State v. Rodrigues

• Decision Date: 08 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 8865,8865
• Citation: 67 Haw. 70,679 P.2d 615
• Parties: STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rodrigo RODRIGUES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 615

679 P.2d 615

67 Haw. 70

STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rodrigo RODRIGUES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 8865.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

March 8, 1984.

Reconsideration Denied March 23, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A defendant is presumed sane in every criminal case but the burden of proof may shift to the State to prove the defendant sane beyond a reasonable doubt if evidence rebuts the presumption.

2. The law adjudges criminal liability according to a person's state of mind at the time of an act. Courts will not begin to parcel criminal accountability out among various inhabitants of a mind in cases of multiple personalities. The person will be held criminally responsible for his acts if the personality in control at the time of the offense was sane.

3. The court must exercise discretion when determining whether the testimony of an expert witness is admissible and the decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion was clearly abused.

4. Neither the court nor the jury are bound by testimony of experts as to sanity or mental state of an accused since they are entitled to make their own assessment of the expert's opinion.

5. The issue of sanity is a question for the jury where the jury might fairly have or not have a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity. In such a case a motion for judgment of acquittal should be denied.

6. Jeopardy does not attach at pretrial proceedings where defendant is not subjected to the hazards of trial and the possibility of conviction, thus, a review of a lower court decision acquitting defendant at such a proceeding does not place defendant in double jeopardy.

Arthur E. Ross, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu (Ernest J. Freitas, Jr., Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, on the reply brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

John S. Edmunds, Honolulu (Ronald J. Verga, with him on the brief; John S. Edmunds, A Law Corporation, Honolulu, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.

HAYASHI, Justice.

This is an appeal by the State of Hawaii from a judgment of acquittal granted by Judge Huddy under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 704-408. Appellant claims, and we agree, that there was sufficient evidence presented so as to require the judge to present the issue of sanity to the jury. ¹ We also decide that a defense of multiple personality syndrome (MPS) does not per se require a finding of acquittal.

Defendant was indicted on November 20, 1979, on three counts of sodomy in the first degree (HRS § 707-733(1)(a)(i)) and one count of rape in the first degree (HRS § 707-730(1)(a)(i)). His victims were all young girls, whom he would lure into secluded areas. He filed a notice of intention to rely on the defense of mental disease, disorder or defect under HRS § 704-404(1) on March 12, 1980. Defendant had previously been examined by Vadim P. Kondratief, M.D. in California, who referred defendant to Bernauer W. Newton, Ph.D., also in California, both of whom testified for the defense.

On March 17, 1980, the court pursuant to HRS § 704-404(2), ordered further mental examination of the defendant to be performed by three court appointed psychiatrists; Drs. Creighton U. Mattoon, Emily Khaw and Gene Altman.

On October 16, 1980, the defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal. Hearings on that motion and a motion for closure of the hearings were held intermittently beginning December 1, 1980. On December 2, the court consolidated the hearing on the motion for acquittal with a motion for determination of fitness to proceed.

On January 9, 1981, the judge found defendant unable to assist in his defense, and pursuant to HRS § 704-406 suspended the proceedings, deferring the matter of acquittal.

For the next year and a half, State psychiatrist Dr. Morgan treated defendant at Kaneohe, Hawaii State Hospital, and on June 25, 1982, the defendant was brought back into court. The defendant was presented as fit to proceed, so the court renewed hearings on the motion for the judgment of acquittal. On August 27, 1982, the judge granted the motion, and this appeal followed.

I.

In every criminal case there exists a presumption that a defendant is sane. This presumption can be overcome by evidence to the contrary, and then the State has the burden of proving a defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Valentine, 1 Haw.App. 1, 612 P.2d 117 (1980).

The defendant in the case at hand introduced testimony from five psychiatrists to rebut the presumption of sanity. There was no contention that this was not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifted to the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was sane at the time of the offenses.

