no other state have such stringent provisions in regard to the quantum of evidence necessary to convict of the crime of seduction. Thus it will readily be seen that decisions of other states, authorizing convictions for that offense, possess but little worth in determining how to apply such a rigid statute as ours....