State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 15 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. C1-87-1553,C1-87-1553
• Citation: 427 N.W.2d 217
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kenneth ROBINSON, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 217

427 N.W.2d 217

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kenneth ROBINSON, Appellant.

No. C1-87-1553.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 15, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Although a pretrial order of the trial court erroneously denied an accused's motion to suppress an in-custody statement, which had been given by the accused to the police after he had requested, but been denied, his constitutional right to counsel, the denial was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.

2. Except for assertion of his right to counsel, an accused knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily waived other constitutional rights afforded him by the holding on Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Spreigl evidence of other crimes which tended to establish pattern of operation, closeness in time between the Spreigl incidents and the current incident, and absence of mistake or accident.

4. The accused was not entitled to a self-defense jury instruction in the absence of any credible evidence demonstrating that the accused, admittedly an original aggressor, had withdrawn from the confrontation.

Susan J. Andrews, Asst. State Public Defender, St. Paul, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Alan L. Mitchell, St. Louis Co. Atty., Brian D. Simonson, Asst. Co. Atty., Hibbing, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

KELLEY, Justice.

Appellant Kenneth Kevin Richard Robinson was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for commission of first degree murder following the robbery and stabbing death of Clifford Enroth in Hibbing, Minnesota. ¹ He appeals from the conviction alleging that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court committed reversible error when (1) it failed to suppress appellant's custodial statement which had been taken by Spokane, Washington police officers after appellant had invoked, but had been denied, his constitutional right to counsel; (2) it failed to sustain the appellant's claim that the statement should be suppressed because his alleged waiver of Miranda rights was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made; (3) it erroneously admitted evidence of other crimes committed by the appellant; and (4) it refused to instruct the jury on appellant's claim that he had acted in self-defense. We affirm the conviction.

Clifford Enroth was robbed and stabbed to death in his Hibbing, Minnesota home during the early morning hours of August 6, 1986. Some days previously, appellant, Michael Merrill, Debra Chamblee, and another person arrived in Hibbing after driving from Oregon in a Toyota automobile belonging to Chamblee's former boyfriend. Shortly after arriving they rented an apartment. None of them were employed. During the course of the evening of August 5 appellant, Michael Merrill and Chamblee first met Clifford Enroth, a Vietnam veteran who had lost both of his legs as a result of war injuries, in a bar known as the Airway Inn in Hibbing. Following the initial introduction, the four socialized together for several hours playing darts, talking and drinking in the bar. Eventually Enroth invited the others to his home for the purpose of continued partying and also to take a sauna. En route to Enroth's home the four acquired tequila, vodka and a case of beer. Upon arrival at the house, the group initially resumed drinking, and smoked marijuana. Later they all took a sauna. Evidentially both Merrill and appellant "passed out". While those two were in a stupor, Enroth and Chamblee voluntarily engaged in a sexual act. After Chamblee had confided to Enroth that Merrill continuously physically abused her, Enroth attempted to contact two battered women shelters by telephone in order to find a haven to which Chamblee could go to escape from that abuse. Though at that time he was unsuccessful, the two did arrange to meet the following day when Enroth would attempt to get her admitted to a battered women's shelter in Duluth.

Chamblee then awakened appellant and Merrill, and soon thereafter the three departed from Enroth's house. As they were proceeding back towards Hibbing, Merrill accused Chamblee of having had sexual intercourse with Enroth. In addition to making the accusations, he proceeded to slap her, grabbed her hair, and slammed her forehead into the dashboard. In an attempt to stem this abuse, Chamblee falsely related that Enroth had raped her with a dildo at gunpoint. This accusation infuriated Merrill, who was driving. He sharply turned the car around 180? and proceeded to return to Enroth's house. During the course of the trip back he asserted that he, Merrill, was going to kill Enroth.

Upon arrival, Merrill and appellant were re-admitted by Enroth. Merrill immediately accused Enroth of raping Chamblee. Enroth's denial of any wrongdoing infuriated Merrill to the point he commenced striking, kicking and ultimately knocking Enroth out of his wheelchair. While so engaged, Merrill also dispatched appellant to bring Chamblee, who had remained outside in the car, into the house.

