State v. Rivas
| Decision Date | 01 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 62404-6,62404-6 |
| Citation | 126 Wn.2d 443,896 P.2d 57 |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Simon B. RIVAS, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Washington Appellate Defender Ass'n, Suzanne Lee Elliott, Seattle, for appellant.
David S. McEachran, Whatcom County Prosecutor, Laura Hayes, Deputy, Bellingham, for respondent.
Following his jury conviction for vehicular homicide by intoxication, Appellant Simon Rivas (Rivas) moved for arrest of judgment because the information did not include the nonstatutory element of a causal connection between intoxication and death. The trial judge denied the motion and Rivas appealed in Division One of the Court of Appeals. We accepted certification from that court and now hold that causation between intoxication and death is not an element of vehicular homicide.
On August 28, 1992, Rivas was the driver in a 1-car accident which left the passenger dead. Before the accident, Jeff Schroeder, a neighbor living on Haynie Road in Whatcom County, heard what he described as a loud vehicle accelerating toward his home. Schroeder was the first to arrive at the scene and found the Rivas vehicle in the ditch. He also found a "gal" lying face down on the pavement. Verbatim Report of Proceedings, at 25. At approximately the same time another neighbor, Peter Len, opened his door to Rivas, who asked for his help. Rivas claimed he had been in an The first officer to arrive, Trooper Clint Casebolt, observed that Rivas was unsteady, swaying slightly; that his eyes were bloodshot and watery; and that his speech was somewhat slurred and disjointed and that he smelled strongly of intoxicants. The trooper administered field sobriety tests which Rivas performed poorly. The trooper also had blood drawn from Rivas and a later analysis indicated a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .15 grams.
accident and his girlfriend had flown out of the car. Len's wife called 911 while he accompanied Rivas to the accident scene. Rivas told Len he had been drinking and Len smelled alcohol on Rivas. Emergency personnel arrived quickly but could not revive the passenger, Heather Nihoul, who was pronounced dead at the scene.
Rivas was charged with vehicular homicide by information filed on September 8, 1992. The information was amended on March 22, 1993, and alleged as follows:
Vehicular Homicide
That the defendant, SIMON B. RIVAS, then and there being in said County and State, on or about the 28th day of August, 1992, did drive a motor vehicle, and said driving was the proximate cause of injury ... and the defendant, SIMON B. RIVAS, was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502, at the time of such driving and of the injuries to HEATHER M. NIHOUL, in violation of RCW 46.61.520, said crime being a Class "B" felony; contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.
Clerk's Papers, at 72-73. Rivas entered a plea of "not guilty" and the case proceeded to trial.
At the close of the State's case the defense moved for dismissal based on a defect in the information. The defense contended that it failed to allege the element of a causal connection between the Defendant's intoxication and the victim's injury as required by State v. MacMaster, 113 Wash.2d 226, 778 P.2d 1037 (1989).
To resolve this case it is helpful to review the history of the vehicular homicide statute in this state. The Legislature first enacted a statute relating to traffic death caused by the operation of a motor vehicle in 1937 when it passed the Washington Motor Vehicle Act. Laws of 1937, ch. 189, § 120, p. 911. Before that enactment prosecution for traffic deaths was brought under the manslaughter statute. State v. Costello, 59 Wash.2d 325, 334, 367 P.2d 816 (1962) (Foster, J., concurring specially). As originally enacted, the Washington Motor Vehicle Act set out the crime of driving under the influence in the first section of the act. In the next section following the crime of driving under the influence, the Legislature established that
[w]hen the death of any person shall ensue within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the operation of any vehicle by any person while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs or by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle.
Laws of 1937, ch. 189, § 120, p. 911.
In one of this court's earliest opinions addressing the negligent homicide section of the Motor Vehicle Act, State v. Stevick, 23 Wash.2d 420, 161 P.2d 181 (1945), overruled in part by State v. Partridge, 47 Wash.2d 640, 289 P.2d 702 (1955), Justice Mallery noted in a special concurrence that
[u]nder the theory of this type of crime [negligent homicide], the state is not required to prove intent or negligence, and though the facts show neither, the killing while engaged in other specified offenses, suffices. Thus the killing of a human being by an automobile properly driven, would nevertheless constitute negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle if the driver was intoxicated, and contributory negligence or lack of negligence as the proximate cause would not be a defense.
Stevick, at 433, 161 P.2d 181 (Mallery, J., concurring specially). In support of that conclusion Justice Mallery quoted 5 Am.Jur. Automobiles §§ 787, 788, at 924-25 (1936) as follows:
Stevick, at 430, 161 P.2d 181 (Mallery, J., concurring specially). The special concurrence also pointed to other statutory crimes (such as felony murder) which are based on the theory that crimes may be "predicated upon being committed while one is engaged in the commission of another and separate offense ...". Stevick, at 430, 161 P.2d 181 (Mallery, J., concurring specially).
Justice Mallery's view was later adopted in a concurring opinion by Justice Foster in Costello. Without discussion, the majority in that case approved a trial court's instructions which required the State, in a charge of negligent homicide, to prove a causal connection between the defendant's intoxication and the act producing the fatal accident. Costello, at 327, 367 P.2d 816. Although the question of whether the State was required to prove a causal connection between a driver's intoxication and the fatal injury was not discussed by the majority in that case, Justice Foster nevertheless argued that the instruction was erroneous because it placed such a burden on the State.
It cannot be overemphasized that the crime is committed if the fatal accident occurs while the driver of the car is under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It is no defense that the injury is not the proximate result of intoxication. The words "proximate result" refer only to the death being the result of an injury received while the driver is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Costello, at 333, 367 P.2d 816 (Foster, J., concurring specially). Citing the discussion by Justice Mallery in Stevick, Justice Foster pointed out that the "predominant purpose of the statute is to prohibit drunken driving". Costello, at 335, 367 P.2d 816 (Foster, J., concurring specially). He noted that the Legislature did not require the State to prove that intoxication is the proximate cause of the death but only that the driver be under the influence of liquor at the time. Costello, at 335-36, 367 P.2d 816 (Foster, J., concurring specially).
Later, in State v. Hardwick, 74 Wash.2d 828, 447 P.2d 80 (1968), this court commented that a majority of the court disagreed with Justice Foster's view in Costello that the instruction was erroneous because it required a causal relationship between the intoxication and the act producing the fatal accident. Hardwick, at 830-31, 447 P.2d 80. Hardwick went on, however, to approve an instruction which permitted a conviction if the State proved that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants and "[t]hat as a proximate result of said operation of an automobile" a death ensued. Hardwick, at 829, 447 P.2d 80.
This court next spoke on this issue in State v. Engstrom, 79 Wash.2d 469, 487 P.2d 205 (1971), where it stated that
[b]efore a person can be convicted of the charge of negligent homicide, there must a causal connection between the...
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