State v. Roberson
Decision Date | 17 June 2021 |
Docket Number | Case No. S-2020-550 |
Citation | 492 P.3d 620 |
Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Parties | STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Brandon James ROBERSON, Appellee. |
APPEARANCES AT HEARING
MATT KEHOE, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 500 S. DENVER, TULSA, OK 74103, COUNSEL FOR THE STATE
JANAY CLOUGHERTY, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER, 423 S. BOULDER, #300, TULSA, OK 74103, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT
APPEARANCES ON APPEAL
STEPHEN A. KUNZWEILER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, MATT KEHOE, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY, 500 S. DENVER, TULSA, OK 74103, COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
STUART W. SOUTHERLAND, ASST. PUBLIC DEFENDER, 423 S. BOULDER, #300, TULSA, OK 74103, COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
¶1 Appellee, Brandon James Roberson, was charged by Information in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2019-2792, with Trafficking in Illegal Drugs in concert with Katelyn Turner, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2019, § 2-415, two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Drug with Intent to Distribute in concert with Katelyn Turner, in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2018, § 2-401, Possession of Controlled Drugs Without Tax Stamp Affixed in concert with Katelyn Turner, in violation of 68 O.S.2011, § 450.8, Acquire Proceeds from Drug Activity in concert with Katelyn Turner, in violation of 63 O.S.2011, § 2-503.1, Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in violation of 63 O.S.2011, § 2-405 and Gang-Related Offense, in violation of 21 O.S.2011, § 856.3. On September 10, 2019, the Honorable J. Anthony Miller, Special Judge, bound Appellee over for trial on all counts.
¶2 At a hearing held August 11, 2020, the Honorable Clifford J. Smith, District Judge, sustained Appellee's motion to suppress. The State announced its intent to appeal in open court. The State timely filed its written Notice of Intent to Appeal and Designation of Record seeking to appeal pursuant to subsection 5 of 22 O.S.2011, § 1053. As the District Court granted Appellee's motion to suppress, effectively preventing the State from proceeding further in this matter, we find that the State may properly proceed on appeal pursuant to § 1053(5). State v. Morgan , 2019 OK CR 26, ¶ 5, 452 P.3d 434, 436.
¶3 In its sole proposition of error, the State argues the District Court abused its discretion by concluding that officers didn't have probable cause to search Appellee's vehicle. Judge Smith granted the motion to suppress, finding lack of probable cause since there was no basis for the officers to determine the marijuana Appellee told them about in the vehicle was illegal rather than lawful medicinal marijuana.
¶4 In appeals brought to this Court pursuant to 22 O.S.2011, § 1053, this Court reviews the trial court's decision to determine if the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Delso , 2013 OK CR 5, ¶ 5, 298 P.3d 1192, 1194 ; State v. Hooley , 2012 OK CR 3, ¶ 4, 269 P.3d 949, 950. An abuse of discretion has been defined as a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented or, stated otherwise, any unreasonable or arbitrary action taken without proper consideration of the facts and law pertaining to the matter at issue. State v. Nelson , 2015 OK CR 10, ¶ 11, 356 P.3d 1113, 1117.
¶5 A review of the record reveals the following: Officer Chris Beyerl and his partner saw a black SUV with an expired tag leave the parking lot of a known drug motel; the driver, Appellee, was not wearing a seat belt; the passenger, Katelyn Turner, ducked down as if she were hiding something as they pulled the vehicle over; Appellee could not produce a driver's license and he was nervous; Turner also failed initially to produce a driver's license; Appellee sported Irish Mob tattoos; and a records check revealed both Appellee and Turner had extensive criminal records, including drug convictions.
¶6 As an initial matter, there is no question of the propriety of the traffic stop. Beyerl saw Appellee commit a seatbelt violation and he saw an expired tag on Appellee's vehicle. See Dufries v. State , 2006 OK CR 13, ¶ 8, 133 P.3d 887, 889 ( ).
¶7 The Supreme Court holds that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable, subject to a few specific exceptions. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte , 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). One of these exceptions is the automobile exception. See Carroll v. United States , 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) ( ). Under this exception, "police officers who have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road may search it without obtaining a warrant." Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 381, 104 S.Ct. 1852, 80 L.Ed.2d 381 (1984). In order for a traffic stop to be valid, both the stop itself and any inquiry following the stop must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for the stop. McGaughey v. State , 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 27, 37 P.3d 130, 137. Ordinarily, an individual may not be detained once the purpose of the stop has been fulfilled. Id. However, police may continue to detain a defendant if the officer develops reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed or if the defendant consents to further interaction. State v. Goins , 2004 OK CR 5, ¶ 13, 84 P.3d 767, 770 (citing United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir. 1998) ).
¶8 Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion which allows him to detain an individual is based upon the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Arvizu , 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). This Court follows the reasoning of Arvizu . See State v. Bass , 2013 OK CR 7, ¶¶ 12-18, 300 P.3d 1193, 1196-98 ( ).
¶9 The location of a traffic stop in a known area of criminal activity is a contributor to reasonable suspicion. See Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ( ). Criminal history of a driver also contributes to reasonable suspicion when combined with other factors. United States v. Morales , 961 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 2020). Additionally, nervousness on the part of a driver is a factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Bass , 2013 OK CR 7, ¶ 16, 300 P.3d at 1197 ( the driver's nervousness along with other factors supported a finding of reasonable suspicion). Based upon the facts shown in the record, we find Beyerl had reasonable suspicion to further question Appellee.
¶10 During further questioning, after telling Beyerl he did not want him to search his vehicle, Appellee told Beyerl there was a small amount of marijuana in the vehicle ash tray. After Beyerl got inside the vehicle to look for the marijuana, he smelled a strong odor of raw marijuana and proceeded to search the entire vehicle. Ultimately, his findings led to the issuance of a search warrant for Appellee's and Turner's motel room where police found contraband.
¶11 We now address the issue of whether legalization of medical marijuana in any way limits an officer's development of probable cause resulting from the existence of or odor of marijuana in a vehicle. In Oklahoma legal marijuana possession is limited to those holding medical marijuana licenses and the amounts are strictly circumscribed by statute and administrative rules. See 63 O.S.Supp.2019, § 420(A) and (B) ; Okla. Admin. Code § 310:681-2-8 (2020). When no medical marijuana license is involved, possession of marijuana is prohibited pursuant to 63 O.S.Supp.2017, § 2-402(A)(1) ().
¶12 That marijuana possession is legal in Oklahoma for those who are issued a valid medical marijuana license does not change the fact that marijuana possession otherwise is generally a crime in Oklahoma. Several states have determined that decriminalization of marijuana does not equate to blanket legalization and thus, the odor (or presence) of marijuana remains a factor indicating criminal activity despite statutes which decriminalize marijuana possession in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Robinson v. State , 451 Md. 94, 152 A.3d 661, 681 (2017) ( ); People v. Zuniga , 2016 CO 52, ¶¶ 23, 28, 372 P.3d 1052, 1059-1060 ( ); State v. Senna , 2013 VT 67, ¶ 16, 194 Vt. 283, 79 A.3d 45, 51 (...
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