State v. Ring, 34552
| Decision Date | 21 May 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 34552,34552 |
| Citation | 339 P.2d 461,54 Wn.2d 250 |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Charley RING, Jr., and Harold M. Ring, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Wilmot W. Garvin, Spokane, Delbert R. Scoles, Colville, Jack R. Dean, Spokane, for appellants.
Sidney Buckley, Thomas I. Oakshott, Colville, for respondent.
Defendants were charged with the crime of forcible rape allegedly committed in Stevens county. Having been found guilty, they appeal from the judgment and sentence.
The prosecuting witness attended a rodeo and dance at Colville. Leaving the dance, she met defendants, one of whom she had known at high school, and accepted his invitation to drive her home. Instead of taking her home, the car was driven to an airport just outside of Colville where, according to the prosecuting witness, one of the defendants commenced forcing his attentions upon her. Both defendants, together with another man, were in the automobile at the time the crimes were alleged to have been committed. After the first incident, the automobile was driven and kept moving by the third man in the car.
It is an understatement to say that the testimony of the witnesses is in sharp conflict. Both defendants testified; they admitted having sexual intercourse with the prosecuting witness and stated that she willingly submitted to their advances. The prosecuting witness testified that her resistance was overcome by force. It is apparent that the major issue is whether the prosecuting witness voluntarily submitted to sexual intercourse.
The assignments of error are of such a nature that we are relieved of the execrable task of setting out the facts in greater detail.
Defendants' five assignments of error present four contentions: (1) That the state failed to prove that the crime of rape had been committed in Stevens county. (2) That the superior court did not have jurisdiction of Harold M. Ring. (3) That the court erred when it rejected an offer of proof that the prosecuting witness was not a virgin at the time of the alleged crimes. (4) That the court erred when it permitted two doctors, who had examined the prosecuting witness, to state their opinions as to the origin and cause of her physical condition.
The parties were in a moving automobile. The circumstances were such that the prosecuting witness was not in a position to know, with certainty, her exact geographic location at any given moment. The defendants, therefore, challenge the jurisdiction of the superior court of Stevens county on the ground that there is no evidence that penetration occurred in Stevens county.
We do not agree. There is evidence, which the jury could have believed, that indicated that the automobile did not leave Stevens county; hence, the court was justified in giving its instruction No. 4, which states:
No exception was taken to this instruction. It became the law of the case.
Further, RCW 10.25.020 provides:
'When a public offense has been committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the act or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county.'
This statute was applied in State v. Wilson, 1951, 38 Wash.2d 593, 599, 231 P.2d 288, 291, wherein this court said:
'Nor does the fact that no one can say with certainty whether the death occurred in Clark county, where the kidnaping occurred, or in Skamania county, where the body was found, present any bar to the prosecution for murder in Clark county.'
We find no merit in defendants' first contention.
At the time of his arrest, Harold M. Ring was under eighteen years of age. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile department of the Stevens county superior court purported to transfer 'the case against said minor' to the superior court, pursuant to RCW 13.04.120. A second amended information, which included Harold M. Ring, was then filed.
The case went to trial on this information, at which time Harold M. Ring was eighteen years of age. It now appears that the copy of the order of the juvenile court, filed in this proceeding, was not properly authenticated; hence, defendant Harold M. Ring now contends that the superior court did not acquire jurisdiction over him. This argument is made for the first time in this court; it was not urged in the trial court.
The superior court has original jurisdiction 'in all criminal cases amounting to felony.' Art. IV, § 6, Washington constitution. The juvenile court act recognizes that the superior court has original jurisdiction 'in all cases coming within the terms of this chapter.' RCW 13.04.030.
RCW 13.04.120 provides that the juvenile court (really the superior court or a department thereof) 'may proceed to hear and dispose of the case' against a child under eighteen years of age. This may be a bar to proceeding against him in the superior court while he is under eighteen, unless the juvenile court orders 'such child to be turned over * * * for trial under the provisions of the criminal code,' but it does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction after he reaches eighteen years of age.
Our conclusion that defendant's contention in without merit is dictated by the rationale of State v. Melvin, 1927, 144 Wash. 687, 689, 258 P. 859, 860, wherein this court said:
'We think it follows, therefore, that the law which provides for protection and reformation or punishment within the discretion of the court in the case of a delinquent minor proceeded against before he arrives at the age of 18 years constitutes no bar to a criminal action brought against him after he becomes 18 years of age for an act committed prior to that age.'
The fact that Harold M. Ring was under eighteen years of age when the second amended information was filed is of no moment. He was eighteen when the case was tried. This conclusion is in accord with the majority rule discussed in the annotation, 'Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time legal proceedings are commenced, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court,' appearing in 123 A.L.R. 446.
Defendants contend the court erred when it refused to admit offered testimony that the witness had had sexual intercourse with the prosecuting witness. There is no merit to this argument. It is settled in this jurisdiction that specific acts of misconduct of the complaining witness in a forcible rape case are inadmissible. State v. Severns, 1942, 13 Wash.2d 542, 554, 125 P.2d 659, and cases cited.
Finally, defendants contend the court erred when it permitted two doctors, who examined the prosecuting witness shortly after the episode in question, to state that her physical condition could not have been the result of 'ordinary normal sexual intercourse.'
Defendants rely upon State v. Acklus, 1923, 126 Wash. 65, 217 P. 61, a case that was not called to the attention of the court...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Montgomery
...that the jury has to pass upon does not call for automatic exclusion. Kirkman, 159 Wash.2d at 929, 155 P.3d 125; State v. Ring, 54 Wash.2d 250, 255, 339 P.2d 461 (1959). ¶ 23 Lay witnesses also may now give opinions or inferences based upon rational perceptions that help the jury understand......
-
State v. Kirkman
...the opinion of an expert covers an issue which the jury has to pass upon, does not call for automatic exclusion. State v. Ring, 54 Wash.2d 250, 255, 339 P.2d 461 (1959). 1. ¶ 29 The State argues that the Court of Appeals wrongly held that the testimony provided by Dr. Stirling and Detective......
-
State v. Haq
...Kirkman, 159 Wash.2d at 929, 155 P.3d 125 (citing Gerberg v. Crosby, 52 Wash.2d 792, 795–96, 329 P.2d 184 (1958); State v. Ring, 54 Wash.2d 250, 255, 339 P.2d 461 (1959)). 160. 159 Wash.2d 918, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). FN161. Id. at 929–30, 155 P.3d 125. FN162. Id. at 930, 155 P.3d 125. 163. 15......
-
In re Hegney
...the age of 18 years at the time of the court's determination. Dillenburg, 70 Wash.2d at 355-56, 422 P.2d 783; see also State v. Ring, 54 Wash.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461 (1959). ¶ 43 Thus, Hegney would not be "left remediless" to challenge the decline hearing. PRP Br. at IV. VACATION OF JUVENILE C......
-
Table of Cases
...Rinderknecht, In re Marriage of, 174 Ind. App. 382, 367 N.E.2d 1128 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . .14.02[3][b] Ring; State v., 54 Wn.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461 (1959) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77.04[1] Rink, In re Marriage of, 18 Wn. App. 549, 571 P.2d 210 (1977). . . . . . . . . ......
-
§77.04 Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
...proceedings are instituted, not the age at the time of the offense. State v. Calderon, 102 Wn.2d 348, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984); State v. Ring, 54 Wn.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461 (1959). Thus, a case can only be filed in juvenile court prior to the offender turning age 18, despite the fact the crime was......