White v. State
| Decision Date | 18 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 4277.,4277. |
| Citation | 649 S.E.2d 172 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Kenneth J. WHITE, Respondent, v. The STATE of South Carolina, Appellant. |
Assistant Appellate Defender Lanelle C. Durant, of Columbia for Respondent.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe and Assistant Attorney General R. Westmoreland Clarkson, all of Columbia, for Appellant.
On July 5, 2005, the State commenced an action pursuant to the South Carolina Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act),1 alleging Kenneth White (White) met the statutory criteria for confinement as a sexually violent predator. Based on the Act, the State sought White's commitment in a secure facility for long-term care, control, and treatment. The circuit court found no probable cause existed to establish White was a sexually violent predator and accordingly dismissed the action. We reverse and remand.
White has a long history of sexually violent behavior toward women. In July 2002, White entered his victim's home, forced her into a bedroom, and used aggravated force to rape her. Based on this incident, he was arrested and charged with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. White pled guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the second degree and was sentenced to ten years in prison, suspended to six months with a five-year probation period.
In January 2004, White sexually assaulted his former girlfriend at his residence. White asked the victim to come to his house, but when she arrived, he became increasingly angry with the victim for ending their relationship. He then threw her on the bed, choked her, and sexually assaulted her. White was again charged with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. White entered a nolo contendre plea to criminal sexual conduct in the third degree and was sentenced to five years in prison, suspended to fourteen months with a five-year probation period.
Before White's release, the Director of the Department of Corrections notified the Attorney General and the multidisciplinary team that White, as a potential sexually violent predator, was to be released from confinement. The multidisciplinary team reviewed his case and determined White satisfied the definition of a sexually violent predator. Thereafter, the prosecutor's review committee reviewed the multidisciplinary team's recommendation and found probable cause to believe White was a sexually violent predator.
Based on the multidisciplinary team's and the prosecutor's review committee's recommendations, the State filed a petition in circuit court to commit White to the South Carolina Department of Mental Health. The circuit court found the petition set forth sufficient facts to establish probable cause that White met the statutory criteria for commitment. The circuit court subsequently held a probable cause hearing.
At the probable cause hearing, in addition to the July 2002 and January 2004 convictions, the State attempted to supplement its petition with: (1) incident reports showing White repeatedly stalked, sexually assaulted, and threatened a third victim over a five-year period, which resulted in White being charged and arrested for unlawful use of a telephone, harassment, violation of a restraining order, and assault; (2) an incident report that charged White with raping a fourth victim whom he had stalked for over a year and a half; and (3) a statement from the mother of White's son who claimed their relationship was "filled with lies, deception, control, physical and mental abuse, and continued infidelity" and "if released, [White] pose[d] an extreme danger to society."
White objected to the introduction of the documents detailing these offenses on the grounds that the incidents did not result in convictions, and only conduct resulting in criminal convictions may be considered under the Act. The circuit court sustained this objection.
In response, the State argued that even if the circuit court considered only White's two convictions, his conduct met the diagnostic criteria for sexual paraphilia as set forth in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). The State then attempted to admit a copy of the definition of sexual paraphilia from the DSM-IV into evidence, but White objected, claiming no basis existed to submit the document. The State argued because the DSM-IV is a recognized treatise and because the Act expressly allows documentary evidence to be considered at a probable cause hearing, the document should be admitted. However, the court disagreed and sustained White's objection.
The circuit court held the State failed to establish probable cause to commit White under the Act and dismissed the case. This appeal follows.
By way of background, the Act provides for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators who are "mentally abnormal and extremely dangerous." § 44-48-20. To determine whether a person can be committed as a sexually violent predator under the Act, a series of steps must occur. First, the multidisciplinary team, appointed by the Director of the Department of Corrections, must determine whether the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator.2 § 44-48-50. The multidisciplinary team may rely on the person's records, which "include, but are not limited to, the person's criminal offense record, any relevant medical and psychological records, treatment records, victim's impact statement, and any disciplinary or other records formulated during confinement or supervision." Id.
If the multidisciplinary team finds the person meets the definition of a sexually violent predator, it then refers the case to the prosecutor's review committee. Id. Relying on the person's relevant records and the multidisciplinary team's recommendation, the prosecutor's review committee must determine whether probable cause exists to commit the person as a sexually violent predator. § 44-48-60. If the prosecutor's review committee determines probable cause is present, the Attorney General may file a petition in circuit court to request a probable cause hearing. § 44-48-70.
At the probable cause hearing, the court considers the State's petition, which may be supplemented by additional documentary evidence or live testimony. § 44-48-80(B). If probable cause exists, the person is transferred to a secure facility for evaluation by a court-approved qualified expert. § 44-48-80(D). Within sixty days of the probable cause hearing, a trial must be conducted, at which the State must convince the court or jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator. § 44-48-90.
The State first argues the circuit court erred when it refused to consider White's past unadjudicated sexual offenses at the probable cause hearing. In response, White argues only conduct resulting in criminal convictions may be taken into account at the probable cause hearing because the Act is triggered only by such conduct. We agree with the State.
The Act does not specifically define whether the circuit court can consider a person's "criminal offense record" at the probable cause hearing, nor does the Act specify what "offenses" the circuit court can consider. § 44-48-80. As such, we must first resolve whether the circuit court can rely on a person's criminal offense record. If so, we must then determine what offenses the circuit court can permissibly consider in its probable cause determination.
In construing a statute, this Court should not consider the particular clause being construed in isolation, but we should read the clause in conjunction with the purpose of the whole statute and the policy of the law. South Carolina Coastal Council v. South Carolina State Ethics Comm'n, 306 S.C. 41, 44, 410 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1991). Statutory provisions should be given a reasonable construction consistent with the purpose of the statute. Jackson v. Charleston County Sch. Dist., 316 S.C. 177, 181, 447 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1994). Statutes that are part of the same act must be read together. Burns v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 297 S.C. 520, 522, 377 S.E.2d 569, 570 (1989). Statutes must be read as a whole and sections that are part of the same general statutory scheme must be construed together and each given effect, if reasonable. Higgins v. State, 307 S.C. 446, 449, 415 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1992).
The Act states that a "person's records," including a "person's criminal offense record," may be considered by the multidisciplinary team and the prosecutor's review committee in determining whether a person is a sexually violent predator. § 44-48-50. The State's petition, submitted to the circuit court at the probable cause hearing, is based in part on the recommendations and reports of the multidisciplinary team and the prosecutor's review committee. §§ 44-48-50 to -80. The Act does not explicitly limit the multidisciplinary team and the prosecutor's review committee to considering only convictions when they make their respective decisions. §§ 44-48-50, 44-48-60. By reading these statutes together, if the circuit court can consider the State's petition at a probable cause hearing, it follows that the circuit court can likewise consider any prior relevant offenses, which may be contained in the State's petition.
Because the circuit court can take into account relevant criminal offenses, we must next determine what offenses are appropriate to consider. Based on our review, we find "offense" to mean either (1) convictions and crimes not resulting in convictions or (2) only convictions. Consequently, this term in the Act is ambiguous.
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533...
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