State v. Rhodes

• Decision Date: 10 February 1981
• Docket Number: No. 14175,14175
• Citation: 274 S.E.2d 920,166 W.Va. 402
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia v. Lawrence Mahlon RHODES.

Page 920

274 S.E.2d 920

166 W.Va. 402

STATE of West Virginia v. Lawrence Mahlon RHODES.

No. 14175.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Feb. 10, 1981.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "In a criminal trial, a psychiatrist testifying on the issue of insanity should be permitted to make unrestricted use of the information elicited by him during his interview with the defendant and should further be permitted to make reference to information available to him in the form of records or documents whose reliability has been reasonably established and which have been kept in the regular course of professional care or treatment of the defendant, provided that such information either from the interview or the records is information taken into consideration by the psychiatrist in arriving at his diagnosis." Syllabus Point 1, State v. Myers, W.Va., 222 S.E.2d 302 (1976).

2. Where a defendant is unable to be tried in a particular term because of his incompetency to stand trial, such term should not be counted under our three-term statute, W.Va.Code, 62-3-21.

3. "The defendant has a right under Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution to be present at all critical stages in the criminal proceeding; and when he is not, the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that what transpired in his absence was harmless." Syllabus Point 6, State v. Boyd, W.Va., 233 S.E.2d 710 (1977).

4. "The State may by appropriate proof rebut an allegation made by a criminal defendant that he was absent during a critical stage of the criminal proceeding." Syllabus Point 2, Fields v. Whyte, W.Va., 242 S.E.2d 463 (1978).

Crandall, Pyles, Crandall & Poyourow and Bradley J. Pyles, Logan, for plaintiff in error.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Tom Trent, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for defendant in error.

MILLER, Justice:

Lawrence Rhodes appeals from a 1972 final judgment of the Logan County Circuit Court sentencing him to a term of twenty-five years confinement on a conviction of armed robbery. He assigns three major errors, that: (1) the court unduly restricted the testimony of his psychiatrists; (2) the three-term rule contained in W.Va.Code, 62-3-21, precluded his trial; and (3) his absence from certain conferences during the trial violated his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of the trial. We find merit in the first and third ground, but not as to the second.

I.

The circumstances surrounding the delay in this appeal are contained in Rhodes v. Leverette, W.Va., 239 S.E.2d 136 (1977). At trial, Rhodes did not contest the fact that he had committed the robbery, but pled not guilty by reason of insanity. On appeal, he contends that certain evidentiary rulings of the trial court, which limited the form of the expert psychiatric testimony at trial, prejudiced his defense and constituted reversible error.

At the time of the trial, the "M'Naghten" rule was the law which controlled insanity pleas in this State. ¹ Under this rule in order to be relieved of criminal responsibility, a defendant must have been incapable of knowing the difference between right and wrong and knowing the nature and consequences of his acts. State ex rel. Burkhamer v. Adams, 143 W.Va. 557, 103 S.E.2d 777 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 869, 79 S.Ct. 102, 3 L.Ed.2d 101; State v. Painter, 135 W.Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950); State v. Fugate, 103 W.Va. 653, 138 S.E. 318 (1927); State v. Harrison, 36 W.Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1896).

During the appellant's trial a number of psychiatrists and one psychologist testified on the question of the appellant's mental state at the time the crime was committed. The trial court, in response to an objection by the State, made an evidentiary ruling which severely restricted the form of the psychiatric testimony. The appellant's psychiatric witnesses were permitted to state only their opinions on the ultimate question of whether he was insane.

The appellant's expert witnesses were not allowed to describe his mental condition by referring to the results of the psychiatric and psychological tests that they had conducted on the appellant. They were not allowed to explain the purpose and function of such tests nor describe the test results even though they based their diagnosis of insanity on them. The experts were not permitted to describe the etiology of his mental condition, but were left with a bare medical conclusion couched in the language of the "M'Naghten" rule.

While we have recognized in State v. McCauley, 130 W.Va. 401, 406, 43 S.E.2d 454, 458 (1947), that the trial court has considerable discretion as to the admissibility of testimony on the issue of insanity, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in its severe restrictions on the scope of the psychiatric testimony.

