State v. Reynolds , No. M2003-02991-CCA-R3-CD (TN 2/28/2005)
| Decision Date | 28 February 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. M2003-02991-CCA-R3-CD.,M2003-02991-CCA-R3-CD. |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ANNETTE REYNOLDS. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Giles County; No. 10814; Robert L. Jones, Judge.
Judgments of the Trial Court Affirmed.
William J. Eledge, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the appellant, Annette Reynolds.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General; and Beverly White and Patrick Butler, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Gary R. Wade, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David H. Welles and John Everett Williams, JJ., joined.
The defendant, Annette Reynolds, was convicted of facilitation of possession of cocaine for resale, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to concurrent sentences of fifteen years and eleven months, twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and contends that there was prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. She also claims that the trial court made several errors: by denying discovery regarding the identity of the confidential informant whose information led to the search warrant for her residence; by denying her motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search; by admitting the presentence report at sentencing; and by sentencing her as a career offender. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
On August 8, 2002, Investigator L.C. Gill of the Pulaski Police Department executed a search warrant for crack cocaine and related paraphernalia at a residence rented by the defendant at 427 Maple Street. A woman later identified as Julie Thompson was in a parked car in front of the house at the time the officers arrived. The engine was running. Once inside the house, officers found the defendant and Ms. Thompson's husband, George Thompson, in a bedroom. A bag containing eight rocks of crack cocaine, later determined to weigh 1.6 grams, was on the dresser. Each of the rocks had a street value of $20. Ratasha Coffee, Theresa Perry, Ricky Coleman, and William Reynolds were also at the scene. Ms. Perry had a crack pipe and a knife. Reynolds had $487 in his possession. Officers also seized $47, a crack pipe, and a Brillo pad found in the possession of the defendant. Officers did not find scales, baggies, or baking soda, which is used to make crack cocaine.
The defendant did not present any proof. The jury returned verdicts of guilt for facilitation of possession of cocaine for resale, a lesser included offense on the original indictment for possession with intent to resell, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Initially, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's proof. She claims that the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove that she constructively possessed the crack cocaine.
Rule 29 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure empowers the trial judge to direct a judgment of acquittal when the evidence is insufficient to warrant a conviction either at the time the state rests or at the conclusion of all the evidence. Overturf v. State, 571 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. 1978). At the point the motion is made, the trial court must favor the opponent of the motion with the strongest legitimate view of the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, and discard any countervailing evidence. Hill v. State, 470 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). The standard by which the trial court determines a motion for judgment of acquittal at that time is, in essence, the same standard which applies on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the evidence after a conviction. State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Anderson, 880 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). That is, "whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
A criminal offense may be established exclusively by circumstantial evidence. Duchac v. State, 505 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Tenn. 1973); Marable v. State, 203 Tenn. 440, 313 S.W.2d 451, 456-58 (1958); State v. Hailey, 658 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). If entirely circumstantial, the facts and circumstances must "be so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant." State v. Crawford, 225 Tenn. 478, 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (1971). In such an event, the circumstantial evidence must be both consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence. Pruitt v. State, 460 S.W.2d 385, 3990 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970). The weight of the circumstantial evidence is for the jury to determine. Williams v. State, 520 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974) (citing Patterson v. State, 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 657, 475 S.W.2d 201 (1971)). The court may not substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact in circumstantial evidence cases. Liakas v. State, 199 Tenn. 298, 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (1956); Farmer v. State, 574 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). The same standard of review is applicable whether the guilty verdict was based upon direct evidence or upon circumstantial evidence. State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977); Farmer v. State, 208 Tenn. 75, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (1971).
This court has described constructive possession as follows:
"Constructive possession requires that a person knowingly have `the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.'" United States v. Craig, 522 F.2d 29 (6th Cir. 1975). "In essence, constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual possession." United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1979).
State v. Williams, 623 S.W.2d 121, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). Additionally, "[t]he mere presence of a person in an area where drugs are discovered is not, standing alone, sufficient to support a finding that the person possessed the drugs." State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 125, 129 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). Similarly, "mere association with a person who does in fact control the drugs or property where the drugs are discovered is insufficient to support a finding that the person possessed the drugs." Id.
In order to support a conviction for facilitation of possession to resell, the state need not prove that the defendant possessed the illegal drugs, either actually or constructively, as an element of the crime. "It is illegal for a defendant to knowingly: . . . [p]ossess a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver or sell such controlled substance." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(4). Possession of more than point five (.5) grams of cocaine is a Class B felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(c)(1). A defendant may be criminally responsible for the facilitation of a felony if, knowing that another intends to commit a specific felony, but without the intent required for criminal responsibility under § 39-11-402(2) [], the [defendant] knowingly furnishes substantial assistance in the commission of the felony." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-403(a).
This offense occurred inside the defendant's residence. Officers found the illegal drug in plain sight in a bedroom occupied by the defendant and George Thompson, whose wife was waiting outside. Ms. Thompson was in the driver's seat of an automobile and the engine was running. There were four other persons in the residence, one of whom had a crack pipe and another of whom had a large sum of cash. Although the defendant was charged with possession to resell, the jury rejected that offense, possibly because there was no direct evidence regarding the ownership of the drug. Nevertheless, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, by providing the use of her residence, knowingly furnished substantial assistance in the commission of a felony.
Under Tennessee Code Annotated 39-17-425, "it is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this part." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-425(a)(1). The record indicates that police seized a crack pipe that was in the actual possession of the defendant. Under these circumstances, the evidence is also sufficient to support conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.
Next, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to exercise its authority as thirteenth juror. The state disagrees.
Rule 33(f) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence." The purpose of the thirteenth juror rule is to be a "`safeguard . . . against a miscarriage of justice by the jury.'" State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting State v. Johnson, 692 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Tenn. 1985)). The rule requires that the trial judge must be personally satisfied with the verdict. State v. Dankworth, 919 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995).
In State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995), our supreme court acknowledged the restoration of the thirteenth juror rule as it existed at common law, thereby...
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