State v. Richardson, 18931

• Decision Date: 12 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 18931,18931
• Citation: 253 S.C. 468,171 S.E.2d 717
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Cornell RICHARDSON, Appellant.

Page 717

171 S.E.2d 717

253 S.C. 468

The STATE, Respondent, v. Cornell RICHARDSON, Appellant.

No. 18931.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 12, 1969.

W. L. Clifton, Sumter, for appellant.

Solicitor R. Kirk McLeod, Sumter, Atty. Gen., Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen., Emmet H. Clair, Columbia, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

Defendant Cornell Richardson has appealed from a conviction of manslaughter for the killing of his son. He was tried in the General Sessions Court of Sumter County and received a sentence of seven (7) years. He seeks in this appeal a new trial upon the grounds that prejudicial error was committed in (1) the admission in evidence of a written confession signed by him, (2) the failure of the State to call his daughter as a witness so that he could cross examine her, and (3) given an instruction to the jury relative to the adverse inference which might be drawn from the failure of a litigant to produce at the trial an available witness. We find no merit in the appeal and the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

The defendant shot and killed his son about 6:30 P.M. on January 14, 1967. The shooting followed a difficulty with his son a short time before. Shortly after the shooting, he voluntarily surrendered to an officer who had been dispatched by radio to the scene. The officer did not know that the shooting had occurred. Just before the officer reached the scene and while he was stopped at a nearby street intersection, defendant opened the officer's car door and voluntarily told him: 'I am the man you are looking for, I just shot my son.' The rifle used in the shooting was turned over to this officer by defendant who was then carried to the office of the Sheriff of Sumter County. He was questioned by the officers, including the Sheriff, with whom defendant had previously expressed a desire to talk, and later made a statement or confession which was reduced to writing about 12:30 A.M., on January 15, 1967, approximately six (6) hours after the shooting. The confession was read to defendant, after which he signed it, and a copy was given to him.

The foregoing written confession was subsequently introduced in evidence at the trial, after a determination by the trial judge, as shown in the agreed Statement in the record, that 'the confession had been voluntarily made by defendant.' Defendant contends that the statement was inadmissible because he was not properly informed of, nor did he intelligently waive, his rights within the rules set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974.

Miranda set forth the following requirements for the admissibility of statements made by a defendant during custodial police interrogation:

'To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the rights will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.'

The officer, who took the statement, testified that he advised the defendant of his rights before he was questioned. His testimony was as follows:

'I told him that he had the right to remain silent. I told him that anything he could say, or anything that he did say could and would be used against him in a court of law. I told him that at that time, that he had a right to a lawyer and to have him present then and during any questioning of him. I also told him that if he could not afford to hire an attorney that one would be appointed for him by the court free of charge before any questioning of him.'

The foregoing warning, given to the defendant prior to the interrogation, fully complied with the requirements of the Miranda decision.

With reference to the question of waiver, this officer testified that, in response to the foregoing warning, the defendant 'told me at that time in the presence of the Sheriff and the other officers, that he understood his rights, that he understood his rights fully, he told us that he did not desire an attorney at that time, and stated he wanted to tell his side of the story, he wanted to tell us what happened.'

This testimony of the officer, as to the warnings given to the defendant and his waiver of the right to remain silent and to have an attorney present, was corroborated by that of the Sheriff, the testimony of the defendant, and the surrounding circumstances. The defendant testified and at no time did he deny that he was advised of his rights by the officers. In fact, he testified that he was in no way threatened and that he told the Sheriff he wanted to tell his side of it. He remembered making the statement in question and...