The testimony introduced by the defense addressed the fact that under HRS § 704-408, a defendant will be relieved of criminal responsibility if at the time of the alleged conduct the defendant suffered from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which substantially impaired his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. In support of his motion for acquittal, the defendant raised the defense that at the time of the offense he was suffering from multiple personality syndrome, which should exclude his responsibility for his actions.

Multiple personality syndrome (MPS) is a disorder where there are within one individual, two or more distinct personalities, each of which is dominant at a particular time. Each individual personality is complex and integrated with its own behavior pattern and the personality that is dominant at any particular time determines the individual's behavior. Often there is amnesia on the part of one personality for the existence of the other. ²

The defense of MPS was raised in connection with HRS § 704-408 because one personality often cannot control the actions of another personality. This disorder is extremely rare, and has recently come to the attention of several courts. The trend in these courts is toward examining the sanity of each personality presented in an individual, or at least the personality which allegedly committed the offense.

The law adjudges criminal liability of the person according to the person's state of mind at the time of the act; we will not begin to parcel criminal accountability out among the various inhabitants of the mind.

Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga.App. 478, 304 S.E.2d 561 at 564 (1983). Recent cases dealing with the multiple personality defense have held that it is immaterial whether the defendant was in one state of consciousness or another, so long as in the personality then controlling the behavior, the defendant was conscious and his or her actions were a product of his or her own volition. State v. Darnall, 47 Or.App. 161, 614 P.2d 120 (1980); State v. Grimsley, 3 Ohio App.3d 265, 444 N.E.2d 1071 (1982); and Kirkland, supra.

The cases dealing with MPS can be examined in a similar fashion as other defenses of insanity. If a lunatic has lucid intervals of understanding he shall answer for what he does in those intervals as if he had no deficiency. The law governs criminal accountability where at the time of the wrongful act the person had the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Since each personality may or may not be criminally responsible for its acts, each one must be examined under the American Law Institute (ALI)-Model Penal Code (MPC) competency test. See State v. Nuetzel, 61 Haw. 531, 606 P.2d 920 (1980); and Kirkland, supra.

II.

Before we examine the testimony relating to the competency of the alleged personalities of the defendant elicited from the psychiatrists, we must address defendant's claim that the court erred in not striking the testimony of one of the psychiatrists, Dr. Khaw.

Generally, in determining whether the conclusions or opinions of an expert witness are admissible, the court must exercise a large measure of discretion with which an appellate court is reluctant to interfere unless that discretion has been manifestly abused to the prejudice of the complaining party. State v. Torres, 60 Haw. 271, 589 P.2d 83 (1978); 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 3. The determination of qualification is in the first instance for the court, and is discretionary. But qualifications also go to weight, and Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 702.1, expressly provides for cross-examination on this subject. See, State v. Okura, 56 Haw. 455, 541 P.2d 9 (1975).

The standard of review therefore, is whether the court abused its discretion in failing to strike the testimony. Defendant argues, and we agree, that the qualifications and methodology of the doctor had been seriously called into question, and we also agree that the trial court gave little, if any weight to Dr. Khaw's testimony.

Court: I'll find her qualified as a psychiatrist, and in that capacity, with expertise to render diagnosis and treatment of people who may or may not be affected with a mendal [sic] disorder, which includes multiple personality. But it's always for the trier of fact to weigh and evaluate the opinion of any expert, and the trier of fact may accept or reject it. So the question is again to the weight and effect for trier of fact to give to the testimony.

Tr. 1/6/81 at 49. But we disagree with defendant's contention that:

[h]ad defendant's motion (to strike Dr. Khaw's testimony) been granted, the court below would have been entirely without any evidence or inferences required to be drawn therefrom pursuant to State v. Freitas, supra, and State v. Summers, supra, other than the exensive [sic] evidence of insanity and lack of penal responsibility adduced by defendant. On that state of the record, the judgment of acquittal below would have been compelled.

Defendant's Answering Brief at 30. Defendant has failed to show a clear...