State v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 03 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2019-001256,Opinion No. 5930 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Kyle Maurice ROBINSON, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., and Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Scott Matthews, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of York, all for Respondent.
In this criminal appeal, Kyle Maurice Robinson argues the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict. Specifically, Robinson argues that under subsection 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i) of the South Carolina Code (2015), the State failed to produce any evidence proving he injured a minor and therefore failed to prove an essential element of assault and battery in the first degree. We affirm.
On July 27, 2017, a sixteen-year-old minor (Minor) was at home watching her younger sister while her mother and live-in grandparents were at work. In the late afternoon, Minor and her sister were playing cards when they noticed a car parked in front of their house. Minor went to the front door to see who was in the car. It was Robinson, and he exited the car and asked Minor if his daughter was there.1 Minor informed Robinson his daughter was not home, and Robinson asked if he could use Minor's bathroom.
Minor agreed and claimed that when she pointed to the bathroom, Robinson requested she walk with him. When she escorted Robinson to the bathroom, he grabbed her by the shirt, pulled her into the bathroom, and backed her into a corner after she refused to enter the bathroom with him voluntarily. Minor testified that as Robinson backed her into the corner, he had his left hand around her neck to press her against the wall but he was not choking her. Minor admitted having Robinson's hand around her neck was uncomfortable but it was not squeezing her, just holding her in place. She stated he was groping her breasts with his free hand. After Minor yelled, "Get the f*** off of me," Robinson released her neck, began "tugging" at her shorts, and exclaimed "I have $60 if you let me do you."
Minor testified that during the altercation, she noticed Robinson was sweating profusely and appeared to be intoxicated. Robinson ended the molestation when he heard Minor's younger sister walking down the hall. Minor's sister stated that she heard Minor exclaim "Stop, stop" from the bathroom. Robinson then ran out of the bathroom, exited the house, and drove off. Several minutes later, Minor's brother returned home, and the two of them called their mother after Minor told him what happened. Upon arrival, Minor's mother called the police, and they arrested Robinson within walking distance of Minor's home approximately half an hour later. Officer Jerry Sanders testified he observed and photographed Minor's neck at the scene. Officer Sanders stated Minor's neck was uninjured and was not reddened.
In December 2017, a York County grand jury indicted Robinson for criminal solicitation of a minor, and in July 2019, it indicted Robinson for assault and battery in the first degree. At trial, after the State rested, Robinson moved for a directed verdict on the first-degree assault and battery charge. Robinson argued that under subsection 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i), the State failed to provide evidence that Minor was physically injured from the encounter with Robinson. Specifically, Robinson asserted that to submit the charge to the jury, the subsection required the State prove an actual, physical injury in addition to a nonconsensual touching of an individual's private parts. Read in unison with the remainder of the statute's subsections that define and require a physical injury, Robinson claimed the term "injures" under subsection 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i) must be construed to require some physical injury rather than a nebulous, legal injury. Robinson claimed an injury is "any physical harm or irritation or ailment."
The trial court denied Robinson's motion, finding the statute only calls for a legal injury in conjunction with the nonconsensual touching of an individual's private parts. After admitting its confusion as to why the legislature set forth two separate requirements under the first-degree assault and battery subsection, the court stated that lacking further guidance from appellate courts, it would interpret the term "injures" in the traditional legal sense. It found that "nonconsensual touching is a legal injury and does not require some sort of vital injury."
Robinson did not raise a defense at trial, and the jury found him guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced Robinson to five years’ imprisonment for each charge and mandatory registration as a sex offender for each charge. This appeal followed.
Did the trial court err in refusing to grant Robinson's motion for a directed verdict because the State failed to produce any evidence that Robinson physically injured Minor under subsection 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i)?2
When reviewing a motion for a directed verdict, appellate courts view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. State v. Harris , 413 S.C. 454, 457, 776 S.E.2d 365, 366 (2015). If direct or substantial circumstantial evidence exists that tends to prove the guilt of the accused, appellate courts must affirm the trial court's decision to submit the case to the jury. Id.
Robinson claims the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a directed verdict as to his first-degree assault and battery charge because the State failed to prove he injured Minor as required under the statute. He asserts that under subsection 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i), the term "injures" requires the State prove an actual, physical injury in addition to nonconsensual touching of the victim's private parts. We disagree and affirm.
This case presents an issue of first impression. This court must define and give effect to the term injures for purposes of first-degree assault and battery. In pertinent part, the statute provides, "A person commits the offense of assault and battery in the first degree if the person unlawfully: (a) injures another person, and the act: (i) involves nonconsensual touching of the private parts of a person, either under or above clothing, with lewd and lascivious intent ...." § 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i) (emphases added).
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible." State v. Landis , 362 S.C. 97, 102, 606 S.E.2d 503, 505 (Ct. App. 2004). "All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute." Id. Appellate courts do not construe particular clauses of a statute in isolation but read them "in conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law." White v. State , 375 S.C. 1, 7, 649 S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 2007). "The legislature's intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute." Landis , 362 S.C. at 102, 606 S.E.2d at 505. Id. (citation omitted).
The Legislature uses inconsistent language throughout Title 16, Chapter 3 of the South Carolina Code to define specific elements required to constitute an offense against an individual's person, especially when the element requires an "injury." For instance, assault and battery by mob requires an "act of violence" be "inflicted by a mob upon the body of another person." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-210 (2015) (emphasis added). Further, an individual is only guilty of hazing if he intentionally or recklessly commits an act that has a foreseeable potential to cause "physical harm to a person for the purpose of initiation or admission" into an organization. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-510 (2015) (emphasis added). Even defined terms under the assault and battery statute are inconsistent. Compare S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(A)(1) (2015) , with S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-600(A)(2) (2015) .
In spite of these inconsistencies, the plain language of subsection 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i) is clear in defining what constitutes assault and battery in the first degree. Despite Robinson's assertion that the statute requires the State prove two separate elements, we find the statute requires one injury stemming from a single act and that the Legislature intended the single act that caused the injury to "involve[ ] nonconsensual touching of the private parts of a person ... with lewd and lascivious intent." § 16-3-600(C)(1)(a)(i). Robinson argues that because the Legislature followed the term "injures" with the conjunction "and," it intended to create a conjunctive list that establishes two distinct elements for the State to satisfy to prove assault and battery in the first degree—(1) a physical injury and (2) a separate, nonconsensual touching of the victim's private parts with lewd intent. Contrarily, after a plain reading of the subsection, it is evident the Legislature included "and" to further modify and define the nature of the act that caused the injury it intended to constitute assault and battery in the first degree.
Robinson also argues that because the Legislature defined "great bodily harm" and ...
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