The State v. Layton
| Decision Date | 26 February 1901 |
| Parties | THE STATE v. LAYTON, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction. -- Hon. Willis H. Clark, Judge.
Affirmed.
Seddon & Blair and Stanley Stoner for appellant.
(1) The act in question conflicts with the provision of section 28 article 4, Constitution of Missouri, which provides that no bill "shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed." Kansas v. Payne, 71 Mo 159; State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1. (2) The Bill of Rights (section 4) provides "that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty and the enjoyment and the gains of their own industry, and that to give security to these is the principal office of government." And section 30, Bill of Rights, provides "that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Under these provisions the defendant Layton, as every other citizen of Missouri, has the equal right that every other citizen has of assuming his ordinary calling or trade in any wholesome and well established article of commerce, and as the law under which he is convicted forbids him to pursue such a calling, it is unconstitutional and void. 2 Hare on Constitutional Law, p. 772; Railroad v City, 67 Ill. 37; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 661; Taylor v. Bronson, 4 Hill, 144; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98; People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377; People v. Arensberg, 105 N.Y. 123. The following are differentiated and discussed: Powell v. Commonwealth, 127 U.S. 678; State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110. (3) The evidence offered by the defendant and ruled out by the court, brought to the attention of the court the fact that the trade in which the defendant was engaged was a lawful business, being the manufacturing and selling of a well-recognized article of commerce of almost universal acceptance after a test of more than twenty-five years of experience. This fact was a matter of common notoriety of which the court should have taken judicial cognizance. The fact that some people engaged in the business may or do commit frauds or by their want of skill or dishonesty injure others, does not render the business unlawful. Tiedeman on Constitutional Law, p. 289. (4) The law under which the defendant was convicted conflicts with the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees to every man the equal protection of the law. State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 55 S.W. 627.
Edward C. Crow, Attorney-General, Sam B. Jeffries, Assistant Attorney-General, and Stewart, Cunningham & Eliot, for the State.
(1) The act in question conforms to the requirement of section 28, article 4, of the Constitution. The bill contained no more than one subject, and that subject is clearly expressed in the title. State v. Bennett, 102 Mo. 364; State v. Burgdoerfer, 107 Mo. 1; State ex rel. v. Bronson, 115 Mo. 276; State ex rel. v. Jackson County Court, 102 Mo. 537; State ex rel. v. Marion County Court, 128 Mo. 441; State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 353; Hannibal v. Marion County, 69 Mo. 571; State ex rel. v. Ranson, 73 Mo. 78; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439; Lynch v. Murphy, 119 Mo. 163. (2) The statute here in controversy does not contravene section 4 of the Bill of Rights. It does not deny or impair the right of appellant or of any person to "life, liberty or the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry," within the meaning of that section. Neither does this statute violate section 30, article 2, of the Constitution. It does not deprive appellant or any person "of life, liberty or property without due process of law," within the meaning of that section. Neither section 4, nor section 30, of article 2, nor any other provision of the Constitution guarantees or gives to defendant the right to manufacture or sell for food, alum or any chemical or substance which the Legislature has declared to be unhealthy and forbidden. Appellant has no such constitutional right, even though he may, before the statute was enacted, have been engaged in the business of such manufacture and sale. State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110, affirming same case, 12 Mo.App. 214; State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678; Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. St. 265; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 667; Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645. (3) The trial court did not err in refusing to take judicial cognizance of the alleged fact that the trade of making and selling alum baking powders, in which defendant was engaged, was a lawful business; or that alum baking powder is a well-recognized article of commerce of almost universal acceptance. No such fact is a matter of common knowledge or of universal or even general acceptance. Neither did the court err in excluding evidence tending to prove such facts. The Legislature must be assumed to have considered all such evidence, and having decided contra, its decision is conclusive upon all such questions. Cooley Const. Lim. (5 Ed.), pp. 222, 223; State v. Rich. 20 Mo. 397; State v. Wiley, 109 Mo. 444; Ex parte Renfrow, 112 Mo. 595; State v. Daniels, 66 Mo. 202; State ex rel. v. Boone County Court, 50 Mo. 323; State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110; S. C., 12 Mo.App. 214; State v. Campbell, 64 N.H. 402; United States v. Des Moines, etc., 142 U.S. 545; People v. Chipperly, 101 N.Y. 634; S. C., 37 Hun., 324. (4) The statute in question does not conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. It does not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws; nor does it conflict with any other provision of the Constitution of the United States or of the Constitution of Missouri. There is in this case no question or subject of foreign or interstate commerce. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U.S. 16; Barnett v. Railroad, 68 Mo. 56; State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335; Butchers' Union, etc., Co. v. Crescent City, etc., 111 U.S. 750. (5) The subject of this legislation, the public health, and the prevention of the adulteration of food, is peculiarly within the power and protection of the Legislature. So long as the Legislature does not clearly exceed constitutional limitation its fiat on that subject is law, however unwise, unjust or hurtful its enactments may seem to the courts and the people. The enactment of the statute under consideration was a valid exercise of the police power of the State conferred by the Constitution upon the Legislature. 18 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (1 Ed.), p. 748, title, "Police Power;" Idem (2 Ed.), vol. 1, p. 739 et seq., title, "Adulteration;" Commonwealth v. Huntley, 156 Mass. 236; State v. Smyth, 14 R. I. 100; State v. Campbell, 64 N.H. 402; Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen, 264; Cooley Const. Lim. (5 Ed.), pp. 207, 206; Edwards v. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 430; State ex rel. v. Pond, 93 Mo. 619; Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 684; Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. St. 292; Thorpe v. Railroad, 27 Vt. 140; State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110; S. C., 12 Mo.App. 214; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84.
Seddon & Blair, Stanley Stoner and Winston & Meagher for appellant in reply.
(1) The title to the act is a deception and a fraud upon the public. The title to the act was apparently drafted with the intent and purpose of deceiving the public and the legislators, in that, from the title we must infer that it was sought to prevent the use of unhealthy chemicals or substances in the preparation or manufacture of any article used, or to be used, in the preparation of food, while in the body of the act we find the words "arsenic," "calomel," "bismuth," "ammonia" and "alum," used to designate "unhealthy chemicals or substances." Arsenic, calomel and bismuth are well-known poisons, and are never, as the evidence shows used in the preparation of food. On the other hand, it appears conclusively from the evidence in this case that for thirty years alum has been used as one of the constituents of baking powder. (2) A statute having for its manifest purpose the protection of the public health, or the prevention of fraud upon the public, is valid. A statute passed merely for the protection and fostering of one branch of an industry by prohibiting another branch of the same industry is invalid. Perhaps in no cases is this distinction better defined than in People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377 (2 N.E. 29), and People v. Arensberg, 105 N.Y. 123 (11 N.E. 277). (3) The tests by means of which it may be determined whether a statute exists for the protection of one industry at the expense of another, or is for the prevention of fraud upon the public, or the protection of the public health, depend in the first instance upon the wording of the statute itself. If an inferior article not naturally like another superior article, or one commonly supposed to be superior, is absolutely prohibited, even though it be labeled or identified, so that it can deceive no one as to its true character, then its validity or invalidity will depend upon whether the article prohibited is in general, injurious to the public health. This proposition has been well enunciated by Tiedeman in his work on the Limitations of Police Power, p. 289. The sole ground for the absolutely prohibitory statute to rest upon is that it is necessary for the protection of the public health. If, then, in the case at bar, it had only been proven that the particular article manufactured and sold by the appellant in this particular case was perfectly wholesome, there might be some force in the argument that the statute should be sustained; because the court, against the will of the...
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