State v. Reeves

Decision Date03 February 2022
Docket NumberDocket: Was-21-86
Citation268 A.3d 281,2022 ME 10
Parties STATE of Maine v. Carine REEVES
CourtMaine Supreme Court

Rory A. McNamara, Esq. (orally), Drake Law LLC, York, for appellant Carine Reeves

Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of Maine

Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.

CONNORS, J.

[¶1] After an eight-day jury trial, Carine Reeves was convicted of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A) (2021). On appeal, Reeves argues that the trial court (Washington County, Stewart, J. ) erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to comply with the Interstate Compact on Detainers. He further contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by holding bench conferences in the hallway and denying his mid-trial motion to represent himself. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[¶2] Because Reeves's arguments on appeal focus only on process and procedure, our summary of the facts constituting the offense is succinct. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the trial record supports the following facts. See State v. Murray , 2021 ME 47, ¶ 2, 259 A.3d 1276. Carine Reeves trafficked drugs from New York to Maine with the aid of the victim and another associate. On July 18, 2017, Reeves, the victim, and the associate drank alcohol at a home in Machias and then left in a rental car. During the drive, Reeves became angry at the victim, struck her, pulled over, and dragged the victim out of the car. He then struck the victim in the face with his handgun, kicked her, and shot her in the head, killing her. He and his associate then made their way back to New York.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[¶3] On July 25, 2017, the State charged Reeves by criminal complaint with intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), and the court (Mallonee, J. ), issued a warrant for his arrest. A grand jury later indicted Reeves for the same offense.1

[¶4] Several days later, Reeves was arrested in New York. There was an outstanding New York warrant for Reeves's arrest stemming from an earlier incident in which he allegedly slashed a woman's face, and, in August 2018, Reeves was found guilty of felonious assault with intent to dismember or disable and was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in New York. Reeves was also convicted of assaulting a corrections officer in New York based on an incident that occurred while he was awaiting trial and was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment.

[¶5] In September 2018, the State of Maine lodged a detainer against Reeves, who was still incarcerated in New York. In May 2019, the State requested temporary custody of Reeves pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate Compact on Detainers (the Compact). See 34-A M.R.S. § 9604(1) (2021). The State took temporary custody of Reeves on January 22, 2020, which started the Compact's 120-day deadline to bring Reeves to trial. See id. § 9604(3). The deadline was due to expire on May 21, 2020. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 45.

[¶6] On January 24, 2020, Reeves was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was initially set to commence on May 18, 2020.

[¶7] Before the trial could begin, however, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the judicial system and daily life for the people of Maine. In light of the public health risks posed by the pandemic, the Supreme Judicial Court issued an emergency order on March 13, 2020, postponing all jury trials, as well as the vast majority of criminal matters, until May 1, 2020. See Emergency Order and Notice from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court Courthouse Safety and Coronavirus (COVID-19) at 1-3 (Mar. 13, 2020); see also Revised Emergency Order and Notice from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court Courthouse Safety and Coronavirus (COVID-19) at 1-2 (Mar. 18, 2020). Subsequent orders postponed the resumption of jury trials until September 7, 2020. See, e.g. , PMO-SJC-1 State of Maine Judicial Branch Pandemic Management Order at 3 (revised May 28, 2020).

[¶8] On March 30, 2020, the trial court (Stewart, J. ) issued an order noting that it was "of the view that it is not possible to assemble jurors or conduct jury trials in May." The court indicated that it was inclined to continue the trial date but gave parties until April 3, 2020, to file objections and show cause why the trial should not be continued.

[¶9] On April 3, 2020, Reeves filed a speedy trial demand as well as a motion objecting to the proposed continuance and anticipatorily moving to dismiss the indictment due to noncompliance with the Compact. See 34-A M.R.S. § 9604(3). Reeves argued that the trial court did not have the authority to order a continuance because good cause had not been shown in open court. See id. To address the issue, the court held a telephonic conference on April 7, 2020, which was apparently not recorded and does not appear in the docket record.

