Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Central Forwarding, Inc.

• Citation: 535 S.W.2d 412
• Decision Date: 25 March 1976
• Docket Number: No. 5515,5515
• Parties: ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL FORWARDING, INC., et al., Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas

Page 412

535 S.W.2d 412

ALLIED VAN LINES, INC., et al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL FORWARDING, INC., et al., Appellees.

No. 5515.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas Waco.

March 25, 1976.

Rehearing Denied April 15, 1976.

Doherty, Robertson & Maxwell, Pat H. Robertson, Austin, for appellants.

Robinson, Felts, Starnes & Nations, Mert Starnes, Austin, for appellees.

OPINION

JAMES, Justice.

This case involves the interpretation of the meaning of the motor carrier authority contained in a Specialized Motor Carrier Certificate issued by the Railroad Commission of Texas. The trial court sustained the plea in abatement filed by Defendant-Appellees and dismissed the suit of Plaintiff-Appellants Allied Van Lines, Inc ., et al. We affirm.

Plaintiff-Appellants Allied Van Lines, Inc., and seven other motor carriers filed this suit against Defendant-Appellees Central Forwarding, Inc., and Public Service Movers, Inc., seeking a declaratory judgment to interpret the meaning of the motor carrier authority contained in Specialized Motor Carrier Certificate No. 31166 which was under lease from Public Service to Central Forwarding, Appellees herein. The suit also sought injunctive relief against Appellees. The certificate in issue conferring the intrastate right to haul for hire reads as follows:

'Household goods from Dallas, Texas, to and from all points in Texas.'

Appellants sought in the trial court a declaratory judgment interpreting the motor carrier authority in issue as authorizing Appellees to transport:

'Household goods from Dallas to all points in Texas, and from all points in Texas to Dallas.'

Appellants Allied Van Lines, Inc., et al., are all holders of authority authorizing the transportation of household goods to, from, or between specified points in Texas, are competitors of Appellees, and by said suit sought to protect their vested property rights in their existing motor carrier operating authorities.

Appellees Central Forwarding et al., filed a plea in abatement to Appellants' suit alleging in effect that Appellants were barred from bringing the instant suit because the same issues were litigated prior thereto in the case of The State of Texas v. Central Forwarding, Inc., Cause No. 198,083, in the 200th District Court of Travis County, Texas, which last-named cause resulted in a final judgment dated December 28, 1972.

On June 8, 1972, while the certificate in issue was owned by Central Forwarding the Attorney General of Texas, at the request and on behalf of the Department of Public Safety, and in the name of The State of Texas, pursuant to Article 911b, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, Article 1690b of Vernon's Penal Code (now Section 16, Article 911b, V.T.C.S.), and Article 2524--1, V .T.C.S., brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, which cause was styled, 'The State of Texas v. Central Forwarding Inc.,' No. 198,083, in the 200th District Court of Travis County, Texas. As stated above, this last-named suit resulted in a judgment dated December 28, 1972, in which judgment the trial court was called upon to construe the identical Specialized Motor Carrier Certificate as the same trial court was called upon to construe in the case at bar. In State v. Central, the judgment construed the certificate to authorize Central Forwarding to transport 'household goods to and from all points in Texas,' without reference to the words 'from Dallas, Texas'; in fact, it held the words 'from Dallas, Texas,' to be mere surplusage. The judgment in State v. Central was not appealed, and same became a final judgment.

Thereafter, and after the judgment in State v. Central had become a final judgment, on April 8, 1974, Plaintiff-Appellants Allied Van Lines, et al., filed the instant suit against Appellees Central Forwarding, et al., for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, seeking to obtain a construction of the motor carrier's certificate contrary to the construction placed on same by the judgment of the court in State v. Central.

As stated, Defendant-Appellees filed a plea in abatement in the case at bar, which was sustained by the trial court, resulting in a dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellants' suit.

The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. We herewith quote pertinent portions of the conclusions of law:

'2. Plaintiffs are precluded from maintaining this suit by virtue of this court's prior Final Judgment in Cause No. 198,083, State of Texas v. Central Forwarding, Inc., because the subject matter and issues involved in this suit, and the relief sought herein, are precisely the same subject matter, issues and relief involved and sought in State of Texas v. Central Forwarding, Inc., and Section 16 of Article 911b (formerly Article 1690b of the Penal Code) authorizes and empowers the State of Texas, on behalf of the Department of Public Safety, by and through the Attorney General, to enforce the Motor Carrier Law, Art. 911b, V.A.T.S., and to represent all citizens and entities of the state which are interested therein, and judgments rendered in Section 16 proceedings are binding upon all persons.

'3. The judgment of this Court in State of Texas v. Central Forwarding, Inc., is a judgment In rem, declaring the meaning, status and scope of that authority now contained in Specialized Motor Carrier Certificate No. 31166, and is binding upon all the world, including these Plaintiffs.

'4. Plaintiffs are bound by this Court's prior judgment in Cause No 198,083 under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because the necessary identify of parties between that prior suit and this suit is established under Art. 1690b of he Penal Code (and now under Section 16 of Article 911b), as in suits instituted under such statute the State and its Departments represent all persons interested in the subject matter of such proceedings, and because the matters adjudicated in State of Texas v . Central Forwarding, Inc., were necessarily matters affecting the public interest, and the State of Texas therefore virtually represented all its citizens interested in the subject matter thereof, including these Plaintiffs.'

Appellants among other things assert error of the trial court in holding:

(1) that Section 16 of Article 911b, V.T.C.S., authorizes and empowers the State of Texas, on behalf of the Department of Public Safety, by and through the Attorney General, to enforce the Motor Carrier Law (Article 911b, V.T.C.S.) and to represent all citizens and entities of the State which are interested therein, and judgments rendered in Section 16 proceedings are binding upon all persons.

(2) That the prior decision in State of Texas v. Central Forwarding Inc., is a judgment In rem and binding against Appellants.

(3) That the matters adjudicated in State of Texas v. Central Forwarding, Inc., were matters affecting the public interest, and that Appellants were virtually represented by the State of Texas in the prior suit.

Since we are of the opinion that the prior judgment is a judgment in rem; and further, that in the case at bar the doctrine of virtual representation applies, we overrule the above-mentioned points of error asserted by Appellants and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At the outset, let us say that there is no question but that the matter of construction of the Specialized Motor Carrier Certificate in question, and the business of operating as a motor carrier of property for hire along the highways of this State are matters affected with the public interest. Section 22b, Article 911b, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes; State of Texas v. Refrigerated Transport,...