People v. McGee

• Decision Date: 19 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. A051882,A051882
• Citation: 232 Cal.App.3d 620,283 Cal.Rptr. 528
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Timothy Thushun McGEE, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 528

283 Cal.Rptr. 528

232 Cal.App.3d 620

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Timothy Thushun McGEE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. A051882.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 5, California.

July 19, 1991.

J. Frank McCabe, Goorjian & McCabe, San Francisco, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., John H. Sugiyama, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Laurence K. Sullivan, David Lew, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

LOW, Presiding Justice.

Defendant Timothy Thushun McGee challenges the trial court's authority to reconsider and to vacate its earlier ruling setting aside defendant's guilty plea to sexual molestation of a child under age 14. (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (a).) ¹ We hold that the court may not reinstate a guilty plea without defendant's acquiescence.

The information charged defendant with sexually assaulting Christina M.

On June 18, 1990, defendant pleaded guilty to the section 288 offense pursuant to a negotiated disposition requiring the prosecutor to recommend a period of probation conditioned upon serving 360 days in the county jail. At the August 31, 1990, hearing on defendant's motion to withdraw his plea, he testified: "I couldn't really think the way I was supposed to be thinking at the time." The district attorney cross-examined defendant and vigorously opposed the motion. The trial court granted the motion, stating that it was convinced defendant's plea was not voluntary and that he noticed the defendant was under a great deal of stress. The court elaborated: "In my mind and at the time I took the plea we went through all the waivers and Mr. McGee indicated that he understood them all; however, while we were taking the plea I detected a great deal of reluctance and second thoughts and misgivings on the part of the defendant. I felt that while he apparently was indicating and making all the appropriate responses on the record, I didn't defect [sic] that he really had come to grips with what he was entering this plea to." The court set a trial for September 10, 1990.

Meanwhile, the district attorney made a motion to reconsider the order setting aside defendant's guilty plea, on the grounds that defendant failed to demonstrate good cause as required by section 1018, and the delay would severely prejudice the People's case because of the nine-year-old victim's inability to recall the details of the offense. The hearing on the motion for reconsideration was continued, to allow the trial court to review the transcript of defendant's guilty plea.

On October 12, the trial court ruled that defendant had not established "a sufficient basis under the law by clear and convincing evidence upon which the Court could base an order granting the Defendant's motion to withdraw the plea." The court noted that it did not consider prejudice to the People's case to be a proper factor for consideration. The court added that it had allowed the earlier withdrawal without reviewing the entire transcript. The court concluded that its decision allowing defendant to withdraw his guilty plea was not supported by substantial evidence and reinstated the guilty plea. In doing so, the court relied on Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision (6), which provides for a new trial upon insufficiency of the evidence or the verdict.

Defendant was sentenced to five years' probation on condition he spend 360 days in county jail.

I

Defendant contends the trial court lost jurisdiction once it entered an order allowing him to withdraw his plea. Defendant compares it to a ruling on a motion for a new trial. He argues that, subject to limited exceptions, once the trial court has ruled on a motion for a new trial, it is without authority to reexamine its decision. (In re Levi (1952) 39 Cal.2d 41, 45, 244 P.2d 403; People v. Hernandez (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 768, 771-773, 245 Cal.Rptr. 156.) Although we do not agree with the new trial analogy, we conclude that the court acted without jurisdiction to reconsider and to set aside its previous ruling.