[¶10] On April 15, 2020, the court entered an order continuing the trial. The court reasoned that due to the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's pandemic management orders prohibiting jury trials, good cause existed to continue the trial.2 The court noted that the continuance was not being granted in open court, as "suggested" by the statute, but concluded that it would be contrary to the Supreme Judicial Court's orders—and a public health risk—to hold a hearing in open court. The court tentatively scheduled the trial to begin on August 24, 2020, although the trial was later postponed until September 2020.

[¶11] On June 8, 2020, Reeves filed a second motion to dismiss, reiterating his arguments regarding the alleged failure to comply with the Compact and noting that the 120-day period to bring him to trial had now expired. See id. After a hearing in July 2020, the court denied the motion to dismiss for the same reasons articulated in its April 2020 continuance.

[¶12] Jury selection for the trial began on September 21, 2020, and the trial began on September 24, 2020. On the first day of trial, Reeves's attorney informed the court that Reeves had requested to be present at all bench conferences. The court addressed this issue during the first bench conference, which was held in the hallway due to concerns about social distancing and COVID-19. The court ruled that although Reeves had the right to review the record, the practical concerns of allowing Reeves to be present at the bench conferences in the hallway outweighed Reeves's right to be physically present. Throughout the course of the trial, over a dozen such bench conferences were held in the hallway.

[¶13] On the fourth day of trial, the State called Reeves's associate to the stand. During cross-examination of the associate, Reeves's lead attorney declined to ask some questions suggested by Reeves. Immediately after the witness was excused, Reeves interrupted the proceedings, asking that the lead attorney be removed and the second-chair attorney be permitted to take over.

[¶14] The next day, the court held a hearing on Reeves's dispute with his lead attorney. Reeves raised several grievances about the lead attorney and again requested that the second-chair attorney take over the case or, in the alternative, that he be permitted to represent himself.

[¶15] Applying the standard set forth in State v. LaBare , 637 A.2d 854, 855-56 (Me. 1994), the court found that none of the issues raised by Reeves was sufficient to justify replacing the lead attorney.3 The court then addressed whether Reeves could represent himself. Citing State v. Brown , 342 Md. 404, 676 A.2d 513 (1996), the court concluded that Reeves's right to self-representation became limited once trial had commenced. The court made findings about the quality of the representation already provided, the reasons for Reeves's request, the potential disruptive effects on the trial, the timing of the request, the complexity of the remaining proceedings, and whether Reeves had previously sought to discharge counsel. After weighing these factors, the trial court denied Reeves's request to represent himself.

[¶16] After the jury found Reeves guilty of intentional or knowing murder, the trial court sentenced him to forty-eight years’ imprisonment to be served concurrently with his New York sentence. He timely appeals.4

III. DISCUSSION
A. The trial court did not err in denying Reeves's motion to dismiss based on the Interstate Compact on Detainers.

[¶17] The Compact is a statutory alternative to extradition adopted by forty-eight states, including Maine and New York. See 34-A M.R.S. §§ 9601 - 9636 (2021) ; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 580.20 (Consol. through 2021 released Chs. 1-833); State v. Beauchene , 541 A.2d 914, 917 (Me. 1988). It is an interstate agreement designed to facilitate the trial of defendants who are imprisoned in one jurisdiction but have charges pending against them in a different jurisdiction. See Beauchene , 541 A.2d at 917 ; Leslie W. Abramson, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers: Narrowing its Availability and Application , 21 New Eng. J. Crim. & Civ. Confinement 1, 2 n.7 (1995). Because the agreement is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact made pursuant to the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 10, cl. 3, the agreement is subject to federal construction. See New York v. Hill , 528 U.S. 110, 111, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) ; State v. Caulk , 543 A.2d 1366, 1368 (Me. 1988).

[¶18] Because the Compact is intended to "encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition" of charges pending in one jurisdiction against prisoners who are incarcerated in another jurisdiction, see 34-A M.R.S. § 9601, it sets strict deadlines. Pursuant to Article IV, when the receiving state requests delivery of a defendant, the trial against that defendant must begin...

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