State v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 15 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 115,115
• Citation: 185 S.E.2d 102,279 N.C. 621
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Charlie RICHARDSON, Jr.

Page 102

185 S.E.2d 102

279 N.C. 621

STATE of North Carolina v. Charlie RICHARDSON, Jr.

No. 115.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Dec. 15, 1971.

Atty. Gen. Robert Morgan and Staff Atty. Walter E. Ricks, III, Raleigh, for the State.

E. A. Hightower, Wadesboro, for defendant appellant.

BOBBITT, Chief Justice.

Neither in the trial court nor here has defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to require submission to the jury and to support the verdicts. Apart from the isolated instruction referred to in our discussion of Assignment of Error #4, the court's charge is not made a part of defendant's case on appeal.

We shall consider first the five assignments of error set forth in the record on appeal. Thereafter, we shall consider the motion defendant filed in this Court for arrest of judgment in Case No. 2295, the felonious assault case.

In Assignment #1, defendant asserts the '(t)he Court erred in permitting the in-court identification of the defendant by the witness Smith without first finding, on a voir dire examination, that his in-court identification had an independent origin and did not result from illegal, out-of-court confrontation.' In his testimony at trial, Smith pointed out and positively identified defendant as the man who entered the service station and robbed and shot him. Assignment #1 is without merit for the simple reason there is no evidence whatever that Smith identified, or even saw, defendant between the time of the robbery and assault and the time of his in-court identification. The in-court identification, therefore, could not have been influenced or tainted by prior confrontation because there was no such prior confrontation.

Assignments #2 and #5 contain assertions that defendant was arrested without a warrant on July 7, 1970, and illegally imprisoned in jail without a warrant from July 7, 1970, until July 12, 1970, and that during this interval defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights or 'afforded counsel' or permitted to communicate with friends or relatives. These assertions are not supported by the record. All the record discloses with reference to what occurred on July 7, 1970, is contained in the testimony of Sheriff Jarman and of defendant. The record shows that warrants for the arrest of defendant for armed robbery and felonious assault were issued July 12, 1970, and were executed the same day. Nothing in the record shows defendant was arrested and 'imprisoned in jail' prior to July 12, 1970, or that he at any time was denied permission to communicate with friens or relatives. The record does disclose the formal appointment of counsel for defendant on July 16, 1970, the date of the preliminary hearings. There being no basis for consideration of the assertions therein, Assignments #2 and #5 are overruled.

In Assignment #3, defendant asserts '(t)he Court erred in permitting the .38 caliber pistol to be introduced into evidence and in permitting the Sheriff to relate where it was obtained or that it was obtained, without first finding, upon voir dire in the absence of the jury, that the production of the pistol by the defendant was done voluntarily and understandingly.' Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, there was no request for or occasion for a Voir dire hearing. The record indicates Sheriff Jarman's conversation with defendant on July 7, 1970, was simply an incident in the course of Sheriff Jarman's investigation of the armed robbery and felonious assault committed on Lester Smith on July 2, 1970. An inference may be drawn from the facts in evidence that the investigation by Sheriff Jarman continued in order to afford opportunity to check the statements made to him by defendant on July 7, 1970, when defendant voluntarily delivered the .38 pistol to Sheriff Jarman.

The Only portion of the charge in the record is the following: 'Now, as to the charge in that Bill of Indictment, which is referred to as armed robbery, you may return one of two verdicts, members of the jury. You may either find the defendant guilty of armed robbery, as charged, or not.' Assignment #4 is based on defendant's exception to this isolated excerpt from the charge. Defendant contends the court erred in charging the jury in Case No. 2296 that they might return a verdict of guilty of armed robbery as charged or a verdict of not guilty. Since a charge must be considered contextually and not piecemeal, the record is insufficient to support this assignment. Even so, defendant's contention that the court should have instructed the jury that they might return a verdict of guilty of common law robbery is without merit. The State's evidence, which showed a completed robbery of Lester Smith at gunpoint, was positive and unequivocal as to each and every element of the crime charged in the bill of indictment in Case No. 2296. The crucial issue was whether the crime was committed By defendant. There was no evidence that would warrant or support a finding that defendant was guilty of a lesser included offense. Hence, the court's instruction was proper. State v. Williams, 275 N.C. 77, 88, 165 S.E.2d 481, 488 (1969); State v. Carnes, 279 N.C. 549, 554, 184 S.E.2d 235 (1971).

