State v. Roberson
Decision Date | 02 March 2004 |
Docket Number | No. COA03-397.,COA03-397. |
Citation | 592 S.E.2d 733,163 NC App. 129 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Ellen Monica ROBERSON. |
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Isaac T. Avery, III and Assistant Attorney General Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.
Wyatt Early Harris Wheeler, LLP, by John Bryson, High Point, for defendant-appellee.
The State of North Carolina appeals an order filed 2 October 2002 allowing a motion by Ellen Monica Roberson (defendant) to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop.
In its 2 October 2002 order, the trial court found as fact that:
Based on these findings, the trial court concluded the totality of circumstances did not give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing justifying a stop or seizure of defendant's person or vehicle. As a result, the trial court suppressed evidence obtained during the traffic stop.
The dispositive issue is whether defendant's eight-to-ten-second delayed reaction at a traffic light gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.
Generally, an appellate court's review of a trial court's order on a motion to suppress "is strictly limited to a determination of whether its findings are supported by competent evidence, and in turn, whether the findings support the trial court's ultimate conclusion." State v. Allison, 148 N.C.App. 702, 704, 559 S.E.2d 828, 829 (2002). Where, however, the trial court's findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal. State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984). In this case, the State did not assign error to the trial court's findings. Accordingly, we review the trial court's order to determine only whether the findings of fact support the legal conclusion that the circumstances surrounding Deputy Eaton's stop of defendant did not give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94-95, 574 S.E.2d 93, 98 (2002) ( ), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 693, 579 S.E.2d 98 (2003). As our Supreme Court has held:
State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 238-39, 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (citations omitted).
The issue of whether a delayed reaction at a traffic signal can give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot is one of first impression in this State but has been addressed in other jurisdictions. In State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 809 P.2d 522 (1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a delayed reaction at a traffic light for the purpose of arousing reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a stop. The defendant in that case, who was alone in his vehicle, stopped at a red traffic light at 2:40 a.m. on a Sunday morning. A law enforcement officer on patrol duty was also waiting at the light. When the traffic light turned green, the defendant's vehicle did not move for five to six seconds. Thereafter, the officer observed the defendant drive away in a straight line but close to parked vehicles. Based on "the slowness of [the defendant's] response to the traffic signal [,] the closeness of [the defendant's] vehicle to other vehicles parked on the street[,] ... the fact that it was 2:40 a.m. on a Sunday morning," and the officer's training "that forty percent of all people who have a slow response at a traffic signal may be under the influence of alcohol," the defendant was stopped. Id. at 663, 809 P.2d at 524. Evidence was subsequently obtained resulting in his arrest for driving while intoxicated. Id. In support of its holding that these factors were insufficient to give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:
The evidence adduced by the officer could just as easily...
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...green tends to support the Court of Appeals' majority opinion in the instant case and to undermine that court's earlier decision in State v. Roberson. See 163 N.C.App. 129, 134-35, 592 S.E.2d 733, 736-37, disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 240, 594 S.E.2d 199 (2004) (holding that the defendant's e......
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...events from which a law enforcement officer would draw his inferences based on his training and experience. State v. Roberson, 163 N.C.App. 129, 592 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Officer Correa did not possess any reasonable ......
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...ultimate conclusion. State v. White, 184 N.C. App. 519, 523, 646 S.E.2d 609, 611-12 (quoting State v. Roberson, 163 N.C. App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735-36, disc, review denied, 358 N.C. 240, 594 S.E.2d 199 (2004)), disc, review denied, 361 N.C. 702, 653 S.E.2d 160 (2007). "Findings of f......
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...not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal." State v. Roberson, 163 N.C.App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735-36 (2004) (citing State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 37, 320 S.E.2d 670, 673 (1984)), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 240, 594 S.E.......
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Table of Cases
...21 Rivera, People v., 650 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App.) 20 Rivera, United States v., 867 F.2d 1261 (10th Cir. 1989) 32 Roberson, State v., 592 S.E.2d 733 (N.C. App. 2004) 29 Roberts, State v., 706 P.2d 564 (Or. App. 1985) 80 Robertson, United States v., 21 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 1994) 199 Robinette......
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