State v. Rhoads, A10–1568.
| Decision Date | 01 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. A10–1568.,A10–1568. |
| Citation | 802 N.W.2d 794 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent,v.Denon Anthony RHOADS, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. When new charges are added to a criminal complaint after an accused has waived the right to counsel, the district court shall obtain a renewed waiver of counsel in conformity with Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4). Failure to obtain a renewed waiver under Minn. R.Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(4) is reversible error unless the record as a whole clearly and convincingly establishes that the failure is not prejudicial to the defendant.
2. A six-month delay between arrest and trial does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial when the defendant does not make a speedy-trial demand until four months have passed and the delay did not prejudice the defense.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R, Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sharon E. Jacks, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.Considered and decided by MINGE, Presiding Judge; PETERSON, Judge; and SCHELLHAS, Judge.
Appellant challenges his convictions for first- and second-degree burglary under Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c), 2(a)(1) (2008), arguing that (1) there was insufficient evidence to prove he entered the building without consent; (2) his initial waiver of his right to counsel on the second-degree burglary charge was ineffective due to his mental condition and due to the state's addition of a charge of first-degree burglary after he provided his waiver; (3) his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; and (4) he was improperly adjudicated guilty of both first- and second-degree burglary. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not inquiring into whether appellant's mental condition affected his waiver of counsel. Although the district court erred in not obtaining appellant's waiver of his right to counsel on the additional charge of first-degree burglary, the record clearly and convincingly establishes that it was not prejudicial to construe his prior waiver of counsel to second-degree burglary as a continuing waiver to the first-degree charge. Therefore, we affirm on the waiver-of-counsel question. We further conclude that appellant was not denied a speedy trial, that there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict, but that the second-degree burglary charge was a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction of first-degree burglary but vacate the conviction of second-degree burglary.
John Ryan was at his apartment when appellant Denon Rhoads, with black tape on his face, entered the building in which the apartment was located, forcefully entered the apartment, and went to the bedroom where Ryan was located. Rhoads accused Ryan of reporting him to the police for an unrelated incident and punched him. Ryan pulled a knife from under his mattress and Rhoads retreated back into the living room. Rhoads then threatened to kill Ryan and a friend who was visiting Ryan before leaving the apartment.
Rhoads was arrested on October 9, 2009, and charged with second-degree burglary under Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 2(a)(1). He was not able to post bail, and a public defender was appointed to represent him. At the time of his first appearance, the prosecutor apparently told Rhoads's attorney that if Rhoads pleaded guilty to the pending second-degree burglary charge, he would not amend the complaint to add a first-degree burglary charge. The offer was not pursued. At Rhoads's second appearance, in October 2009, Rhoads discharged his public defender attorney, waived his right to counsel, and proceeded pro se. At the time of his discharge, the public defender gave Rhoads a completed and signed demand for a speedy trial. The district court also appointed advisory counsel at that time. Rhoads did not file the speedy-trial form with the district court or verbally request a speedy trial until February 10, 2010.
During Rhoads's initial hearings, he complained of not being released on his own recognizance and of not getting all the medications he needed, reaffirmed his desire to represent himself, and complained that he was frustrated with repeated court appearances without a trial. On a couple of occasions he also complained of the lack of legal resources available to him. The record at the early hearings indicates that he had been previously institutionalized for mental illness and that he appeared agitated.
In December 2009, the prosecutor again stated that unless Rhoads pleaded guilty to second-degree burglary, the state would amend the complaint to add a charge of first-degree burglary. Rhoads again declined the offer. The state then amended the complaint to include the first-degree burglary charge. During several continuances of the trial date, the prosecutor continued to offer to drop the first-degree charge in return for a guilty plea to second-degree burglary, and the district court repeatedly made inquiries whether Rhoads wished to have counsel appointed. On April 8, 2010, Rhoads reiterated his waiver of his right to a jury, repeated his determination to represent himself, and a bench trial was held. The district court found him guilty of both burglary counts and sentenced him to 92 months in prison. This appeal follows.
I. Was the evidence sufficient to support the conviction for first-degree burglary?
II. Did Rhoads's initial waiver of counsel remain valid and does the record clearly and convincingly demonstrate that Rhoads was not prejudiced by the failure to renew his waiver after the first-degree burglary charge was added to the complaint?
III. Was Rhoads denied his right to a speedy trial?
IV. Is second-degree burglary a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary?
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conduct a thorough analysis to determine whether the factfinder reasonably could find the defendant guilty of the charged offense based on the facts in the record and the legitimate inferences that can be drawn from those facts. State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 477 (Minn.1999). In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the factfinder believed the evidence supporting the guilty verdict and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. Id. This is especially true when resolution of the matter depends mainly on conflicting testimony. State v. Pieschke, 295 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn.1980).
To support a conviction of first-degree burglary, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) entered a building; (2) without consent; and (3) assaulted a person within the building. Minn.Stat. § 609.582, subd. 1(c). “Whoever enters a building while open to the general public does so with consent except when consent was expressly withdrawn before entry.” Minn.Stat. § 609.581, subd. 4 (2008).
At trial, Ryan testified that Rhoads did not have consent to enter the apartment. Ryan stated that when a friend stepped out of his apartment, he asked her to prop open both the door to his apartment and the outside common entrance of the apartment building so he would not have to let her back into the building. However, the apartment door was not propped open all the way, and Rhoads kicked it open when he entered. Rhoads himself testified, “I'm not denying the fact that I broke in, that I didn't ask him.” Although Ryan's apartment door was ajar and anyone could have entered his apartment by simply pushing on the door, the fact that his door was cracked open did not constitute an invitation to enter or consent to Rhoads's entry.
Ryan further testified that Rhoads was there because Ryan had reported him to the police and Rhoads wanted retribution. Rhoads's approach belies any innocent intentions in entering the apartment. Rhoads went to the apartment with black tape on his face—an apparent attempt to disguise his identity. The black tape supports the conclusion that Rhoads was there for malevolent reasons. Finally, Rhoads did not contest that he had a grudge against Ryan and assaulted him while in the apartment. Assuming that the district court believed the evidence in support of the conviction, Ryan's testimony alone is sufficient for the conviction. See State v. Miles, 585 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn.1998) ().
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. Criminal defendants also have a “corollary constitutional right to choose to represent themselves in their own trial.” State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 279 (Minn.1998) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). The right to an attorney can be waived if the waiver is “competent and intelligent.” Id. at 275 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), overruled on other grounds, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981)). This court reviews a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel to determine whether the “record supports a determination that [the defendant] knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel.” State v. Garibaldi, 726 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Minn.App.2007). We will only reverse the finding of a valid waiver if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Jones, 772 N.W.2d 496, 504 (Minn.2009) (citation omitted). If the waiver is inadequate, we remand for a new trial. Garibaldi, 726 N.W.2d at 831.
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