State v. Ripple

Decision Date24 August 1994
Docket NumberNo. 93-1948,93-1948
Citation70 Ohio St.3d 86,637 N.E.2d 304
PartiesThe STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. RIPPLE, Appellant.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

Absent approval of methods by the Director of Health pertaining to the testing of bodily substances for drugs, a chemical analysis purporting to indicate the presence of drugs in an accused is inadmissible in a prosecution brought pursuant to R.C. § 4511.19. (R.C. § 4511.19[D], construed.)

On the evening of July 1, 1992, Trooper Craig Seitz of the Ohio State Highway Patrol was assigned to work in Licking County because of a "Grateful Dead" concert that was being held in the area. At approximately 11:39 p.m., Trooper Seitz made a traffic stop of a vehicle operated by defendant-appellant, Douglas A. Ripple, just north of the concert area. Subsequently, the trooper arrested defendant for driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, R.C. 4511.19, 1 and received permission from defendant to conduct a breath and urine test.

The breathalyzer test indicated that defendant registered .086 concentration of alcohol per two hundred ten liters of breath, which is below the per se limit set forth in R.C. 4511.19(A)(3). The urine test also indicated that defendant's alcohol level was below the per se limit established in R.C. 4511.19(A)(4). However, defendant's urine was further tested for seven different classes of drugs, and the results of such testing allegedly revealed the presence of marijuana in his urine.

On July 8, 1992, defendant appeared before the county municipal court, entered pleas of not guilty to all charges and requested a jury trial. Defendant thereafter filed several motions to suppress the results of the urinalysis, and on October 19, 1992, a hearing was conducted pursuant to one of such motions which had not been denied.

In a judgment entry dated November 12, 1992, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, stating that "the tests were conducted in conformity with the generally accepted scientific principles for drug analysis used in laboratories across the county * * *." Defendant then requested the court to permit him to change his plea on all charges to one of "no contest," with a stipulation that he would appeal the court's denial of the motion to suppress. Subsequently, the court found defendant guilty on all counts and sentenced him accordingly.

Upon appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in a split decision. The majority rejected defendant's argument that the drug test results were inadmissible for failing to comply with R.C. 4511.19(D), and held that " * * * in a case of a[n] R.C. 4511.19(A) violation, scientific tests that do not conform with R.C. 4511.19(D) are admissible if the necessary foundation is established and the tests of relevance and reliability are met."

The dissenting appellate court judge, Judge W. Scott Gwin, stated that under R.C. 4511.19(D), evidence was admissible in a prosecution brought pursuant to either R.C. 4511.19(A) or (B) only "if such bodily substance is analyzed in accordance with methods approved by the [Ohio] Director of Health." (Emphasis sic.) Since R.C. 4511.19(D) was not complied with, the dissent reasoned that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion to suppress.

The court of appeals, finding its decision to be in conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for Miami County in State v. Sawyer (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 185, 598 N.E.2d 747, certified the record of the case to this court for review and final determination.

James W. Hostetter, Director of Law and Mark D. Gardner, Asst. Director of Law, Newark, for appellee.

Mark A. Serrott, Columbus, and Holly A. Jacobs, New Middletown, for appellant.

A. WILLIAM SWEENEY, Justice.

R.C. 4511.19 provides in relevant part:

"(A) No person shall operate any vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley within this state, if any of the following apply:

"(1) The person is under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse;

" * * *

"(D) In any criminal prosecution for a violation of this section, of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, or of a municipal ordinance relating to operating a vehicle with a prohibited concentration of alcohol in the blood, breath, or urine, the court may admit evidence on the concentration of alcohol, drugs of abuse, or alcohol and drugs of abuse in the defendant's blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance at the time of the alleged violation as shown by chemical analysis of the defendant's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance withdrawn within two hours of the time of the alleged violation.

" * * *

"Such bodily...

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12 cases
  • State v. Meyers
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 28 September 2001
    ...of test results to establish alcoholic concentration under R.C. 4511.19 turns on substantial compliance with ODH regulations."6 In State v. Ripple,7 the Ohio Supreme Court discussed the use of chemical tests in R.C. 4511.19 prosecutions, {¶ 18} "In our view, the language of R.C. 4511.19(D) ......
  • State v. Brand, C-030388.
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 26 March 2004
    ...540, 545, 708 N.E.2d 1086. 24 See State v. Lloyd, supra. 25 146 Ohio App.3d 563, 2001-Ohio-2282, 767 N.E.2d 739, at ¶ 20. 26 70 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 637 N.E.2d 304. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 30 See State v. Biros (1997), 78 Oh......
  • State v. Moore
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 11 December 2013
    ...TO SUPPRESS FINDING THAT THE ODH DIRECTOR HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF R.C. 3701.143 AND, PURSUANT TO STATE V. RIPPLE, [70 Ohio St.3d 86, 637 N.E.2d 304 (1994) ] SUCH LACK OF COMPLIANCE REQUIRES EXCLUSION OF INTOXILYZER RESULTS IN ANY 4511.19 PROSECUTION.” {¶ 3} Appellee re......
  • State v. Lane
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • 13 December 1995
    ...without Director of Health standards is not plain error, because, inter alia, it is not error at all. Lane relies on State v. Ripple (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 86, 637 N.E.2d 304. Lane's reliance is not only misplaced, but phantasmal. In Ripple, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that R.C. 4511.19(D......
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