State v. Rich
| Decision Date | 31 January 1855 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE STATE, Appellant, v. RICH & RICH, Respondents. |
1. A law cannot be judicially declared unconstitutional, in a public prosecution, upon the admission by a circuit attorney of a fact upon which its unconstitutionality depends.
2. The unconstitutionality of a law establishing a new county cannot be inquired into upon a motion to quash an indictment found in a court of such county.
Appeal from Lawrence Circuit Court.
John W. and John Rich were indicted in the Circuit Court of Stone county, at the June term, 1853, for an assault. Upon their motion, the cause was subsequently removed by change of venue to the Circuit Court of Lawrence county. They there moved to quash the indictment, assigning as a reason that the law establishing the county of Stone was unconstitutional, because its effect was to reduce the population of Taney county below the legal ratio of representation. At the hearing, the circuit attorney admitted that such was the effect of the law, and thereupon, on, the court sustained the motion and quashed the indictment. The circuit attorney, on behalf of the State, appealed to this court. The cause was submitted without oral argument.
Gardenhire, (attorney general,) for the State.
The case of the State v. Scott, (17 Mo. 531,) and the State v. Gates, to be decided at the present term, will decide this case.
There was no brief for the respondents.
This judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded, to be proceeded into a final trial and determination.
The ground of the motion to quash the indictment was, that the act of the general assembly establishing the county of Stone, (Sess. Acts, 1851, p. 186.) where the indictment was found, was unconstitutional, because the establishment of this county had the effect of reducing the old county, (Taney,) from which it was taken below the ratio of representation then required; that, therefore, Stone county was not constitutionally established, and that, of course, there was, in point of law, no such court constituted as the Stone Circuit Court, where an indictment could be lawfully found; or, in other words, that there was no case lawfully in the Lawrence Circuit Court, which that court could proceed to try and determine. The circuit attorney admitted the alleged fact, and upon this admission, the court decided that the act of the general assembly referred to was contrary to the State constitution, and that, consequently, the Stone Circuit Court not being lawfully constituted, the indictment was a nullity, and must be quashed.
1. The invalidity of this act does not, as is usually the case, appear upon the face of the statute; it is impossible, therefore, to determine, from a comparison of the act with the constitution, that there is any conflict between them.
The old statute of this State, establishing loan offices, was declared to be a violation of the federal constitution, because it appeared upon the face of it that the paper certificates which it authorized to be issued were “bills of credits,” within the meaning of that instrument; but here, the alleged nullity depends upon an extraneous fact, that may or may not be true, that the erection of the new county left the old county with population less than the existing ratio of representation required.
A knowledge of the law is imputed to the courts of justice, and so nul tiel record cannot be pleaded to a public statute. (6 Bac. Abr. Stat., p. 394.) But the appeal is to the judges, who are supposed to know the law, and if the courts are to pass upon the validity of a legislative act, impeached on the ground that what it directs to be done produces an effect not allowed by the constitution, they must, of necessity, determine for themselves, in some way, the existence or non-existence of this fact. How they are to ascertain it, we need not stop here to enquire. It was the duty of the legislature to determine...
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