Defendant's motion that this Court arrest the judgment in Case No. 2595 is based on the contention that the felonious assault for which he was indicted and convicted in Case No. 2295 is a lesser included offense of the armed robbery for which he was indicted and convicted in Case No. 2296. Answering, the Attorney General contends the motion should be denied. We agree.

The crime of robbery includes an assault on the person. State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 159, 84 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1954). The crime of armed robbery defined in G.S. § 14--87 includes an assault on the person with a deadly weapon. The crime of felonious assault defined in G.S. § 14--32(a) is an assault and a deadly weapon which is made with intent to kill and which inflicts serious injury. These additional elements of the crime of felonious assault are not elements of the crime of armed robbery defined in G.S. § 14--87.

If a person is convicted simultaneously of armed robbery and of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon, and both offenses arise out of the same conduct, as in State v. Parker, 262 N.C. 679, 138 S.E.2d 496 (1964), and State v. Hatcher, 277 N.C. 380, 177 S.E.2d 892 (1970), and separate judgments are pronounced, the judgment on the separate verdict of guilty of assault with a deadly weapon must be arrested. In such case, the armed robbery is accomplished by the assault with a deadly weapon and All essentials of this assault charge are essentials of the armed robbery charge. However, if a defendant is convicted simultaneously of armed robbery and of Felonious assault under G.S. § 14--32(a), neither the infliction of serious injury nor an intent to kill is an essential of the armed robbery charge. A conviction of armed robbery does not establish a defendant's guilt of felonious assault.

In the present case, the evidence shows that, by the use or threatened use of his .38 pistol, defendant robbed his victim of cash and of a .22 pistol and ordered him to go to the back of the store and lie down with his face on his hands. Thereafter, while the victim was lying on the floor, defendant shot him in the head, closed the door and left when his victim was apparently dead. Thus, separate assaults were committed in quick succession, the first being an assault with a deadly weapon and the second an assault with a deadly weapon which was made with intent to kill and which inflicted serious injuries.

It is true that both of these assaults were committed in the perpetration by defendant of the felony of armed robbery defined in G.S. § 14--87. An assault is committed in the perpetration of a robbery if made to overcome resistance, to effectuate flight, or to eliminate the possibility of identification by the victim, notwithstanding the assault may occur after the robber has taken possession of the victim's goods. However, the fact that a felonious assault is committed during the perpetration of armed robbery does not deprive the felonious assault of its character as a complete and separate felony.

Here the injury inflicted by the felonious assault was not fatal. However, the injury was serious and the assault was made with intent to kill. The question is whether the felonious assault is to be ignored as an independent felony simply because an assault with a deadly weapon is an essential element both of felonious assault and of armed robbery and the permissible punishment for armed robbery is greater than the permissible punishment for felonious assault. We perceive no sound reason why two felonies should be treated as one simply because they share a single essential element, when they consist of additional separate elements.

Our research has disclosed few decisions bearing closely upon the precise question under consideration. People v. Thomas, 59 Cal.App.2d 585, 139 P.2d 359 (1943), presented an analogous factual situation. In Thomas, the defendants were charged with the crime of robbery (Count I) and of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Count II), offenses committed on the same occasion and in the course of the same series of acts. As stated in the opinion: 'Defendants pleaded guilty to the charge of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Count II), and not guilty to the charge of robbery (Count I). When placed on trial for the latter crime they interposed a plea of once in jeopardy and at the conclusion of their trial moved to dismiss the robbery charge, upon the grounds of former conviction and former jeopardy. The motions were denied, defendants were found guilty of robbery and were sentenced for each crime, to state prison for the crime of robbery and to the county jail for the assault, the sentences to run concurrently. All of them have appealed...