In regard to the evidence that may be introduced on the insanity issue, this Court has never adopted a restrictive position. In State v. Maier, 36 W.Va. 757, 15 S.E. 991 (1892), and State v. Price, 92 W.Va. 542, 115 S.E. 393 (1922), we recognize that both lay and expert testimony could be utilized. In Price, we stated that the insanity of blood relatives of the defendant might be shown "but before such evidence is admissible the duration and general nature of the insanity of such relatives should be shown, as well as that the accused exhibited signs of insanity of a more or less permanent nature which might be attributed in some degree to heredity." Syllabus Point 14, in part, State v. Price, supra.

In State ex rel. Burkhamer v. Adams, 143 W.Va. 557, 565-67, 103 S.E.2d 777, 783-84 (1958), dealing with evidence at a pretrial insanity hearing, it is clear that this Court approved the comprehensive inquiry made into the insanity issue. Our latest case is State v. Myers, W.Va., 222 S.E.2d 302 (1976), where we stated in Syllabus Point 1:

"In a criminal trial, a psychiatrist testifying on the issue of insanity should be permitted to make unrestricted use of the information elicited by him during his interview with the defendant and should further be permitted to make reference to information available to him in the form of records or documents whose reliability has been reasonably established and which have been kept in the regular course of professional care or treatment of the defendant, provided that such information either from the interview or the records is information taken into consideration by the psychiatrist in arriving at his diagnosis."

Other courts have adopted much the same rule in regard to the scope of the insanity inquiry. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C.Cir.1972); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); State v. McGill, 101 Ariz. 320, 419 P.2d 499 (1966); People v. Jones, 225 Cal.2d 598, 37 Cal.Rptr. 454 (1964); Tvrz v. State, 154 Neb. 641, 48 N.W.2d 761 (1951); Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949).

Our rule with regard to the scope of psychiatric testimony is a part of the general rule in regard to expert medical testimony which permits such experts to relate test results, the purpose of such tests, and the defendant's reaction to such tests. As we remarked in State v. Pendry, W.Va., 227 S.E.2d 210, 215 (1976), "such a rule is consistent with the progressive and logical trend of bringing judicial practice into line with the practice of experts themselves when not in court, thereby tending to make their testimony less artificial and more meaningful." Cf. Somerville v. Dellosa, 133 W.Va. 435, 56 S.E.2d 756 (1949); Curfman v. Monongahela West Penn Public Service Co., 113 W.Va. 85, 166 S.E. 848 (1932); Graves v. Katzen, 112 W.Va. 467, 164 S.E. 796 (1932); State v. Gunnoe, 74 W.Va. 741, 83 S.E. 64 (1914).

Of course, the purpose of permitting such medical evidence to be developed is to give the jury as complete an understanding as possible of the defendant's medical and mental condition in order that they might arrive at a proper verdict. Here, we believe the trial court's substantial restriction of the appellant's psychiatric testimony on the issue of his insanity resulted in reversible error ² as it prevented the jury from having relevant evidence on which to base a decision as to the appellant's insanity.

II.

The appellant also contends that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment of conviction because prosecution was barred by the State's failure to try him within three terms of his indictment. W.Va.Code, 62-3-21. ³ We have traditionally held that our statutory three-term rule requires an absolute discharge if three unexcused regular terms have passed. State v. Lacy, W.Va., 232 S.E.2d 521 (1977); State ex rel. Spadafore v. Fox, 155 W.Va. 674, 186 S.E.2d 833 (1972); State ex rel. Parsons v. Cuppett, 155 W.Va. 469, 184 S.E.2d 616 (1971).

Rhodes was first indicted at the May 1968 term of the Circuit Court of Logan County. At that time, he had fled the state, and while the record is not completely clear on the point, it appears undisputed that he remained out of this state until January 11, 1971, as which he was returned to Logan County on a West Virginia detainer. ⁴ His absence from this jurisdiction between 1968 and January 11, 1971, tolls the three-term statute for this period. W.Va.Code, 62-3-21. ⁵ State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W.Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961); State v. Gregory, 143 W.Va. 878, 105 S.E.2d 532 (1958).

The appellant's argument, however, is that three unexcused terms elapsed between his return in January, 1971, and his trial in July, 1972. The regular terms of the Circuit Court of Logan County commence the second Monday in January, May and September. By an order dated January 18, 1971, the court concluded that there was a substantial question as to his mental competency, and ordered him to undergo mental examinations by two doctors. By a further order entered on February 17, 1971, based on the reports of these two doctors, the appellant was found not...