State v. Rhodes

• Decision Date: 13 May 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-142,91-142
• Citation: 590 N.E.2d 261,63 Ohio St.3d 613
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. RHODES, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 613

63 Ohio St.3d 613

590 N.E.2d 261

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. RHODES, Appellee.

No. 91-142.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1992.

Decided May 13, 1992.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

A defendant on trial for murder or aggravated murder bears the burden of persuading the fact finder, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she acted under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which was brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that was reasonably sufficient to incite the defendant into using deadly force, R.C. 2903.03(A), in order for the defendant to be convicted of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder or aggravated murder. (State v. Muscatello [1978], 55 Ohio St.2d 201, 9 O.O.3d 148, 378 N.E.2d 738, construed and modified.)

On May 4, 1989, the Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellee, Cornell Rhodes, on one count of murder, under R.C. 2903.02. Rhodes was charged with the April 20, 1989 stabbing death of Annette Akins, with whom he shared an apartment. Following a jury trial, Rhodes was convicted of murder.

During the trial, conflicting testimony was presented as to whether the victim or the defendant was the initial aggressor. Substantial testimony was presented that the victim had a reputation for violence when she was intoxicated, and the victim's blood analysis revealed an alcohol level of "0.08 grams percentage" as well as the presence of an anti-anxiety, anti-itch medication called Hydroxyzine.

Appellee testified that prior to the fatal stabbing, the victim had thrown a glass figurine at him and had begun to stab at him with a knife. He further testified that the victim was stabbed during a struggle over the knife, after which defendant left the apartment, and told a neighbor to call 911.

After closing argument, the jury was charged. The charge included instructions on murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter and self-defense. The relevant portions of the court's instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter were as follows:

"The defendant is charged with murder. Before you can find the defendant guilty of murder, you must find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant on or about the 12th day of April, 1989, and in Franklin County, Ohio, purposely caused the death of Annette Akins.

"If a wound is inflicted with a deadly weapon in a manner calculated to destroy life, the purpose to cause the death may be inferred from the use of the weapon, along with all the other facts and circumstances in evidence.

"A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a certain result. To do an act purposely is to do it intentionally and not accidentally. Purpose and intent mean the same thing. The purpose with which a person does an act is known only to himself, unless he expresses it to others or indicates it by his conduct. Since you cannot look into the mind of another, you must determine purpose from all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

" * * * "As you consider murder, you may also consider the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter is knowingly causing the death of another, while the defendant is under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the defendant into using deadly force.

"Before you can find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter, you must find that the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 12th day of April, 1989, in Franklin County, Ohio, the defendant knowingly caused the death of Annette Akins.

"A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or he is aware that his conduct will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist. Since you cannot look into the mind of another, you must determine knowledge from all the facts and circumstances in evidence.

"Being under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the defendant into using deadly force[,] is a mitigating circumstance, which reduces what would otherwise be murder to voluntary manslaughter.

"The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted while under the influence of sudden passion or a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the defendant into using deadly force.

" * * *

"If you find that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant purposely caused the death of Annette Akins, and you find the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted while he was under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the defendant into using deadly force, then you must find the defendant guilty of murder.

"If you find that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant purposely caused the death of Annette Akins, but you also find that the defendant proved by a preponderance [sic ] that he acted while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which was brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that was reasonably sufficient to incite the defendant into using deadly force, then you must find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

" * * *

"Such passion is a mitigating circumstance, the existence of which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter. It is not, however, an element of the offense of voluntary manslaughter. If the defendant fails to establish such passion by a preponderance [sic ], the state must still prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of an offense before you can find the defendant guilty of that offense."

During the course of its deliberations, the jury sent out two questions, one of which requested a clarification "between the murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter verdicts." In response to the question, the court stated on the record that it would provide the jury with a written copy of the law relevant to the offenses.

On February 8, 1990, the jury reached a verdict and found Rhodes guilty of murder. Rhodes filed a timely appeal, and on November 27, 1990, the Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed and remanded his murder conviction. The court held that it was error to instruct the jury that a defendant who seeks to mitigate his offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter bears the burden to prove either of the mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. ¹

This cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

S. Michael Miller, Pros. Atty., and Alan C. Travis, Columbus, for appellant.

Vivyan, Graeff, Rigg & Schneider and David J. Graeff, Columbus, for appellee.

Randall M. Dana, Ohio Public Defender, Gregory L. Ayers and Shelly R. Smith, Columbus, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public Defender Com'n.

WRIGHT, Justice.

This case requires us to decide whether a defendant on trial for murder bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was "under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage either of which was brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that * * * [was] reasonably sufficient to incite the * * * [defendant] into using deadly force * * * "--the mitigating circumstances of R.C. 2903.03(A)--, in order for a jury to find the defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. In order to understand the import of the issue before us, a review of the law of voluntary manslaughter is necessary. The text of the relevant portion of the voluntary manslaughter statute, R.C. 2903.03(A), reads as follows:

"No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another."

R.C. 2903.03 defines voluntary manslaughter as a single offense that, under certain circumstances, permits a defendant to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter. The crime comprises elements that must be proven by the prosecution and mitigating circumstances that must be established by the defendant. ² Under the statute, the jury must find a defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than murder if the prosecution has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant knowingly caused the victim's death, and if the defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of one or both of the mitigating circumstances.

Voluntary manslaughter is, by our prior definition, an inferior degree of murder. State v. Tyler (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 36, 553 N.E.2d 576, 592. Accord State v. Deem (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294, paragraph two of the syllabus. Thus, if a defendant on trial for murder or aggravated murder (or the prosecution in such trial) produces evidence of one or both of the mitigating circumstances set forth in R.C. 2903.03, that evidence will be sufficient to entitle a defendant to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as an inferior degree of murder if under any reasonable view of the evidence, and when all of the evidence is construed in a light most favorable to the defendant, a reasonable jury could find that the defendant had established by a preponderance...