State v. Heffelman

• Decision Date: 09 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 69878,69878
• Citation: 256 Kan. 384,886 P.2d 823
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jim L. HEFFELMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 823

886 P.2d 823

256 Kan. 384

STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Jim L. HEFFELMAN, Appellant.

No. 69878.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Dec. 9, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Rules of statutory construction are stated and applied.

2. K.S.A. 22-3210 embodies the due process requirements for a trial court's acceptance of a plea of guilty as mandated in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).

3. A failure to comply strictly with the explicit requirements of K.S.A. 22-3210 may be reversible error, unless upon review of the

entire record it can be determined the pleas were knowingly and voluntarily made and otherwise accepted by the trial judge in compliance with the statute.

4. A trial court's failure to enter a judgment of guilty on the record when taking a plea in a criminal case is a procedural error which can be waived by the defendant.

5. When the record, docket entry, and subsequent actions by the court and parties indicate that the defendant intended to plead guilty, the plea was properly taken, sentencing followed, and there was no objection to the process, the failure of the judge to orally articulate an express entry of judgment of guilt will not invalidate the plea, conviction, or sentence.

6. State v. Morse, 18 Kan.App.2d 268, 855 P.2d 87 (1993), is overruled.

Stephen C. Moss, Asst. Appellate Defender, argued the cause, and Jessica R. Kunen, Chief Appellate Defender, was on the brief, for appellant.

Debra S. Peterson, Asst. Dist. Atty., argued the cause, and Mark Jordan, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Nola Foulston, Dist. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.

HOLMES, Chief Justice.

Jim L. Heffelman appeals from the sentence imposed following his pleas of guilty to numerous counts of burglary, theft, and forgery. Defendant asserts an error in the plea procedure based upon the failure of the trial judge to specifically state that he entered judgment finding the defendant guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in an unpublished opinion No. 69,878 filed April 8, 1994. 874 P.2d 1214. We granted the defendant's petition for review to resolve a conflict between two opinions of the Court of Appeals: State v. Jacobson, 18 Kan.App.2d 788, 860 P.2d 47 (1993), rev. denied December 23, 1993, and State v. Morse, 18 Kan.App.2d 268, 855 P.2d 87 (1993).

The facts are not in dispute. On May 26, 1992, the defendant was arraigned on 12 counts of forgery, contrary to K.S.A. 21-3710(1)(a); 6 counts of burglary, contrary to K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-3715(1); and one count of felony theft and 5 counts of misdemeanor theft, all contrary to K.S.A. 21-3701(a). On August 17, 1992, pursuant to the terms of a plea bargain, the defendant pled guilty to 5 counts of burglary, 10 counts of forgery, and 5 counts of misdemeanor theft. Prior to accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court satisfied the due process requirements set forth in K.S.A. 22-3210. Specifically, the trial court advised the defendant of the rights he was forfeiting by pleading guilty and informed the defendant of the consequences of his pleas, including the maximum penalty provided by law which the court could impose. The trial court further determined the defendant's pleas were freely and voluntarily given and that a factual basis existed for his pleas. Nevertheless, while the trial court accepted defendant's guilty pleas, the court failed to explicitly enter a judgment on defendant's guilt.

During sentencing, the trial court suspended defendant's sentence for three years and placed him in community corrections. Within six months, the defendant violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence, and the trial court imposed sentence with a controlling term of 5 to 25 years. On March 1, 1993, defendant filed a motion to modify sentence. The trial court denied defendant's motion to modify sentence on April 30, 1993. The defendant timely appealed the trial court's decision.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant without entering a formal judgment of guilt in open court at the time of the acceptance of the defendant's pleas. A resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of relevant statutory language in K.S.A. 22-3210(b). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and when determining a question of law, this court is not bound by the decision of the district court. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc. v. Knutson, 239 Kan. 663, 668, 722 P.2d 1093 (1986). Statutory construction is subject to unlimited appellate review. Steele v. City of Wichita, 250 Kan. 524, 527, 826 P.2d 1380 (1992).