There is nothing in the statute (§ 1018) authorizing guilty pleas to permit the court to reconsider its original order to withdraw the plea upon the application by the prosecution. Section 1018 requires that every plea must be entered or withdrawn "by the defendant himself in open court." It further provides: "On application of the defendant at any time before judgment the court may, ... for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." The language of the statute is plain and needs no construction. (See, e.g., People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.) Section 1018 permits the defendant, and only the defendant, to enter a guilty plea or make a motion to withdraw a previously entered plea. The language permits no interpretation that would allow the prosecutor to make a motion, or the trial court on its own motion, to reinstate the guilty plea after it is withdrawn. The prosecutor had no authority, under this statute, to make a motion before the trial court to "reconsider" the previous ruling allowing defendant to withdraw his plea. Having entered its order to withdraw the plea, the trial court could not rely on this statute to entertain the prosecutor's motion to reconsider and annul its earlier ruling. We note that if the People desired review of the earlier nonappealable order of withdrawal, they could have petitioned for a writ of mandate. (See People v. Thompson (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 129, 136-138, 88 Cal.Rptr. 753; People v. Municipal Court (Gelardi) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 692, 697-698, 149 Cal.Rptr. 30.)

II

The People argue that, apart from this statute, the trial court has the inherent power to reconsider and modify its prior ruling once it determined it was erroneous. The People rely on dictum in People v. Krivda (1971) 5 Cal.3d 357, 362-363, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262, much of which was disapproved in Madril v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 77-78, 123 Cal.Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33. Moreover, the court in Krivda, recognizing the divergent line of cases on this issue, refused to attempt to reconcile them. (Krivda, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 363, 96 Cal.Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262.)

"It is not open to question that a court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true facts. [Citations.] The power exists independently of statute and may be exercised in criminal as well as in civil cases. [Citation.] ... The court may correct such errors on its own motion or upon the application of the parties. [Citation.]" (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729; Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 285, 290, 171 Cal.Rptr. 387.) Clerical error must be distinguished from judicial error, which cannot be corrected once final. (Candelario, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729; 6 Witkin, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) § 3130, pp. 3862-3864.) "Generally, a clerical error is one inadvertently made, while a judicial error is one made advertently in the exercise of judgment or discretion. [Citations.]" (People v. Jack (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 913, 915, 261 Cal.Rptr. 860; Candelario, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 447 P.2d 729.) The asserted error here--the court's determination that defendant showed good cause to withdraw his guilty plea--is a judicial error and the trial court did not have the inherent power to reexamine its original ruling. This is especially so absent the presentation of new evidence.

In Candelario, supra, our Supreme Court held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend the abstract of judgment after trial and sentencing by adding a prior felony conviction of possession of marijuana. (3 Cal.3d at p. 708, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729.) Defendant admitted the prior conviction at his trial for selling heroin. The court entered judgment on the heroin offense, but failed to pronounce judgment finding defendant guilty of the prior conviction and to enter that finding in the abstract of judgment. After the defendant was remanded to the Department of Corrections, on its own motion, the trial court amended the abstract of judgment to include the prior conviction. The Supreme Court held this to be a noncorrectable judicial error: "An amendment that substantially modifies the original judgment or materially alters the rights of the parties, may not be made by the court under its authority to correct clerical error, therefore, unless the record clearly demonstrates that the error was not the result of the exercise of judicial discretion. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 705, 91 Cal.Rptr. 497, 477 P.2d 729; cf. Goodman, The Power of the Trial Judge to Change a Prior Ruling on a Motion (1970) 45 State Bar J. 483.)

Smith v. Superior Court, supra, is also apposite. Smith held that a trial court has no inherent authority to vacate a dismissal, to a charge of embezzlement of a rental car, entered deliberately but on an erroneous factual basis. The trial court agreed to enter a dismissal, based on an unlawful search, on the prosecution's representation that there were no pending appellate matters. (115 Cal.App.3d at pp. 287-288, 171 Cal.Rptr. 387.) Unknown to the prosecutor, the Attorney General had filed an application for a stay pending completion of a petition of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Upon learning of this, the prosecutor moved to vacate the dismissal, and the trial court granted the motion, reinstating the charges against defendant. The reviewing court granted defendant's request for mandate, concluding that this was a noncorrectable judicial error. "When the trial court entered the order of dismissal it was performing the act it intended to perform. The mistake touched only the factual basis for its action." (Id.,...