State v. Refrigerated Transport, Inc., 10862
| Decision Date | 28 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. 10862,10862 |
| Citation | 348 S.W.2d 241 |
| Parties | STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. REFRIGERATED TRANSPORT, INC., Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Will Wilson, Atty. Gen., Morgan Nesbitt, John C. Phillips. Asst. Attys. Gen., Charles E. Crenshaw, Austin, for appellant.
Phinney, Hallman & Pulley, Dallas, for appellee.
This is a suit brought by the State of Texas on behalf of the Department of Public Safety under the terms and provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Article 2524-1, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.) to construe the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued to appellee, Refrigerated Transport, Inc. In addition, the suit asked for injunction under the provisions of Article 1690b of the Penal Code to restrain the transportation of certain commodities by apellee. Appellee-defendant denied plaintiff's allegations and by cross action prayed for declaratory relief consistent with appellee's interpretation of its certificate. From a judgment denying all relief to all parties the State has appealed.
This litigation concerns the question of what appellee is authorized to transport under its certificate and involves a proper construction of the meaning of the language of the certificate.
Appellee is a specialized motor carrier authorized to transport:
'Meats, vegetables and other commodities requiring refrigeration in transit, between all Texas points within a 300 mile radius of San Antonio, Texas.'
The prime questions is whether appellee is authorized under its certificate to transport for hire in intrastate commerce Hershey's chocolate syrup and cocoa and Wrigley's chewing gum.
The appellant, the State, contends that such commodities do not require refrigeration and that transportation of such is beyond the authority of the certificate, and therefore unlawful, entitling the State to an injunction. Appellee asserts that as to the three commodities that the certificate language means that it is authorized to transport such and to haul any commodity that may be requested by the shipper to be refrigerated, kept cool, or protected from heat.
The State says that the reference to 'other commodities' as used in the certificate must be construed to refer to commodities such as 'meats and vegetables' in the sense that such 'other commodities' will spoil of perish unless refrigerated during the time required for intrastate transit (a period of not more than approximately 15 hours), and further that the word 'require' used in its normal sense means 'must', 'necessary' or 'compelled to'; that it is important to a construction of the language of the certificate that is the concept that 'physical characteristics' or inherent nature of the commodity itself is the determining factor as to whether such commodity will spoil or perish in transit unless refrigerated.
Appellant emphasizes this because Section 1(i)(4) of the Motor Carrier Law, Article 911b, V.A.C.S., beng the section of the statute under which Certificate No. 6629 was issued, states that:
'For the purpose of this Act, the term 'property requiring special equipment's is limited to * * * (4) commodities which by reason of [their] length, width, weight, height, size, or other physical characteristic require the use of special devices, facilities or equipment for their loading, unloading, and transportation.'
We believe that this is a proper case for the application of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act and that the Trial Judge should have granted, as in his judgment was proper, declaratory relief for one or the other of the parties.
The appeal is based on three points and are that the Court erred in refusing to render a declaratory judgment, construing the terms of the certificate with respect to transportation of Hershey's chocolate products and Wrigley's gum; in refusing to grant an injunction because appellee was without authority to transport such mentioned items, because there was no evidence that such items required refrigeration; and because appellee was without authority to transport products and gum in question under the terms of its certificate.
The State sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction, and appellee joined issue by its answer and brought its cross action and alleged that the Court had jurisdiction to determine the questions of interpretation and construction of the order and to declare the rights of the parties thereunder.
The subject matter in this suit involves important questions of public interest. The enforcement officials of the Department of Public Safety are concerned, large shippers...
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...matters affected with the public interest. Section 22b, Article 911b, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes; State of Texas v. Refrigerated Transport, Inc., (Austin CA 1961) 348 S.W.2d 241, 243, The precise question that we are obliged to answer is this: Is this final judgment (in State v. Central)......
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