State v. Royse, 252 Kan. 394, 396, 845 P.2d 44 (1993), sets forth various cardinal rules of statutory construction pertinent to the issue under review:

"The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs. State v. Cole, 238 Kan. 370, 371, 710 P.2d 25 (1985). When a penal statute is questioned, the court is required to strictly construe the act in favor of the accused. State v. Cole, 238 Kan. at 372, 710 P.2d 25. However, this rule of strict construction concerning penal statutes is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effectuate legislative design and intent. State v. Fowler, 238 Kan. 213, 215, 708 P.2d 539 (1985). Words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary meaning. State v. Magness, 240 Kan. 719, 732 P.2d 747 (1987); Szoboszlay v. Glessner, 233 Kan. 475, 478, 664 P.2d 1327 (1983)."

We now turn to the statutes before us. K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-3110(4), a definitional statute, provides that " '[c]onviction' includes a judgment of guilt entered upon a plea of guilty." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3210(b) provides: "In felony cases the defendant must appear and plead personally and a verbatim record of all proceedings at the plea and entry of judgment thereon shall be made." (Emphasis added.)

Defendant argues that the plain and express language of both K.S.A. 22-3210(b) and K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-3110(4) require the trial court to enter a judgment of guilt in open court. He also maintains the subsequently filed journal entry adjudging the defendant guilty does not cure the trial court's failure to make a proper entry of judgment in open court. Specifically, the defendant asks this court to adopt the holding in State v. Morse, 18 Kan.App.2d 268, 855 P.2d 87, and disapprove the more recent and opposite holding on this question in State v. Jacobson, 18 Kan.App.2d 788, 860 P.2d 47.

The State maintains, however, that the relevant statutory language at issue does not require the trial court to utter any specific "magic words" to indicate that a judgment of guilt has been entered by the trial court. The State's argument, which is consistent with the reasoning set forth in Jacobson, is that when the court's action examined as a whole indicates that (1) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered pleas of guilty; (2) the appropriate procedures were properly followed in accepting the guilty pleas; and (3) there was no objection to the procedure followed, the requirements of K.S.A. 22-3210(b) have been met even though the court does not specifically state it finds the defendant guilty or that it is entering a judgment of guilty.

The Court of Appeals summarily dispatched the defendant's arguments, stating:

"Defendant argues his sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing because the trial court failed to make a finding of defendant's guilt.

"In State v. Morse, 18 Kan.App.2d 268, 855 P.2d 87 (1993), we concluded that in order for a defendant to be convicted, a trial court must not only accept defendant's guilty plea, but also must enter a finding of defendant's guilt in open court.

"However, in State v. Jacobson, 18 Kan.App.2d 788, 793, 860 P.2d 47 (1993), rev. denied December 23, 1993, the issue was revisited by this court, and we concluded if the record, docket entry, and later actions by the court and parties indicate defendant intended to plead guilty, and that if the plea was properly taken and defendant was sentenced with no objection to the process, failure of the court to orally articulate an express acceptance of defendant's guilty plea will not invalidate the plea and conviction. 18 Kan.App.2d at 793, 860 P.2d 47. We find the Jacobson decision to be more persuasive than the Morse decision."

The Jacobson and Morse decisions present a split of authority between two panels of the Court of Appeals on the issue of whether a trial court, when accepting a plea of guilty, must enter a judgment of guilt in open court. Accordingly, this court has been called upon to make a determination as to which Court of Appeals decision is controlling on this issue. See In re Marriage of Cray, 254 Kan. 376, Syl. p 1, 867 P.2d 291 (1994).

In Morse, the court reviewed the relevant language of "entry of judgment," found in K.S.A. 22-3210(b), to determine whether the trial court's failure to enter a judgment of guilt in open court constituted error, requiring defendant's sentence to be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. Under the facts, the defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State, pled guilty to the charges remaining, and was sentenced accordingly. However, while the trial court accepted the defendant's plea, the court failed to enter an express judgment of guilt in open court.

The Morse court raised the issue sua sponte and determined that the language of K.S.A. 22-3210(b) was clear and unambiguous in its requirement that an express entry of judgment must be made in open court prior to sentencing. In pertinent part, the court stated: "To have a conviction, it is imperative that the trial court make a determination of the defendant's guilt and utter the magic words finding him guilty." (Emphasis added.) 18 Kan.App.2d at 270, 855 P.2d 87. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied a strict and...