State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 05 August 1895
• Citation: 12 Wash. 491,41 P. 884
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. ROBINSON. [1]

41 P. 884

12 Wash. 491

STATE v. ROBINSON. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Washington

August 5, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Snohomish county; John C. Denney, Judge.

James Robinson was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

Anders and Scott, JJ., dissenting.

Clark & Allen, for appellant.

L. C Whitney, Pros. Atty., for the State.

HOYT, C.J.

In December, 1892, George Schultz and Frederick Smith were shot and killed on what was known as the "John White Road" in Snohomish county, state of Washington. On account of such killing an information was filed in the superior court of said county, charging appellant, with others, with murder in the first degree in the killing of George Schultz. Upon this information defendant, upon his demand, was separately tried, and upon the trial a verdict of not guilty was returned by the jury. Thereafter an information was filed in said court charging him with murder in the first degree in the killing of Frederick Smith. The defendant, by his counsel, filed a plea in writing, setting up the alleged facts as to the killing of the said Schultz and Smith, and his acquittal upon his trial for the killing of the former and thereupon moved the court for his discharge for the reason that he had been so acquitted. This motion was denied but the written plea was allowed to stand, and in connection therewith a plea of not guilty was interposed in open court. Upon this state of the record the cause was tried, and a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree returned by the jury. Judgment and sentence followed, from which this appeal has been prosecuted.

The first allegations of error all relate to the action of the court upon the plea of former acquittal. First, it is claimed that the motion for discharge on that account should have been granted; second, that appellant was entitled to a separate trial upon the questions presented by such plea; and third, that the court took the consideration of all questions relating thereto from the jury. It is only necessary to refer to the action of the court in instructing the jury to disregard all evidence relating to the question of former acquittal. The ruling of the court in so doing was founded upon the theory that the undisputed facts showed that appellant had never been acquitted of the crime with which he was charged in the information upon which he was on trial. This instruction was clearly erroneous, if any proof had been introduced which tended in any degree to show that the appellant had been acquitted of the crime so charged. If there was no such proof, defendant has no right to complain of the ruling of the court in denying his motion for a discharge, or in not giving him a separate trial upon the issues raised upon the plea of former acquittal. The undisputed facts show that, in an affray at which the appellant was present, two men, the said Schultz and the said Smith, were killed; that the appellant had been acquitted upon trial for the killing of Schultz, but that he had never before been on trial for the killing of Smith. It follows that, if the killing of each of the men constituted a distinct crime, there was no proof tending to show that the appellant had been formerly acquitted of the crime alleged to have been committed in the killing of Smith. The fact that the same line of proof was introduced for the purpose of showing that he was guilty of the killing of Schultz as that introduced to show his guilt in the killing of Smith would in no manner tend to show that an acquittal for the killing of the former would constitute an acquittal for the killing of the latter, if the killing of each was a distinct crime. That such proofs in reference to two prosecutions for the commission of a single offense would be proper to go to a jury upon the question of former acquittal or conviction is beyond question, but to us it seems equally clear that proof which was necessary and competent to convict of one crime would have no weight upon such question in the prosecution for another, even although the same criminating circumstances were relied upon in the latter as in the former case. Was the killing of each of these men a distinct crime? They were killed in a single affray, and the connection of the appellant was substantially the same in his relations to such affray, as it related to each of such men. If the result of the meeting at which the two were killed had been the death of only one of them, a prosecution for murder could have been founded upon his death, and under the circumstances of this case this would have been true whether the one so killed had been Schultz or Smith; and there can be no good reason why that which would have warranted a prosecution for murder should lose force by reason of the fact that another circumstance, which in itself would warrant such a prosecution, occurred at the same time and place. If the prosecution had been founded upon the killing of the two, and the case had gone to trial upon a plea of not guilty, proof of the killing of either of them would have warranted a conviction. It follows that the killing of each was, so far as the homicide was concerned, a distinct transaction. The taking of a human life with certain intent constitutes murder, and neither law nor public policy will justify a holding that each life is of less value when taken with another than it would be if taken alone. If a person without justification intends to kill A., and does so, he will be guilty of a crime; if he intends to kill B., he will be guilty of another and a different crime; and the fact that he entertains the intent to kill both, and carries such intent into effect at the same time and place, should not be held to make of that which would otherwise be a foundation for two distinct prosecutions a foundation for only one. In our opinion, the undisputed proofs, when...