State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 21 April 1987
• Docket Number: No. 4686,4686
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Kevin T. ROBINSON.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

Page 1365

523 A.2d 1365

10 Conn.App. 520

STATE of Connecticut v. Kevin T. ROBINSON.

No. 4686.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

April 21, 1987.

John R. Williams, New Haven, filed the motion for appellant (defendant).

Marcia B. Smith, Asst. State's Atty., in opposition, for appellee (state).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and HULL, BORDEN, SPALLONE, DALY and BIELUCH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This opinion is a memorandum of decision on the defendant's motion to clarify the status of his appeal. The principal issue to be decided is whether the trial court, Ripley, J., on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, had the authority to order the discharge of the defendant from custody unless his appeal was reinstated by this court within a prescribed period of forty-five days. We hold that the habeas court exceeded the scope of its authority, and we therefore vacate the trial court's order.

The defendant was convicted, after a trial to a jury, of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70. The defendant was sentenced to a term of ten years and was thereafter released on appeal bond. His appeal from that conviction was ultimately dismissed by this court for failure to file a brief. ¹ Upon the dismissal of his appeal, the defendant was taken into custody. The defendant thereafter brought a habeas corpus action in the Superior Court for the judicial district of Tolland, claiming that he was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate counsel because his attorney had withdrawn from the case without filing the requisite appellate brief, and because the court made no attempt to procure substitute appellate counsel for him. ² See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811, reh. denied, 373 U.S. 905, 83 S.Ct. 1288, 10 L.Ed.2d 200 (1963); Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510, 515-16, 481 A.2d 1084 (1984).

By a written stipulation filed in the habeas corpus action on September 8, 1986, the assistant state's attorney and the defendant's habeas corpus counsel agreed that the defendant's writ of habeas corpus should be granted and the defendant "discharged from custody unless his appeal to the Appellate Court is reinstated not later than forty-five days from the date of the order hereunder." On September 22, 1986, the trial court, Ripley, J., pursuant to the stipulation, issued an order which read as follows: "So ordered."

On October 14, 1986, twenty-two days after the issuance of the trial court's order, the defendant filed a motion to reinstate his appeal in this court. Thereafter, on November 14, 1986, the state filed a motion in the habeas court to extend the date of the defendant's discharge since this court had not yet acted on the defendant's motion for reinstatement. The motion for an extension was, for inexplicable reasons, not pressed by the state in the habeas court. On December 5, 1986, seventy-four days after the issuance of the trial court's order, but fifty-four days after the filing of the defendant's motion, this court granted the defendant's motion for reinstatement of his appeal. The defendant, however, was discharged from custody on November 21, 1986, pursuant to the habeas court's order. On January 21, 1987, when the defendant did not file his appeal brief, the state filed a motion in the trial court for the setting of an appeal bond or the return of the defendant to custody. The trial court, E. O'Connell, J., informed the parties that the matter was more appropriately before this court.

On February 24, 1987, the defendant filed the present motion for clarification in this court, requesting this court to "affirm that there is no longer any criminal action pending against [the] defendant-appellant and that this appeal is, accordingly, moot." The state, in its answer to the defendant's motion for clarification, and pursuant to the direction of the trial court, E.O'Connell, J., has requested that this court address that issue, to determine whether the defendant's appeal is reinstated and whether the defendant should be returned to custody. Because we find that the habeas court exceeded the scope of its authority in imposing time limitations on this court, we hold that the defendant's discharge from custody, which was based solely on the failure of this court to adhere to the forty-five day time limit imposed on us by the habeas court, was erroneous. We reaffirm the status of his appeal, namely, that it was reinstated by this court on December 5, 1986, and is now pending in this court.

In reaching our decision, we are cognizant of the familiar proposition that "the writ of habeas corpus 'holds an honored position in our jurisprudence ... [as] a bulwark against convictions that violate "fundamental fairness." ' Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1571, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, reh. denied, 456 U.S. 1001, 102 S.Ct. 2286, 73 L.Ed.2d 1296, and reh. denied, 457 U.S. 1141, 102 S.Ct. 2976, 73 L.Ed.2d 1361 (1982)...." Gaines v. Manson, supra, 194 Conn. at 516, 481 A.2d 1084. The habeas court has the power, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470, to dispose of the case " ' "as law and justice require." ' " ³ Fredericks v. Reincke, 152 Conn. 501, 506-507, 208 A.2d 756 (1965). The trial court, therefore, has the power to order the discharge of a petitioner from custody in appropriate circumstances; see Gaines v. Manson, supra; Fredericks v. Reincke, supra; because it, "much like a court of equity, has considerable discretion to frame a remedy, so long as that remedy is commensurate with the scope of the constitutional violations which have been established." ⁴ Gaines v. Manson, supra, 194 Conn. at 528, 481 A.2d 1084.

The broad power vested in the trial court in a habeas corpus action, however, does not include the trial court's unnecessary intrusion into an appellate court's supervision and control of its own rules of procedure. See Practice Book § 4183 (formerly § 3096). By necessity, this court must have exclusive power over the control of its own docket, including the imposition of time limitations for hearing and deciding motions. Our Supreme Court has recognized that an appellate court "has 'the general supervisory power to protect its jurisdiction to hear appeals' and that this 'power cannot be defeated by the arbitrary action of a trial court.' " State v. S & R Sanitation Services, Inc., 202 Conn. 300, 309-310, 521 A.2d 1017 (1987). The habeas court's imposition of a forty-five day limitation within which this court was required to reinstate the defendant's appeal was an arbitrary interference with the general supervisory powers of this court.

It is important to note that in reaching this conclusion, we are not reviewing the propriety of the trial court's action in a collateral habeas corpus proceeding not presently before this court. Rather, upon considering the defendant's motion for clarification, and utilizing our general supervisory powers provided in Practice Book § 4183 (formerly § 3096), we are merely vacating that portion of the trial court's order directly affecting the time period within which we could exercise our power to act upon a motion to reinstate the defendant's appeal. Practice Book § 4183 provides that this "court may, on its own motion, modify or vacate any order made by the trial court, or a judge thereof, in relation to the prosecution of the appeal." (Emphasis added.) This court, therefore, while not questioning or disputing the power of the habeas court to order the discharge of the defendant in the event that his appeal was not reinstated; see Gaines v. Manson, supra, 194 Conn. at 529, 481 A.2d 1084; must nevertheless be able to hear and decide a motion to reinstate such an appeal without strict and unrealistic time limitations imposed on it.

Several important public policy considerations guide us in reaching this conclusion. First, we note that there is a grave potential for abuse and tactical maneuver by a defendant when an order is issued by a trial court which imposes a particular number of days as a limitation on the reinstatement of an appeal. By conditioning the defendant's discharge on this court's compliance with the forty-five day period, the habeas court paved the way for the defendant to thwart this court's timely consideration of his motion to reinstate his appeal, thus guaranteeing his discharge from custody. In this case, the defendant did not file a motion for reinstatement of his appeal until twenty-two days into the forty-five day time limit. He could, however, have conceivably waited until the forty-fourth day to file the motion, which would have made it utterly impossible for this court to act within the prescribed period of time. The effect of the habeas court's order, therefore, was to place in ...