State v. Rice
Decision Date | 24 April 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 4107.,4107. |
Citation | 629 S.E.2d 393 |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Russell W. RICE, Jr., Appellant. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, and Assistant Attorney General Derrick K. McFarland, all of Columbia and Solicitor Robert M. Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.
Russell W. Rice, Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences for murder and trafficking in cocaine arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges. Rice contends he was prejudiced by having a single trial for both charges because the murder occurred six to seven weeks before the cocaine trafficking. We affirm.
In September or October of 2002, upon leaving a restaurant in Greenville, Rice discovered his car, a 1994 Mercury Topaz, had been stolen from the parking lot. Rice suspected Homer Johnson, an acquaintance who sold drugs, stole the car. Drugs and money were inside the vehicle when it was stolen.
On November 4, 2002, despite Rice's suspicion that Johnson had stolen his car, Rice and Johnson entered into a drug deal. Johnson possessed twenty pounds of marijuana that he, Rice, and another person, Johnny Hamby, "cut up" into twenty individual bags. Johnson gave Rice ten pounds of marijuana and told him he owed $11,000. Although Rice was unhappy that he received only ten pounds of marijuana, he told Johnson he would pay him the money the next day.
The following day, Rice phoned Hamby. He asked Hamby to call Johnson and tell him that Rice would meet him at a Super 8 Motel. Hamby relayed the message to Johnson. Johnson was murdered at the motel.
During the course of the police investigation, Daniel Fuller, the investigator assigned to the case, attempted to contact Rice numerous times by telephone. On December 26, Investigator Fuller spoke with Rice, who informed Fuller he was leaving town and would not return until December 30. Fuller was skeptical of Rice and began looking for Rice in Greenville. Fuller observed Rice driving a 1994 Mercury Topaz — the car Rice claimed Johnson had stolen from him a few months earlier. Fuller found the car at a motel and discovered it was not insured or properly registered in South Carolina. Further, the forty-five day paper tag had expired. Fuller set up surveillance at the exits of the motel.
When Rice left the parking lot, Corporal Dave Dempsey followed Rice and pulled him over. Rice was unable to provide proof of insurance. Dempsey and Fuller asked Rice to exit the vehicle. They patted Rice down to see if he had a weapon. Dempsey found a pistol in Rice's front pocket and $2,500. They arrested Rice for the traffic violations. The officers conducted an inventory search before they removed the car from the scene. A search of the trunk produced a large amount of cocaine, a scale, and a rifle cut into several pieces in a plastic bag. Rice was subsequently charged with murder and trafficking in cocaine.
Before trial, Rice moved to sever the murder and trafficking in cocaine charges. Rice argued the traffic stop occurred six to seven weeks after the murder and the only connection between the two was that a weapon was found with the cocaine. Therefore, Rice alleged, no nexus between the two charges existed. The State disagreed and claimed the reason for the stop was the murder. The State believed the rifle found in Rice's car was the murder weapon. The State contended the "drug transaction was at the root of the murder itself" and the two charges involved the same or similar evidence. The trial court denied the motion to sever the charges. A jury convicted Rice of both charges.
A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Walker, 366 S.C. 643, 623 S.E.2d 122 (Ct.App.2005); State v. Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 573 S.E.2d 856 (Ct.App.2002). The trial court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Harris, 351 S.C. 643, 572 S.E.2d 267 (2002); State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996); Walker, 366 S.C. at 656, 623 S.E.2d at 128; see also State v. Grace, 350 S.C. 19, 564 S.E.2d 331 (Ct.App.2002) ( ). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is unsupported by the evidence or controlled by an error of law. Walker, 366 S.C. at 656, 623 S.E.2d at 129.
Rice contends the trial court erred in refusing to sever the murder and trafficking in cocaine charges. Rice maintains the cocaine discovered in his car was unrelated to the murder that occurred six to seven weeks earlier. Therefore, Rice avers any evidence of cocaine trafficking was prejudicial to Rice in the murder trial, warranting severance of the charges. We disagree.
The appellate court considers several factors when deciding whether the trial court's consolidation of charges was proper. Where the offenses charged in separate indictments are of the same general nature involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character, the trial judge has the power, in his discretion, to order the indictments tried together if the defendant's substantive rights would not be prejudiced. State v. Cutro, 365 S.C. 366, 618 S.E.2d 890 (2005); State v. Smith, 322 S.C. 107, 470 S.E.2d 364 (1996); State v. Simmons, 352 S.C. 342, 573 S.E.2d 856 (Ct.App. 2002); State v. Jones, 325 S.C. 310, 479 S.E.2d 517 (Ct.App.1996); see also State v. Sullivan, 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981) ( ); McCrary v. State, 249 S.C. 14, 36, 152 S.E.2d 235, 246 (1967) ( ). Offenses are considered to be of the same general nature where they are interconnected. State v. Grace, 350 S.C. 19, 564 S.E.2d 331 (Ct.App.2002); Jones, 325 S.C. at 315, 479 S.E.2d at 519.
Conversely, offenses which are of the same nature, but which do not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and are not provable by the same evidence may not properly be tried together. See Simmons, 352 S.C. at 350, 573 S.E.2d at 860; Jones, 325 S.C. at 315, 479 S.E.2d at 519; see also State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 339 S.E.2d 692 (1986) ( ); State v. Tate, 286 S.C. 462, 334 S.E.2d 289 (Ct.App.1985) ( ). Cf. State v. Woomer, 276 S.C. 258, 277 S.E.2d 696 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) ( ); Simmons, 352 S.C. at 351, 573 S.E.2d at 861 (...
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