State v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 18 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 31214.,31214.
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lawrence ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 152

146 P.3d 152

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lawrence ROBINSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 31214.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

October 18, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Manweiler, Manweiler, Breen Ball, PLLC, Boise, for appellant. James K. Ball argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.

PERRY, Chief Judge.

Lawrence Robinson appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for release from the sexual offender registration requirements. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In 1986, Robinson pled guilty to forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object. I.C. § 18-6608. The district court entered an order withholding judgment and placed Robinson on probation for ten years. Robinson was required to register as a sexual offender pursuant to the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act (the Registration Act). See I.C. §§ 18-8301 to 18-8326. In 1996, Robinson moved the district court to set aside his guilty plea and dismiss his case, asserting that he had fully complied with the terms of his probation. The district court granted Robinson's request and ordered that Robinson's "plea of guilty ... to the crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object ... shall be set aside and the case dismissed." In 2004, Robinson filed a motion for release from the sexual offender registration requirements. The district court denied Robinson's motion. Robinson appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this case, we must interpret the interaction between the Registration Act and the authority of the courts to dismiss a case following an adjudication of guilt and the entry of an order withholding judgment pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2604(1). This Court exercises free review over the application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999); State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct.App.2000). The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978 P.2d at 219. If the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation. Escobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. Rhode, 133 Idaho at 462, 988 P.2d at 688. To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation, which will not render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App.2001).

III. ANALYSIS

In 1993, the Idaho Legislature adopted the Sexual Offender Registration Act, which required sexual offenders to register with the sheriff of any Idaho county in which the person resided or was temporarily domiciled. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 1. In 1998, the Sexual Offender Registration Act was repealed and the Registration Act was enacted.¹ 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 411, §§ 1-2. For purposes of the Registration Act, an "offender" is an individual who has been convicted of an enumerated sexual offense. See I.C. § 18-8303(8). Forcible penetration by use of a foreign object is an enumerated offense. See I.C. § 18-8304. Like the 1993 Act, the Registration Act requires offenders to register with the sheriff within ten days of coming into any county to establish a residence or temporary domicile. I.C. §§ 18-8304 to 18-8307. Offenders are required to update their registration annually. I.C. § 18-8307(4)(a).² The information received from the offender is forwarded by the county sheriff to a central registry established and maintained by the Idaho State Police. I.C. §§ 18-8303(3), 18-8303(5), 18-8305, 18-8307(3)³.

The provisions of the Registration Act apply to a person who, "[o]n or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of" an enumerated offense. I.C. § 18-8304(1)(a). The Registration Act also applies to a person who "pleads guilty to or has been found guilty [of an enumerated offense] prior to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense ... is under probation ... on or after July 1, 1993." I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d).⁴ Idaho Code Section 18-8304(3) defines conviction to mean "that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment." Thus, the registration requirements are imposed not only upon those who have received a judgment of conviction for one of the enumerated sexual offenses, but also upon those who have been adjudicated guilty and have received an order withholding judgment. See State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 19, 13 P.3d 344, 346 (Ct.App.2000). Because Robinson was on probation in July 1993 for an enumerated offense that he had pled guilty to, he was subject to the Registration Act pursuant to Section 18-8304(1)(d).

Following the completion of Robinson's term of probation, the district court dismissed Robinson's case pursuant to Section 19-2604(1), which provides:

If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on probation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant. .... The final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to his civil rights.

In denying Robinson's motion for release from the sexual offender registration requirements, the district court concluded that dismissal of the underlying criminal case pursuant to Section 19-2604(1) did not excuse Robinson from those requirements and that such release could only be obtained by satisfying the requirements of the Registration Act itself as provided for in I.C. § 18-8310. Section 18-8310(1) states that the following persons may petition for release from the sexual offender registration requirements:

Any person, other than a recidivist, an offender who has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent sexual predator, may, after a period of ten (10) years from the date the person was released from incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is greater, petition the district court for a show cause hearing to determine whether the person shall be exempted from the duty to register as a sexual offender.

The crime of forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object is an aggravated offense. I.C. § 18-8303(1). Therefore, Robinson is precluded under Section 18-8310 from obtaining release from the registration requirements, regardless of how much time elapses from the date he was placed on probation.

In Perkins, the defendant pled guilty to an enumerated sexual offense prior to 1993. The district court entered an order withholding judgment and placed the defendant on probation. Thus, the defendant was required to register as a sexual offender. In 1994, the district court ordered that the withheld judgment be dismissed. Thereafter, the district court granted the defendant's motion for exemption from the registration requirements and ordered that his name be removed from the central registry. On appeal, this Court reversed the district court's order, holding that the defendant remained subject to the Registration Act, including the provisions found in Section 18-8310, notwithstanding the district court's order of dismissal. Perkins, 135 Idaho at 21-22, 13 P.3d at 348-49.

Here, Robinson does not contest that he is precluded from release under Section 18-8310. Instead, Robinson asserts that the district court erred in applying the definition of conviction found in Section 18-8304(3) to his case. Robinson also asserts that, because the district court set aside his guilty plea in addition to dismissing his case, he is no longer a person who has pled guilty and, thus, is no longer subject to the Registration Act.

A. Statutory Definition of Conviction

After a person has been found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty in a criminal case, I.C. § 19-2601(3) authorizes a court to withhold judgment in lieu of entering a judgment of conviction. See also Perkins, 135 Idaho at 20, 13 P.3d at 347. The Section 18-8304(3) definition of conviction applies to a person who has pled guilty and received an order withholding judgment. Perkins, 135 Idaho at 19, 13 P.3d at 346. In Perkins, this Court reasoned that, by providing this definition of conviction and by restricting the opportunity for release from registration in Section 18-8310, the legislature limited the effect of a Section 19-2604(1) dismissal. Perkins, 135 Idaho at 21, 13 P.3d at 348. Robinson nevertheless contends that this limitation does not apply to him because the Section 18-8304(3) definition of conviction is relevant to Section 18-8304(1)(a), which applies to a person who "is convicted" of an enumerated offense on or after July 1, 1993, whereas his case falls under Section 18-8304(1)(d), which applies to a person who "pleads guilty or has been found guilty" prior to July 1, 1993....