State v. Rideout
| Decision Date | 18 February 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 3681,3681 |
| Citation | 450 P.2d 452 |
| Parties | The STATE of Wyoming, Plaintiff, v. Mike Wyatt RIDEOUT, Defendant. |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
James E. Birchby, County and Pros. Atty., James N. Wolfe, Deputy County & Pros. Atty., Sheridan, for plaintiff.
E. E. Lonabaugh, of Lonabaugh & Lonabaugh, Sheridan, for defendant.
Before GRAY, C. J., and McINTYRE, PARKER, and McEWAN, JJ.
Under the provisions of §§ 7-288 to 7-291, W.S.1957, the County Attorney of Sheridan County claims error of the trial court (a) in directing a verdict of acquittal for insufficiency of evidence upon which to find defendant Rideout guilty of negligent homicide and lesser included offenses and (b) for refusal to allow the coroner to testify as to what defendant said concerning the speed of his vehicle at the time of the fatal accident.
In the justice court the State had charged three counts, one under § 6-58, W.S.1957 (manslaughter), a second under § 31-232, W.S.1957, C.1967 (negligent homicide), and a third under § 31-125, W.S.1957, C.1967 (reckless driving). Following his being bound over to the district court, the defendant challenged this format by a motion to quash and a motion for bill of particulars. The court ruled on the former, requiring an election between manslaughter and negligent homicide and ordering deletion of the third court as a lesser offense, whereupon the State filed an amended information charging negligent homicide under § 31-232 and, without an order requiring same, also filed a bill of particulars delineating the reckless disregard as 'by continuing to drive has said vehicle towards the City of Sheridan, Wyoming after he had gone to sleep while driving said vehicle and had driven said vehicle off of the road and into a ditch on the Beckton-Dayton Farm Road at approximately 4:00 A.M. * * * and thereafter, in a very sleepy condition, continuing to drive his car (which had become difficult for him to steer) on the said Beckton-Dayton gravel road and then east on the * * * Big Goose Highway for approximately two miles where he drove his car off of the said highway into the south borrow-pit for a distance of approximately 200 feet at which time his said car traveled up onto and across the oiled pavement into the north borrowpit of said highway where * * * Robert J. Gorzalka was thrown from said vehicle and the same was driven over him by said Mike Wyatt Rideout.'
Two circumstances must be borne in mind in the consideration of the claimed errors:
1. This court has historically been most reluctant to resolve a matter under the statutes allowing a bill of exceptions by a prosecuting attorney unless it would lead to a determination of law which might govern a future case.
2. When facts are detailed in a bill of particulars the one furnishing such bill will be confined by the court to the proof of the facts so specified. Braatelien v. United States, 8 Cir., 147 F.2d 888, 892; United States v. Brennan, D.Minn., 134 F.Supp. 42, 53, affirmed 240 F.2d 253, certiorari denied 353 U.S. 931, 77 S.Ct. 718, 1 L.Ed.2d 723.
In that climate, we turn to the wording of the statute under which the defendant was finally charged, § 31-232: '(a) When the death of any person ensues within 1 year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.' 1
The meaning of the key words of the section, 'in reckless disregard of the safety of others,' is vital. We have had no previous occasion to interpret their meaning in this statute since it is a matter of common knowledge that prosecuting attorney ordinarily utilize the manslaughter statute in situations where death has occurred in the unlawful use of a motor vehicle. 2 However, such words have many times been discussed, analyzed, and defined by other courts. Throwing some light on the meaning of this axial phrase is State v. Park, 17 Utah 2d 90, 404 P.2d 677, 678, which dealt with a conviction of negligent homicide under a statute with provisions identical to § 31-232(a), :
'The term 'reckless disregard of the safety of others' of course implies a much greater dereliction in hazarding the safety of others than ordinary negligence.
However, it does not require any intent to do harm either generally, or to the victim in particular. What is essential is that it be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove in a manner that he knew, or should have known, was highly dangerous to others, and that he did so intentionally, or heedlessly, with a careless indifference to the consequences. This court has said that the 'doing of an act fraught with the potentiality of producing death amounts to such a reckless disregard for the safety of others' that it will justify a conviction of this crime.'
Section 500, 2 A.L.I. Restatement, Torts 2d (1965), defines 'reckless disregard of safety' as:
'The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.'
The rationale of this definition is well explained in the succeeding comment, pp. 587-590.
The pivotal words of § 31-125, 3 'willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property' were considered in Norfolk v. State, Wyo., 360 P.2d 605, 607, and it was observed that willful misconduct implies at least the intentional doing of something either with a knowledge that serious injury is a probable (as distinguished from a possible) result, or the intentional doing of an act with a wanton and reckless disregard of its possible result. Any comparison of 'reckless driving' in § 31-125 with 'reckless disregard of the safety of others' in § 31-232 is not required here since the burden of the State to show 'willful or wanton disregard' under the former could scarcely be less than its burden under the latter.
Cognizant of the noted holdings, we turn to the specific arguments of the county attorney here concerning the error charged against the trial court, basically the direction of the verdict of not guilty because of insufficiency of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Alcala v. State
...v. Osmus, 73 Wyo. 183, 276 P.2d 469, 484; or even upon probabilities, Smith v. State, 40 Wyo. 128, 274 P. 1074, 1079; State v. Rideout, Wyo., 450 P.2d 452, 454-455. It is also well recognized that the establishing of the corpus delicti will not be presumed, State v. Doyle, 201 Kan. 469, 441......
-
State v. Sodergren, 83-110
...statute, which requires a conscious disregard of the safety of others. There is no meaningful distinction between the two. In State v. Rideout, 450 P.2d 452, the Court found that there was no operative distinction between 'careless disregard of the safety of others' and the definition of ne......
-
Corson v. State
...of untoward participation lacks sufficiency to meet constitutional criteria. King, 718 P.2d 452. This is only conjecture. State v. Rideout, 450 P.2d 452 (Wyo.1969); State v. Paulas, 74 Wyo. 269, 286 P.2d 1041 (1955); Gardner, 196 P. 750. A rational and reasoned examiner could not realistica......
-
State v. Selig
...4 The purpose set forth in that statute is to "determine the law to govern in any similar case" to arise in the future. State v. Rideout, Wyo., 450 P.2d 452 (1969). All cases arising from bills of exceptions filed by the prosecution in criminal cases are moot from the standpoint of the defe......