State v. Robb

Decision Date20 January 2000
Docket NumberNo. C1-98-1872.,C1-98-1872.
Citation605 N.W.2d 96
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, petitioner, Appellant, v. Jeffrey Lyle ROBB, Respondent.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Marcy S. Crain, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, for appellant.

Leslie Joan Rosenberg, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

RUSSELL A. ANDERSON, Justice.

In this case we review the pretrial order of the district court suppressing, on Fourth Amendment grounds, a shotgun and ammunition seized during a search of respondent Jeffrey Lyle Robb's vehicle. We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the state has failed to demonstrate, clearly and unequivocally, that the order was in error and we affirm.

A shotgun and ammunition were seized during a search of Robb's vehicle in Anoka County. At 9 o'clock on a July evening in 1998, two Anoka County deputies on routine patrol at the Linwood Lake landing noticed a boat trailer with expired license tabs that did not belong to the trailer. The deputies were inspecting the trailer when a friend of Robb's drove up in Robb's Ford Bronco. Robb's friend told the deputies that the trailer belonged to Robb, who was in a boat on Linwood Lake. The deputies ran license plate checks and learned that the Bronco was registered to Robb, that it had no violations, and that the boat trailer was not registered to either Robb or his friend. The deputies also learned that there was a "body only" warrant for Robb's arrest because he had failed to appear in court on a minor traffic offense.

Robb's friend walked with the deputies to the lakeshore and called Robb to come to shore. Robb came willingly, landing his boat at the water's edge. Once on shore, Robb gave the deputies his name and one of the deputies asked Robb for identification. Robb indicated that his license was in the Bronco and, accompanied by one of the deputies, Robb walked to the Bronco, opened the door, reached his arm into the vehicle and retrieved his license from the dashboard.1 The deputy then took Robb to the front of the Bronco to discuss the expired license tabs on the trailer. After the other deputy confirmed that there was a warrant for Robb's arrest, the deputies informed Robb that he would be arrested. Robb remained cooperative and told the deputies that he was aware of the warrant but that he thought he had time to take care of the matter.

The deputies then initiated a conversation about how to deal with removing the boat, trailer and Bronco from the landing. Because Robb had been cooperative, one of the deputies suggested that Robb load the boat onto the trailer and then Robb's friend could drive the vehicles away, thereby avoiding expensive towing charges. Robb stated that he would be happy to load the boat for his friend. At that point, one of the deputies told Robb that "for [deputy] safety" they would have to search the Bronco and the boat before Robb could enter them.

According to the deputies, Robb became "very nervous," "fidgety" and "antsy" when told of the search. Robb told the deputies that he did not want them in his vehicle. One of the deputies stepped between Robb and the Bronco and the other deputy then ordered that the Bronco be searched. While searching the Bronco, the deputy moved some clothing between the front seats and found a loaded shotgun. Robb was then handcuffed, as was his friend. The deputies seized the loaded shotgun and released Robb's friend, later providing her with a telephone so that she could call for help to remove the Bronco, boat and trailer. The deputies left with Robb, leaving Robb's friend to remove the vehicles from the landing.

A subsequent background check revealed that Robb was convicted of assault in the second degree in 1992. Robb was charged with Possession of a Firearm by an Ineligible Person (Convicted Felon) in violation of Minn.Stat. §§ 624.713, subd.1(b) & 2; 609.11, subd. 5(b); and 609.101, subd. 4 (1998).

I.

We will not overturn a pretrial order of the district court unless "the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the trial court erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial." State v. Webber, 262 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn.1977). There is no dispute that the district court's pretrial order will have a critical impact on the outcome of trial. Therefore, the state must demonstrate clearly and unequivocally that the district court erred when it suppressed the shotgun and ammunition. The district court's order is based upon an interpretation of law which we review de novo. See State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn.1992).

The starting point in the analysis of a challenged search is to note that subject to certain narrow exemptions, warrantless searches are prohibited under the United States Constitution. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981)

. Exemptions from this general rule are based on particular exigencies of a situation and must be "jealously and carefully drawn" and "the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).

One exemption from the warrant requirement is that a person's body and the area within his or her immediate control may be searched incident to a lawful arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)

. This exemption ensures officer safety by allowing officers to remove any weapons the arrestee might reach and also prevents the arrestee from tampering with or destroying evidence or contraband. See id. Because of the difficulty lower courts had applying Chimel's immediate control test to vehicle searches, the Supreme Court established a "bright line" rule for those searches in Belton.

453 U.S. at 459-60,

101 S.Ct. 2860,

69 L.Ed.2d 768. Belton held that when the occupant of a vehicle is lawfully arrested the police can automatically search the vehicle's passenger compartment. 453 U.S. at 460,

101 S.Ct. 2860,

69 L.Ed.2d 768.

A second exemption from the warrant requirement permits a search of a vehicle's passenger compartment, even when not incident to arrest, if an officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that a suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)

. A third exemption, referred to as the doctrine of inevitable discovery, permits evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be admitted at trial if the state can demonstrate that, even if the improper police conduct had not occurred, the evidence eventually would have been discovered. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).

We analyze the validity of the deputies' decision to search the Bronco based on the totality of the circumstances at two critical points in time. The first point in time is when the deputies made the initial decision to search the Bronco, but before they informed Robb of the search. We must determine whether this was a valid search incident to arrest; that is, whether Robb was an occupant of the Bronco under Belton and whether the passenger compartment of the Bronco was within Robb's immediate control under Chimel.

If we conclude that this was not a valid search incident to arrest under either Belton or Chimel, we must then turn our analysis to the second critical point in time, which was after the deputies told Robb that the Bronco would be searched. Here we must determine whether Robb's nervous conduct and opposition to the search constitute sufficient justification for the search under the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard set out in Long. If the requirements of Long are not met, we must then decide whether the deputies could have impounded and inventoried the Bronco, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976),

which could render the evidence admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444,

104 S.Ct. 2501,

81 L.Ed.2d 377.

First we focus on that point in time when the deputies made the initial decision to search the Bronco, but before they informed Robb of the search. If Robb was an occupant of the Bronco under Belton, the search was valid. If Robb was not an occupant under Belton, there may still be a valid search incident to arrest under the immediate control test articulated in Chimel.2

We conclude that Robb was not an occupant within the meaning and purpose of Belton and therefore the search was not valid under Belton. In Belton, the Supreme Court held that when the occupant of an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest, a search of the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he or she was riding is constitutionally permissible. 453 U.S. at 463-64, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768.

While the Court did not define the term "occupant" in Belton, Belton's rationale does not apply where, as here, the arrestee, when approached by the arresting officer, was so far removed from the vehicle, both in distance and in time, that he did not have the opportunity to conceal weapons, contraband, or evidence therein. To apply Belton in such a circumstance would sever Belton from its foundation in Chimel: that at the time the person was arrested, the area to be searched was under his or her immediate control. See Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383, 388 (D.C.1993)

; United States v. Vaughan, 718 F.2d 332, 333-34 (9th Cir.1983). The mere presence of the vehicle in the vicinity of the arrest is insufficient to support a search. Belton does not permit searches of arrestees' vehicles; it permits searches of occupants' vehicles incident to lawful arrest.

The state asks this court to extend Belton to a situation where the arrestee was not an occupant of the vehicle at the time the officers approached...

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