State v. Riley

• Decision Date: 01 January 2013
• Docket Number: No. 33506.,33506.
• Citation: 58 A.3d 304,140 Conn.App. 1
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Ackeem RILEY.

140 Conn.App. 1

58 A.3d 304

STATE of Connecticut

v.Ackeem RILEY.

No. 33506.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 12, 2012.

Decided Jan. 1, 2013.

Limited on Constitutional Grounds

C.G.S.A. § 53a–35a(1)Heather M. Wood, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Melissa Patterson, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, John F. Fahey, senior assistant state's attorney, and Kathryn Ward Bare, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

BEACH, ALVORD and BORDEN, Js.

BEACH, J.

“Determining the appropriate sentence for a teenager convicted of murder presents grave and challenging questions of morality and social policy.” Miller v. Alabama, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2477, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Last term, in Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that, in addressing this complicated issue, policymakers can no longer prescribe mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles,¹even for the most serious homicide offenses. Id., at 2460.

The defendant, Ackeem Riley, who was seven months shy of his eighteenth birthday at the time of his crimes, challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court following his conviction of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–54a (a) and 53a–8, two counts of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–49 (a)(2) and 53a–54a (a), two counts of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–59 (a)(5) and 53a–8, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a–48 (a) and 53a–54a (a). The defendant was sentenced to 100 years imprisonment.² Although the sentence imposed was not mandatory, the defendant claims that, in order to comply with the logic underpinning the holding in Miller, he is entitled to a resentencing procedure in which the court will be required not only to consider his youth and any attendant deficiencies, but also to articulate on the record that it has done so. The defendant further claims that, if the court were again to impose a life without parole sentence, it must explain why such a severe sentence was appropriate despite his age. We decline to adopt such a rigid interpretation of the rule announced in Miller. Because the court exercised discretion in fashioning the defendant's sentence, and was free to consider any mitigating evidence the defendant was able to marshal, including evidence pertaining to his age and maturity, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could have found, and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. At approximately 6 p.m. on November 17, 2006, the defendant and his companion, Lasell Lewis, were driving a borrowed car in Hartford's North End. As they drove by a house on Garden Street, they thought they saw a male named Mike, who they believed was responsible for a gang related shooting on Vine Street the previous week. The defendant and Lewis circled back with the intention of exacting revenge and drove by the house again, this time firing a barrage of bullets into a crowd of people and hitting three young men.

Tray Davis, a sixteen year old, died of gunshot wounds to his head and chest. Twenty-one year old Montrel Gage and thirteen year old Jaequan Sheppard–Ray were seriously injured but survived. Gage was shot in the back; the bullet was never extracted from his body. Sheppard–Ray was shot in the abdomen and sustained multiple life-threatening injuries. There was no suggestion that any of the three victims was involved in gang activity.

The defendant was charged with six counts: one count of murder for the shooting of Davis; two counts each of attempted murder and first degree assault for the shootings of Gage and Sheppard–Ray; and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–127 (a), the defendant's case was automatically transferred from the juvenile docket to the regular criminal docket of the Superior Court. On March 3, 2009, after a five day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges.

On May 5, 2009, the defendant appeared for sentencing. The court heard statements from the prosecutor, defense counsel and the mothers of two of the three victims, Gage and Davis. The court had also reviewed the defendant's presentence investigation report, which included, among other things, information about the defendant's family, upbringing, education and physical and mental health.³

The state asked the court to impose an effective sentence of 120 years imprisonment because, in its view, the defendant “should never ever be on the streets again.” Any chance for rehabilitation, the state argued, was significantly undermined by the defendant's alleged involvement in another shooting that took place several weeks after the Garden Street incident and which resulted in the paralysis of one of the two victims. There were, then, at least five victims shot by the defendant and his colleagues in these two transactions.

Defense counsel addressed the court next. He explained that the defendant would not be speaking on his own behalf because he maintained his innocence and therefore could not be expected to express remorse or sympathy. Moreover, defense counsel told the court that his client had instructed him to keep his remarks “short and sweet....” Regarding the defendant's background, defense counsel pointed out that the defendant was “a young man”; that he had experienced a “fallout” with his father and subsequently “[taken] to the streets”; and that he had had difficulties in school. He also suggested that the defendant should be presumed innocent of the subsequent shooting, which the prosecutor had described. He concluded his remarks by asking the court “to consider [the defendant's] age” and that he had “little or no prior involvement in the criminal justice system” and to “use [its] wisdom in meting out a punishment that you feel is appropriate.”

In rendering its sentence, the court asserted that it was unable to identify anything in the defendant's background that might have explained why his life had taken such a violent turn. The court conceded that it had “very little sense of [the defendant]” because he had not testified at trial or spoken at his sentencing, but it observed that the defendant's life had been “pretty unremarkable. There's no reason or excuse for him being here. He didn't really come from a horrible family, wasn't abused as a child ... wasn't raised by someone smoking crack or drinking all day. Had a loving mother ... [and] a relationship with his father.” The court also acknowledged the senselessness of the crimes of which the defendant had been convicted and the terror inflicted on Hartford neighborhoods by random shootings. The court finally considered the likelihood that the defendant would be rehabilitated and concluded that “[t]he answer is probably never.” The court expressed its sympathy for the victims and their families, and then, exercising its sentencing discretion, imposed a total effective sentence of 100 years imprisonment.

The defendant was sentenced to sixty years for count one for the murder of Davis; twenty years for count two for the attempted murder of Gage, consecutive to the first count; twenty years for count three for the attempted murder of Sheppard–Ray, consecutive to the first two counts; twenty years for count four for the assault of Gage with a firearm, concurrent to the second count; twenty years for count five for the assault of Sheppard–Ray with a firearm, concurrent to the third count; and twenty years for count six for conspiracy to commit murder, concurrent to the previous counts. This appeal followed.

This case was argued before this court on January 12, 2012. At that time, the defendant claimed that Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), entitled him to a resentencing procedure in which the trial court would expressly consider his youthful characteristics and reduced culpability. The state countered that Graham was not controlling because it created only a categorical ban on the imposition of life sentences without the possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses, and did not require sentencing courts to consider the defendant's age and development in all cases. Additionally, the state asserted that State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 581–86, 958 A.2d 1214 (2008),⁴ had already settled the issue of whether life without the possibility of release is a constitutionally permissible sentence for juveniles convicted of murder, and that Graham did not disturb that holding.

While this case was pending, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miller v. State, 63 So.3d 676 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, No. 1091663 (Ala. October 22, 2010); see Miller v. Alabama, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 395 (2011) (grant of certiorari); and a companion case, Jackson v. Norris, 2011 Ark. 49, 378 S.W.3d 103 (2011). See Jackson v. Hobbs, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 548, 181 L.Ed.2d 395 (2011) (grant of certiorari).⁵ Both cases involved fourteen year old defendants who were sentenced, following aggravated murder convictions, to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under mandatory sentencing schemes. Miller v. Alabama, supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. In other words, once the petitioners were convicted of their respective crimes, the sentencing authority had no discretion to impose a sentence other than life without the possibility of parole.

The petitioners in Miller and Jackson argued first that the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a fourteen year old was unconstitutional under eighth amendment excessiveness principles. See Miller v. Alabama, U.S. Supreme Court Record & Briefs, January Term (2012),...