State v. Reinier

• Decision Date: 13 December 2000
• Docket Number: 99-1963
• Parties: STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TAMMY JO REINIER, Defendant-Appellant./ 99-1963 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA Filed
• Court: Iowa Court of Appeals

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee vs TAMMY JO REINIER, Defendant-Appellant

No. 0-625 / 99-1963

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

Filed December 13, 2000

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis, Judge.

The defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon the district court ruling finding her guilty of possession of amphetamines with intent to deliver. AFFIRMED.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie Cox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.

VAITHESWARAN, J.

While searching the Des Moines home of Tammy Jo Reinier, police discovered methamphetamine, marijuana, and other drug-related items. Charges were filed and, following a bench trial, the district court adjudged Reinier guilty of four drug crimes. On appeal, Reinier contends the court should have suppressed the seized items on the ground the officers entered her home illegally and the search was therefore unconstitutional. We disagree and affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Des Moinespolice officers Blad and Westlake received a complaint that Reinier might be involved in drug activity at her work place. They conducted surveillance of her home for approximately one week and, after noting nothing suspicious, decided to walk up to the door and ask Reinier for consent to search her home. They knocked on the outer door of a closed area characterized by the State as a porch. Reinier answered the knock and the officers entered the porch area. Reinier subsequently signed a consent to search the home. On entering the living room, the officers discovered methamphetamine, cash, marijuana, a scale, a scanner, an address book, phone book and drug notes, packaging materials, a bottle of pills, and various other items.

The State charged Reinier with: (1) possession of a controlled substance (amphetamine) with intent to deliver; (2) conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance; (3) possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver; (4) failure to possess a drug tax stamp; and (5) possession of a controlled substance (marijuana). See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(b)(7), (5), (10)(b)(8); 453B.3; 453B.12 (1997). Reinier moved to suppress items seized from the home. The district court denied the motion following a hearing and the case proceeded to trial before the court. The court found Reinier guilty of all but the conspiracy count and sentenced her to prison terms not to exceed twenty-five years on the possession with intent to deliver counts, one year on the tax stamp count, and six months on the possession count, to be served concurrently. This appeal followed.

II. Suppression Ruling

A. Contentions on Appeal. Reinier contends the officers' entry onto the porch violated her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. She maintains this entry tainted the subsequent search of her home. She also maintains her later consent to the search was not voluntary. The State responds that Reinier had no expectation of privacy in her porch under the Fourth Amendment and Iowa Constitution and, even if she did, she consented to the porch entry. The State additionally argues the written consent form Reinier signed cured any illegality associated with the entry.

B. Standard of Review. We review constitutional issues de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1999). We interpret the Iowa Constitution consistently with federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Showalter, 427 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Iowa 1988).

C. Search and Seizure Law. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect persons against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Iowa Const. art. I, § 8; State v. Jones, 586 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Iowa 1998). A search occurs when the government unreasonably intrudes upon a person's legitimate expectation of privacy. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1998). A search and seizure without a valid warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L. Ed. 2d. 290, 298 (1978). These exceptions include searches based on consent. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 45. Evidence obtained in violation of these constitutional guarantees cannot be used in a criminal prosecution against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S. Ct. 613, 619, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571 (1974); State v. Carlson, 548 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Iowa 1996).

D. Porch Entry. It is undisputed the officers entered Reinier's porch area without a warrant. Therefore, we must decide whether Reinier had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the porch area triggering the constitutional protections set forth above. If she did, the officers' entry would be per se unreasonable unless supported by a valid exception, in this case, consent.

1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy. The determination of whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular location is made on a case-by-case basis, considering the unique facts of each situation. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 46. Photographs of Reinier's home reveal the "porch" was an enclosed structure with siding, a screen door and what appeared to be a solid wood door. Cf. State v. Kitchen, 572 N.W.2d 106, 107 (N.D. 1997) (noting outer door was metal storm/screen door with large, glass, uncovered window); State v. Edgeberg, 524 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Wis. App. 1994) (noting porch had only wooden screen door that opened with a lightweight latch). The structure also had glass-encased windows covered with blinds. The outer wall of the structure was the same length as the rest of the home and appeared to be part of the home. On the inside of the structure was a finished ceiling with a decorative light fixture and a smoke detector. Officer Blad testified these pictures accurately depicted the structure as it was when she entered it. Additionally, Reinier testified the door to the porch had a deadbolt that she unlocked when the officers knocked. She also testified the porch contained her belongings, including collectibles.

We find the "porch" was in fact a portion of Reinier's home. We accordingly conclude Reinier had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that area. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1384, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 653 (1980) (noting in no setting "is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home . . . ."); State v. Ahart, 324 N.W.2d 317, 319 (Iowa 1982) (noting core of Fourth Amendment is protection of security of home against arbitrary intrusion by police); cf. Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1376 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting defendant arguably had an expectation of privacy in front porch because it was area immediately surrounding residence); Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 45-47 (concluding defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in area leading from outer door of apartment building to apartment door); People v. Greene, 682 N.W.2d 354, 358 (Ill. App. 2d 1997) (noting defendant had lesser expectation of privacy in vacant porch); State v. Dykstra, 926 P.2d 929, 933 (Wash. App. 1996) (concluding defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in back porch).

2. Consent. Because Reinier had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the porch area, the officers' entry into that area was per se unreasonable unless the State could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Reinier voluntarily consented to the entry. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, 100 S.Ct. at 1384, 63 L. Ed. 2d at 651; State v. Hatter, 342 N.W.2d 851, 854 (Iowa 1983); State v. Brown, 309 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Iowa 1981). Voluntariness is a fact issue to be determined from all the circumstances. State v. Ahern, 227 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Iowa 1975). "This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 802 (1968). We conclude Reinier's conduct amounted to nothing more than acquiescence to the officers' claimed lawful authority to be on her porch.

Officer Blad testified that after she and her partner knocked on Reinier's door, Reinier "opened the door really wide." She went on to state, "I don't recall if I specifically asked, 'Hey, it's cold out here. Can I come on in?' But I felt there was an invitation to come to the porch." She stated she and Westlake then stepped into the porch area, identified themselves, and explained they were there to investigate a complaint of narcotics activity. Blad conceded on cross-examination she did not indicate in her police report that Reinier consented to the entry. She further stated, "I told you I don't recall if she specifically acknowledged or spoke to let us in or if it was just an invite by physically opening the door really wide. I don't recall."

Reinier described the entry as follows:

I seen two people standing there, and I just said, "Yes?" And they said, "Are you Tammy or Debbie?" And I said, "Well, depends on who you are." And at that time they started to walk in and I just backed up.

We find from this testimony Reinier did not explicitly consent to the officers' entry into the porch area.

The next question is whether one could infer voluntary consent from Reinier's conduct. The district court found:

"[t]he defendant's actions as well as words did consist of an invitation to enter, and the...