State v. Richards
| Decision Date | 02 March 1926 |
| Docket Number | 5588. |
| Parties | STATE v. RICHARDS et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted February 16, 1926.
Syllabus by the Court.
If, in a homicide case, a juror on his voir dire shows to the satisfaction of the court that, notwithstanding a previously expressed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused his mind is free from bias and prejudice, and that he can give the defendant a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence, he is a competent juror, and should not be rejected from the panel of 20 called.
Although a juror so called answers on his voir dire that it will take evidence to change a previously expressed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, yet if it appears that such opinion is based solely on newspaper reports and reports current in the community, and the opinion merely tentative and he satisfies the court by unequivocal and satisfactory answers to questions that, regardless thereof, he can give the prisoner a fair trial according to the law and the evidence adduced on the trial, it is not reversible error to accept such juror, and if selected to try the case, the judgment upon a verdict of guilty will not be reversed on that ground.
To disqualify a juror in a homicide case on account of a previously formed and expressed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the opinion must have been deliberately and decidedly formed, and the juror thereby rendered uncertain as to his ability to try the case without bias or prejudice on the law and the evidence adduced at the bar of the court.
It devolves upon the trial court in the first instance before admitting it, to determine from evidence whether a confession of guilt has been freely and voluntarily made, and not under duress or threats, or by some inducement, made or held out to the accused by some one in authority, of benefit or reward of a worldly or temporal character, or in mitigation of punishment; and the burden is upon the state to show to the satisfaction of the court facts justifying the admission of such confession; and upon its admission the jury are then the final judges of the weight and effect that should be given such confession in connection with all the other evidence in the case as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The fact that a confession has been made to a public officer, as a sheriff or public prosecutor, will not render it inadmissible, provided it has been freely and voluntarily made, though in response to questions, if made without any threats or intimidations or promises of reward or immunity from punishment for the crime.
Error to Circuit Court, Doddridge County.
Ralph Richards, Roscoe Cross, and Samuel Elliott were convicted of murder, and they bring error. Affirmed.
M. K Duty, of Pensboro, for plaintiffs in error.
Howard B. Lee, Atty. Gen., and R. A. Blessing, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Defendants were indicted, tried and convicted of the murder of James Powell, on the night of December 23, 1924, at his home in Doddridge County, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the period of their natural lives.
To reverse the judgment of imprisonment pronounced on April 25, 1925, counsels' first proposition is, that the jury trying the case was unlawfully impaneled, in that the panel of twenty jurors from which the trial jury was selected were not qualified jurors. On their voir dire seven of the panel had stated that they had made up and expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants, and four of these said that it would take evidence to change their opinions; and these four were among those selected and sworn to try the case; and a fifth said, that from reading the newspapers that defendants had confessed, he thought they were the guilty parties, but that he did not know. But the Attorney General would affirm the judgment on the ground that each of these jurors qualified themselves by their answers to certain other questions propounded to them by the court, to the effect that, regardless of what they had read and heard about the case, and the opinions any of them had expressed, they would take the evidence of the witnesses, and the law as it might be propounded by the court, and give the defendants a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence; and to the further question by the trial judge, "Will you and each of you do that?" they answered that they would. The fact most strongly urged is the admission of four of these jurors that it would take evidence to change their opinions previously formed. In impaneling jurors courts should not too lightly consider the provision of the Constitution and statutes granting to those accused of crime trial by an "impartial" jury, and a jury free from exception. Article 6, Const. Amend. U.S., and section 3, chapter 159, Code W.Va. Neither of the jurors impaneled was specifically asked whether he was conscious of any bias or prejudice against the accused, as he should have been, perhaps; but his answers to the questions which were addressed to him, in connection with the other evidence on the subject, we think imply that each was free from all bias and prejudice, and was prepared to try the case as presented to him. In State v. Schnelle, 24 W.Va. 767, it was held that if a proposed juror shows to the satisfaction of the court on his voir dire that, notwithstanding a previously expressed opinion of the guilt or innocence of the accused, his mind is free from bias and prejudice, and the contrary is not shown, he is a competent juror and ought not to be rejected.
The close question presented here is, did the jurors who said it would take evidence to change their opinions thereby disqualify themselves to sit as jurors in the case? Having answered that they could and would give the prisoners a fair and impartial trial according to the law and the evidence, what did they mean by saying it would take evidence to change their previously formed opinions? They could not have meant that they would start upon the trial with any preconceived and decided opinion on the question of guilt or innocence of the defendants; they could have meant simply that if on the trial the evidence did not warrant conviction, their opinions based necessarily on newspaper reports or gossip in the county, tentative opinions, would be surrendered, and their verdict given according to the law and the evidence. We have perhaps written enough on this subject to render it a work of supererogation to write more. State v. Schnelle, supra; State v. Baker, 10 S.E. 639, 33 W.Va. 319; State v. Hatfield, 37 S.E. 626, 48 W.Va. 561; State v. Johnson, 39 S.E. 665, 49 W.Va. 684; State v. Moneypenny, 94 S.E. 540, 81 W.Va. 362; State v. Lutz, 101 S.E. 434, 85 W.Va. 330; State v. Toney, 127 S.E. 35, 98 W.Va. 236; State v. Messer, 128 S.E. 373, 99 W.Va. 241, 40 A. L. R. 608. The rule as most recently stated is that if the answers of the jurors are so unequivocal and satisfactory as to convince the trial court of the juror's fairness and impartiality, the reviewing court will not disturb the judgment below accepting the juror. State v. Toney, supra. To disqualify one proposed as a juror in a case like this, on account of a previously formed or expressed opinion, his opinion must have been deliberate and decided. But if he hesitates or is in doubt as to his ability to disregard such opinion and with an unbiased and unprejudiced mind to give the accused a fair and impartial trial, it would be error to accept him as qualified to try the case. In State v. Messer, we decided that a juror whose opinion was of such a decided character that he could not give due weight to the presumption of innocence of the accused and would not acquit unless the defendant should prove himself innocent, was incompetent. While some of the questions proposed to the jurors chosen in the present case were not as searching as might be desired, yet we cannot say, after a careful consideration of their examination, that the court below committed any error in accepting them.
The next point of error to be considered relates to the admission in evidence of the several alleged confessions in writing of the defendants. The court, in the absence of the jury, heard all the evidence offered by the state and by the prisoners on the question of the admissibility of these confessions, and from it determined that they were admissible and proper to go to the jury on the question of their voluntariness and of the guilt or innocence of the prisoners. We have examined carefully all the evidence thereon submitted to the court and have concluded that no error was committed in admitting them.
It is well settled by the authorities that it devolves upon the court in the first instance to determine whether the confession of the accused was freely and voluntarily made, or was under duress and threats, or by inducement made or held out by some one in authority of benefit or reward of a worldly or temporal character respecting his escape from or in mitigation of his punishment. Ormohundro v. Com., 121 S.E. 908, 138 Va. 854; Early v. Com., 11 S.E 795, 86 Va. 921; Smith v. Com., 10 Grat. (Va.) 734; 16 C.J. p. 735, § 1513, and notes; and the burden of showing the qualifying facts respecting a confession of guilt is upon the state. Ormohundro v. Com., and Smith v. Com., supra. And where the court has determined from the evidence adduced on the facts relating thereto, that the confession is admissible, the appellate court will not disturb the judgment when supported by the evidence, though there be conflict therein; for in the end the question of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the truth and verity...
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