State v. Roadhs
| Decision Date | 27 July 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 39289,39289 |
| Citation | 430 P.2d 586,71 Wn.2d 705 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Albert Edwin ROADHS, Appellant, Charles Bradney Sullivan and Eugene Harvard Roadhs, Defendants. |
Callahan & Minium, Jess E. Minium, Jr., Kelso, for appellant.
Wayne Roethler, Pros. Atty., Henry K. Dunn, Deputy Pros. Atty., Kelso, for respondent.
June 4, 1966, at about 9:30 p.m., Albert Edwin Roadhs and two other men broke into the Cowlitz County Public Utility District compound. Defendant Roadhs was apprehended by the police inside of a three-sided shed in the compound. He was charged with and convicted of second degree burglary. Defendant contends that he was improperly charged with second degree burglary since he did not break and enter any building or other structure wherein any property is kept for use, sale or deposit.
The Public Utility District warehouse compound consists of a blacktopped area 150 by 200--400 feet. The entire area is surrounded by a cyclone fence 6 to 7 feet high, with stands of barbed wire strung along the top making the fence barrier 9 to 10 feet high. Inside of the compound are five buildings. Three of these buildings are three-sided sheds used for the storage of trucks, tools and rolls of wire. The remaining two buildings are completely enclosed. One serves as a garage and the other is used for the storage of electrical transformers and equipment. Some materials and equipment are kept in the open area unprotected from the weather. The compound arrangement is such that the walls of some of the buildings form the exterior wall of the compound, while the cyclone fence in question constitutes a continuation of the building wall, to the end that the exterior barrier of the compound consists of a combination of building walls and the fence. Entry to this compound is normally made through one of three gates, which are padlocked at night.
Defendant Roadhs and his companions gained entrance into the compound by cutting the three strands of barbed wire at the top of the fence and climbing over the fence into the compound.
RCW 9.19.020 provides:
Every person who, with intent to commit some crime therein shall, under circumstances not amounting to burglary in the first degree, enter the dwelling house of another or break and enter, or, having committed a crime therein, shall break out of, any building or part thereof, or a room or other structure wherein any property is kept for use, sale or deposit, shall be guilty of burglary in the second degree and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than fifteen years.
The principal question presented on appeal is: Does the fence here in question constitute a 'building' or 'structure' wherein property is kept for use, sale or deposit, as those terms are used in RCW 9.19.020? This question is one of first impression.
RCW 9.01.010 provides in part:
In construing the provisions of this act, save when otherwise plainly declared or clearly apparent from the context, the following rules shall be observed:
(18) The word 'building' shall include every house, shed, boat, watercraft, railway car, tent or booth, whether completed or not, suitable for affording shelter for any human being, or as a place where any property is or shall be kept for use, sale or deposit.
The above quoted statute is quite specific as to what constitutes a 'building.' Where a statute specifically designates the things to which it refers, there is an inference that all omissions were intended by the legislature, Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Department of Public Service, 1 Wash.2d 102, 95 P.2d 1007 (1939); 2 Horack, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 4915 (3d ed. 1943). Affirmative specification excludes implication. Layne v. Hayes, 141 W.Va. 289, 90 S.E.2d 270 (1955). Without going into an etymological dissection of the words used by the legislature in defining 'building', we can clearly conclude that a fence is not encompassed within the concept of a 'building' as that term is used in RCW 9.19.020.
The term 'structure' as used in RCW 9.19.020 is not given any statutory definition. We are bound therefore by the rule that, in interpreting the words of a statute, the words are to be given their ordinary meaning. State v. Miller, 72 Wash. 154, 129 P. 1100 (1913); State ex rel. Longview Fire Fighters Union v. City of Longview, 65 Wash.2d 568, 399 P.2d 1 (1965). The term 'structure' in its ordinary meaning includes 'any...
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State v. Flores
...is that specific words modify and restrict the meaning of general words when they occur in a sequence. State v. Roadhs, 71 Wash.2d 705, 708, 430 P.2d 586 (1967), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Wentz, 149 Wash.2d 342, 349, 68 P.3d 282 (2003) (applying the doctrine of ejusdem gen......
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Roth v. Bell
...unius est exclusio alterius applies where a party is seeking to be brought within the terms of a statute, See State v. Roadhs, 71 Wash.2d 705, 430 P.2d 586 (1967), not where a party is seeking the creation of a new and independent cause of Six days after the opinion in the Lockhart case was......
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Joy v. State
...notwithstanding, the defendant has ignored several other cases which are more readily analogous to the one at bar. In State v. Roadhs, (1967) 71 Wash.2d 705, 430 P.2d 586, the defendant and his confederates gained entry into an enclosed power station compound by cutting three strands of bar......
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City of Seattle v. Buchanan
...v. State, 81 Wash.2d 814, 505 P.2d 453 (1973); Garrison v. State Nursing Bd., 87 Wash.2d 195, 550 P.2d 7 (1976); and State v. Roadhs, 71 Wash.2d 705, 430 P.2d 586 (1967). The validity of legislative definitions is a question which usually arises in the context of statutory interpretation. S......