State v. Hooley

• Decision Date: 31 January 2012
• Docket Number: No. S–2010–1226.,S–2010–1226.
• Citation: 2012 OK CR 3,269 P.3d 949
• Parties: STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. Cindy Ann Pope HOOLEY, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

2012 OK CR 3

269 P.3d 949

STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant,

v.Cindy Ann Pope HOOLEY, Appellee.

No. S–2010–1226.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

Jan. 31, 2012.

¶ 0 An Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County; the Honorable Geary L. Walke, Special Judge.David Prater, District Attorney, Matthew Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, counsel for appellant in District Court.

Jeff Eulberg, Oklahoma City, OK, counsel for appellee in District Court.

David Prater, District Attorney, Matthew Johnson, Assistant District Attorney, Oklahoma City, OK, counsel for appellant on appeal.Jeff Eulberg, Oklahoma City, OK, counsel for appellee on appeal.

OPINION

LUMPKIN, Judge.

¶ 1 Appellee Cindy Ann Pope Hooley was charged in the District Court of Oklahoma County on March 23, 2010, with Driving Under the Influence (47 O.S.2001, § 11–902(A)), Case No. CM–2010–893. Subsequently, her driver's license was revoked by the Department of Public Safety (DPS). She appealed that revocation to the District Court, Case No. CV–2010–1010. The District Court ruled in part that Appellee had been seized and that her seizure was unconstitutional.

¶ 2 On November 29, 2010, Appellee filed a motion to suppress in the misdemeanor DUI case. At a hearing before the Honorable Geary L. Walke, Special Judge, Appellee argued that as the District Court had ruled in her driver's license revocation appeal that her stop and seizure were unconstitutional, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied and precluded the District Attorney's Office from re-litigating the issue in the criminal misdemeanor case. The District Attorney responded by stipulating that the issue heard in the DPS hearing was identical to the issue Appellee sought to preclude the District Attorney's Office from raising in the misdemeanor proceeding and that the issue was finally adjudicated on its merits at the DPS hearing. However, the District Attorney also argued that the District Attorney's Office and DPS were not the same parties for purposes of collateral estoppel and that the District Attorney's Office did not have a full and fair hearing on the issue to be precluded. The trial court granted the motion to suppress finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied and the District Attorney's Office was therefore precluded from re-litigating the constitutionality of Appellee's seizure. The District Attorney announced his intention to appeal. It is from this order of the District Court precluding the Oklahoma County District Attorney's Office from arguing the constitutionality of Appellee's seizure that the State now appeals.

¶ 3 The State appeals under the authority of 22 O.S.Supp.2009, § 1053(5) asserting that the suppressed evidence forms a substantial part of the proof of the pending misdemeanor charge and that the prosecution cannot proceed if the Motion to Suppress is upheld. Therefore, argues the State, appellate review of the matter is in the best interests of justice.

¶ 4 In appeals brought to this Court pursuant to 22 O.S.Supp.2009, § 1053, this Court reviews the trial court's decision to determine if the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Love, 1998 OK CR 32, ¶ 2, 960 P.2d 368, 369. See also State v. Pope, 2009 OK CR 9, ¶ 4, 204 P.3d 1285, 1287. An abuse of discretion has been defined as a conclusion or judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented. Love, 1998 OK CR 32, ¶ 2, 960 P.2d at 369. See also Slaughter v. State, 1997 OK CR 78, ¶ 19, 950 P.2d 839, 848–849.

¶ 5 In its sole proposition of error, the State argues the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. In the first part of a three part argument, the State backs away from its stipulations made at the motion to suppress hearing and argues the issue in the Department of Public Safety (hereinafter DPS) hearing was not identical to the issue in the criminal proceeding and that the issue was not finally adjudicated in the license revocation appeal. The State asserts this Court should adopt U.S. Supreme Court precedent which applies a two part test to determine when a civil proceeding triggers the Double Jeopardy clause and that Appellee's license revocation was not a form of criminal punishment that would trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause. Therefore, according to the State, the order granting the motion to suppress should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 6 Alternatively, the State argues that DPS and the District Attorney's Office are not the same party or in privity and that the District Attorney's office did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue at the hearing on the license revocation appeal.

¶ 7 The Appellee responds that the District Court correctly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Appellee argues that the trial court did not bar the District Attorney's Office from proceeding against her, but merely found that the very narrow issue of the constitutionally of her seizure had already been specifically decided in the appeal of the driver's license revocation. Further, Appellee asserts that DPS and the District Attorney's Office are the same party and in privity as the real party in interest is the State of Oklahoma and the State had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue at the license revocation appeal.

¶ 8 This Court addressed the doctrine of collateral estoppel in Smith v. State, 2002 OK CR 2, 46 P.3d 136, where we stated in pertinent part:

The doctrine of collateral estoppel stands for the principle that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) This rule of law is applicable to criminal proceedings and is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445–446, 90 S.Ct. at 1195.

...

To apply collateral estoppel, the following elements must be established: (1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question; (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1022 (10th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1019, 122 S.Ct. 543, 151 L.Ed.2d 421 (2001).

2002 OK CR 2, ¶¶ 7–9, 46 P.3d at 137–138 (footnotes omitted).

¶ 9 Subsequently, in Smith v. Dinwiddie, 510 F.3d 1180, 1183 (10th Cir.2007), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in part:

The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the government from trying the same person twice for the same offense. The Clause embodies two broad principles: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense (whether after acquittal or conviction) and protection from multiple punishments for the same crime. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980). Relatedly, collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating an issue that has already been decided. Although better known as a civil law concept, collateral estoppel also applies in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). In the criminal context, the doctrine of collateral estoppel serves to: (1) reduce chances of wrongful conviction after an acquittal, (2) strengthen notions of finality, (3) preserve judicial resources, and (4) restrain overzealous prosecutors. See Note, The Due Process Roots of Criminal Collateral Estoppel, 109 Harv. L.Rev. 1729, 1732 (1996).

The Supreme Court has clearly established that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in state criminal cases via the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The doctrine is embodied in the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, which has been incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970) ... Thus, state courts are constitutionally required to apply principles of collateral estoppel in criminal cases if and only if the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause have been triggered.

...

Collateral estoppel bars the adjudication of a particular claim in a subsequent proceeding when four elements are met. Those elements are: (1) the issue previously decided is identical with the one presented in the action in question; (2) the prior action has been finally adjudicated on the merits; (3) the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is raised had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. E.g., Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1022 (10th Cir.2001).

Interpreting the Supreme Court's relevant constitutional precedents, then, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies in state criminal proceedings only if the Double Jeopardy Clause is triggered by an earlier proceeding. For an issue to be barred from relitigation under the doctrine, the petitioner must show the four elements of the collateral estoppel test have been satisfied. 510 F.3d at 1186–1188 (footnotes omitted).¹ See also Jackson v. State, 2006 OK CR 45, ¶ 16, 146 P.3d 1149, 1157, fn. 5 (“[t]he doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an ultimate issue by a party or his privies when the issue has been determined by a valid and final judgment,” citing Smith v. State, 2002 OK CR 2, ¶ 7, 46 P.3d 136, 137).

¶ 10 In light of the stipulations made at the motion to suppress hearing, we first turn our attention to the second portion of the test to determine the applicability of the collateral...