Upon entry, Chamblee, fearing further beating at the hands of Merrill, instead of helping Enroth, likewise joined Merrill in slapping him while screaming and yelling accusations at him. However, shortly afterward she returned to the car outside, and thereafter actually observed none of the subsequent occurrences inside the house.

Meanwhile, while Chamblee was still in the house, appellant had secured a kitchen knife to "guard" Enroth while Merrill proceeded to ransack the house by placing jewelry, a camera, and other valuables into a pillowcase, ostensibly as retribution for the "rape" of Chamblee. Later, after Chamblee left the house, Enroth's guns were also taken. At one point during the course of his looting, Merrill admonished appellant to "slit" Enroth's throat.

When appellant and Merrill later joined Chamblee in the car, they brought with them a trash bag filled with items, such as beverage bottles and cans, that might contain incriminating fingerprints. They, likewise, brought with them the guns and other valuables removed from the Enroth's house. On the return trip to their Hibbing apartment, they disposed of the trash bag. At the apartment, the threesome quickly packed their few belongings into the Toyota and immediately left town heading for Spokane, Washington. Along the way, they sold some of the items filched from the Enroth house to pay expenses of the trip. After arrival in Spokane, some of the remaining loot was stored in the basement of a house occupied by appellant's sister. Appellant divulged to his sister that he and Merrill had had to depart Minnesota in a hurry because they had "beat up a guy" who had raped Chamblee.

Enroth's body was discovered two days after the assault. The physical evidence indicated that he had been stabbed while in his wheelchair which had been tipped over so he was on his back, unclothed, face up, with arms extended outward. Bloodstained pajamas were found nearby on the living room floor. Three knives were missing from knife blocks on the kitchen counter. In the bedroom, the telephone cord appeared to have been forcibly pulled from the wall. Personal items were strewn about Enroth's bedroom. The bedroom safe was found unlocked and empty, as was the gun case in the den.

Chamblee left Merrill and appellant in Spokane and went to Crescent, Oregon where her former boyfriend, the owner of the Toyota, lived. After learning from him that the police had been inquiring about the car, she contacted the Oregon police authorities and, ultimately, gave them a lengthy statement concerning her knowledge of the events leading to the robbing of Enroth and his death. She also told the police where Merrill and appellant could be found in Spokane, Washington. Merrill and appellant were both arrested by Washington authorities the following morning. Following extradition both Merrill and appellant were duly indicted and convicted of first degree murder in Minnesota. ²

1. We proceed first to consider appellant's contention that the trial court should have suppressed a detailed statement elicited from him during custodial interrogation on August 24, 1986, two days after his arrest, and after he had allegedly invoked his constitutional right to counsel.

The chronology of events leading up to the statement begins shortly after appellant's arrest at 6:20 a.m. on August 22. Detective James Lundgren of the Spokane Police Department first attempted to question appellant. Preliminarily, Detective Lundgren questioned appellant concerning a matter unrelated to the Enroth case. The inquiry, however, soon focused on the Minnesota case. Thereupon, appellant, who initially had been read his Miranda warnings and who had waived those rights, immediately stated that if he was a suspect in a murder, he wanted to consult with a lawyer. Even though Lundgren considered appellant's "request" to be equivocal, because appellant merely had opined that maybe he shouldn't say anything further, and that "maybe" he should talk to an attorney, nonetheless, he discontinued the interrogation. However, he took no steps to provide appellant with contact with an attorney nor did he permit appellant to place a telephone call.

Three hours later, and while appellant was still confined in the same interview room at the Spokane jail, he was approached by Detective Ronald Graves, also of the Spokane Police Department, who told appellant that Merrill had revealed most of the story about the Enroth affair. Graves then asked appellant if he wished to tell his side. Appellant likewise told Graves he wanted to make no statement, and that he felt he should consult with an attorney. Detective Graves, as did Lundgren, felt appellant was undecided whether he wanted to counsel with an attorney. But, as had Lundgren, Graves, too, terminated the interview. Again, however, he made no attempt to...