State v. Richards

• Decision Date: 09 February 1905
• Citation: 126 Iowa 497,102 N.W. 439
• Parties: STATE v. RICHARDS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

126 Iowa 497

102 N.W. 439

STATE

v.RICHARDS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 9, 1905.

Appeal from District Court, Warren County; J. H. Applegate, Judge.

A jury found the defendant guilty of the crime of burglary, and he appeals from a judgment on the verdict. Affirmed.Kinkead & Mentzer, for appellant.

Chas. W. Mullan, Atty. Gen., and Lawrence De Graff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

SHERWIN, C. J.

The burglary in question was planned by the defendant, and was executed by Frank Baird and Chas. Redup. Baird was shot immediately after he left the house that he had entered, and was soon thereafter captured, and was held to answer for the crime. A regular term of the district court was held soon thereafter at Indianola, the county seat of Warren county. After the court was convened in its regular room in the courthouse, and opened for the transaction of business, the presiding judge announced from the bench that the session would be adjourned to the office of the county superintendent, on the first floor of the courthouse, for the purpose of impaneling the grand jury. This was done, and the grand jury was impaneled in said room, and afterward returned the indictment on which the defendant was tried. Baird was at that time in a weak physical condition, and the court's action was for the purpose of having him present when the grand jury was impaneled without physical injury to him. The defendant was not held to answer and no one appeared for him at that time. The room in question was large enough to accommodate the court and its officers, the jurors and attorneys, and a number of the general public. After it had been well filled, the door thereof was closed for a short time, for the purpose of avoiding overcrowding. Because of the foregoing facts, the appellant contends that the court was not legally in session, nor the grand jury legally impaneled, and that the indictment was invalid. Section 286 of the Code provides that “courts must be held at the place provided by law, except for the determination of actions, special proceedings, and other matters not requiring a jury, when they may, by consent of the parties therein, be held at some other place.” And section 283 of the Code provides that all judicial proceedings must be public, unless otherwise specially provided by statute or agreed upon by the parties. The manifest purpose of the requirement that courts shall be held at the place provided by law is to give due stability and dignity to the administration of justice, and to protect the interests of litigants. In Hobart v. Hobart, 45 Iowa, 501, it was said that, to give existence to a court, its officers and the time and place of holding it must be such as are prescribed by law. This rule was recognized in Casey v. Stewart, Adm'r, 60 Iowa, 160, 14 N. W. 225;Moore v. C. & St. P. & K. Ry. Co., 93 Iowa, 484, 61 N. W. 992; and again in Funk v. Carroll County, 96 Iowa, 158, 64 N. W. 768. In the Funk Case the issue was tried to the court, and the testimony of a witness was taken at his residence, away from the courthouse, and we held that the court had no authority to adjourn to a private house for the purpose of a trial. There is a well–defined distinction, however, between the cases cited and the one at bar. Here the court was formally and regularly convened at the courthouse, in its own room, and the adjournment was to a room in the same building. It may readily be conceded that the word “place” may sometimes mean a particular room or a particular spot in a room, but we are cited to no judicial construction so limiting it in a case of this kind. If the court be held in the building provided by law, though not in the room set apart for that purpose, we think the requirement and reason of the statute are fully met. To limit the place to a particular room in the courthouse would in many instances interfere with the reasonable dispatch of business, and would serve no recognized purpose of the statute; hence we do not believe that it was the legislative intent to so limit the language. The proceedings when the grand jury was impaneled were public, within the meaning of the statute. The public was admitted, to the capacity of the room, and, so far as the record shows, a large proportion of those who desired to attend were present. State v. Worthen (Iowa) 100 N. W. 330;Myers v. State, 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. E. 252;State v. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, 5 S. W. 257, 330;Stone v. State, 2 Scam. 326.

The telegram which the state claimed was sent by the appellant to Baird was properly admitted in evidence. Baird testified that its contents were agreed upon beforehand, and it corresponded with such agreement. Furthermore, there was testimony tending to identify the defendant as the person who delivered it to the operator for transmission to Baird. The opinion or best judgment of a witness is competent when he cannot positively identify the person, and the value thereof is a question for the jury. State v. Lucas, 57 Iowa, 501, 10 N. W. 868;State v. Seymour, 94 Iowa, 706, 63 N. W. 661.

There was evidence tending to show that the appellant was within hearing distance, and could have heard the conversation between Wilcox and Long relative to the deposit of the money which the burglars secured, and we think the conversation was properly admitted in evidence.

Dr. Tandy, a witness for the state, testified that the appellant had employed him to treat Baird's gunshot wound soon after he was captured, and that he paid him for such services, and requested him to “keep still.” On cross–examination the doctor was not permitted to answer a question touching his qualifications to practice medicine in this state....